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This thesis entitled “From ‘Sacred’ to ‘Secular’? The Hermeneutical Future of 
Religion in the Thought of Gianni Vattimo and Charles Taylor” aims at a 
deconstructive analysis of religion and secularism in order to explore both its 
postmodern and post-secular implications. It suggests that Vattimo and Taylor’s 
philosophies of religion and secularism exemplify the key features of a defining feature 
of the post-modern world. Their discussion of ‘an emergent religious and cultural 
sensibility’ implies a post-modern, post-secular and hermeneutical re-affirmation of 
religion. Vattimo’s philosophy is presented as emerging from its own axiom of “weak 
thought” which is itself a secularising principle. By way of contrast, Taylor’s reflection 
on the foundation of secularity is delivered in four segments: 1) an historical approach 
to his concept of secularism, 2) his attempt at overcoming epistemology and its 
implications for understanding secularism, 3) a re-appraisal of his philosophical 
sources of secularity, and 4) the development of the concept of secularity 
commensurable with embracing a non-religious notion of religion.  
The thesis entails a comparative and dialogical exchange between Vattimo and Taylor 
concerning their understanding of a post-secular engagement with religion. The thesis 
proposes that their dialogical engagement with secularism and religion articulates: 1) 
a process of hermeneutical reflexive re-evaluation, 2) a way of re-evaluating 
transcendentalism, and 3) a re-worked non-metaphysical notion of transcendence. In 
addition, this thesis suggests that their dialectical discourse on religion exploits the 
inexhaustible nature of religion, and its capacity to be more than itself. I shall argue 
that the philosophical outcome of their hermeneutical deconstruction of both religion 
and modern secularism (the two are intimately allied) will be presented as: 1) the 
development of a non-religious conception of religion, 2) a retrieved religion of being-
for-the-other, 3) the precedence of charity over truth, and 4) an understanding of the 
transition from sacred to secular as a hermeneutical process of both ‘an exodus’ and ‘a 
transition’. This thesis offers a hermeneutical deconstruction of  the‘return of religion’. 
In so doing, it both engages and unfolds aspects of an ongoing philosophical and 
hermeneutical tradition. Although located primarily in the continental tradition of 
thought, the thesis is also concerned with responding to articulations of secular and 
religious dichotomies in other traditions in order to invigorate the re-thinking of 






“Hermeneutically speaking, there is always a ‘beyond’ to interpretation, that is, 
more interpretation. This is the principle of hermeneutic excess: no interpretation 
will exhaust the possible determinations of meaning within its chosen target subject-
matter: there is always more to be said.” Nicholas Davey1 
 
This thesis entitled “From ‘Sacred’ to ‘Secular’? The Hermeneutical Future of 
Religion in the Thought of Gianni Vattimo and Charles Taylor” aims at a 
deconstructive analysis of religion and secularism and considers its postmodern and 
post-secular implications. It suggests that Vattimo and Taylor’s philosophy of religion 
and secularism are a defining feature of the post-modern world. ‘Post-secular’, and 
‘post-modern’ in this context, suggest a transient condition or perspective which is the 
effect of or subsequent to the secular and the modern. In classical Western 
philosophical terms my thesis can be compared to ‘the dark night of the soul’ which 
articulates the most fundamental and problematic relationship between the individual 
self and the transcendent reality. This reality is discussed both in classical and 
contemporary philosophical terms and in relation to environmental concerns. Both 
Vattimo and Taylor address this particular philosophical thought in their own diverse 
ways, dialectic (Vattimo) or historical (Taylor). Their hermeneutics regarding re-
articulation of problems of faith and skepticism lead to the affirmation of 
transformational relationships and post-modern re-engagement of religion.  
The basic questions addressed are: (1) does the secularism of Vattimo and Taylor open 
the possibility of a new non-metaphysical re-orientation towards transcendence and 
any associated ethics? (2) Is the emergence of modern secularism incompatible with 
                                                          
1 Nicholas Davey, “Praxis and the Impossibility of Hermeneutics? Reflections on Vattimo’s Beyond 
Interpretation and “The Future of Hermeneutics””, in Trόpos: Rivisita Di Ermeneutia E Critica Filosofica 




an orientation towards transcendence and religious diversity? (3) Does modern 
secularism spell the death of conventional religion and ethics? 
Vattimo and Taylor elucidate these questions in deep and profound ways. This thesis 
will both explore and compare the detailed analysis both thinkers undertake with 
regard to the philosophical and ethical emergence of modern secularism and how it 
leads to a hermeneutical re-engagement with the sacred. In exploring the 
consequences, I refer to Vattimo’s proactive thinking with regard to Nietzsche’s ‘death 
of God’. This argument does not imply the negation of religious orientation but 
establishes through consequent secularism a new transformational religious 
experience. Taylor attempts to show historical evolution of the death of God that 
neither exhausts religious consciousness nor negates it, but offers a new direction to 
its appearance in post-modernity. My thesis attempts to argue that the historical and 
cultural critique of Christianity in its traditional idioms is a necessary route to its 
resurrection, but not as a return to an original form. Vattimo and Taylor create the 
conceptual space in which a new articulation of religious and Christian thinking can 
be undertaken. This space enables me to create a further development of secular 
thinking through my existential commitment to non-religious religion, a religion of 
being for the other and to charity taking precedence over truth. My position derives 
not only from Vattimo and Taylor’s re-evaluation of secularism but also from the 
questions they raise. 
I utilize two axioms to discuss the hermeneutics of ‘secularism’ and ‘religion’. (1) ‘The 
principle of hermeneutic excess’, whereby no interpretation will exhaust the possible 
determinations of meaning within a chosen target subject matter, and (2) the principle 
of ‘the language turn’.2 As we shall see, Nietzsche’s negation of God as the subject of 
apophantic statements unwittingly relocates the question of God within the aletheic 
function of language.   
Religion as a social, philosophical, and hermeneutical category is central to Western 
consciousness. The dichotomous relationship between science and religion led 
Western culture into conflicting conceptual frameworks. Accordingly, religion’s role 
                                                          
2 Nicholas Davey, Excerpts from a Seminar, Hermeneutica Scotia, Dundee: University of Dundee, 2015. 
“Language turn” also is knows as ‘linguistic turn’. “Gadamer (following Heidegger) referred to it saying 
that being which can be understood is language, and what Derrida meant when he said there is nothing 
outside the textual systems we rely upon to make sense” (John D. Caputo, Hermeneutics: Facts and 
Interpretation in the Age of Information, Milton Keynes: Pelican Books, 2018, p. 146).  
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as a structural and institutional authority was challenged and weakened by science’s 
questioning of the transcendent. The Enlightenment privileging of reason and its 
discrediting of metaphysics prompted philosophical theories such as positivist 
scientism, atheistic rationalism, Hegelianism and Marxist historicism. Nietzsche’s 
‘death of God’ and Heideggerian ‘post-metaphysics’ mounted a counter-
Enlightenment enabling a new form of religious consciousness and practice. An 
unprecedented rebirth of religion became possible precisely because of the death of 
God, and the secularisation of the sacred. A hermeneutic of ‘the return of religion’ 
came to challenge the legacy of both the Enlightenment and modernity. “Neither 
secular modernity nor the decline of religious practice signalled the death knell for 
faith or belief; on the contrary, faith would always continue in a new social, cultural, 
linguistic, and philosophical context outside the orthodox religious pale and be subject 
to new and unprecedented influences.”3 In post-secular and post-modern culture, faith 
and religion continues to exist because of the key paradigm shift mentioned above.  
By examining the key arguments of Vattimo and Taylor, this research unveils the 
inexhaustible continuity, the hermeneutical possibility, and rich implications of the 
language turn for the interpretation of religion. The return of religion, and re-engaging 
with the sacred are events which renew the possibility of religious experience. 
Returned religion opens new semantic possibilities for terms such as community, faith, 
love, and God. Religion becomes a hermeneutical post-secularity realised as a 
happening (an event) of truth, and thus as a transformative practice.  
Vattimo’s theory of secularisation offers a post-modern revaluation of religion in post-
metaphysical terms. His hermeneutical philosophy of ‘weak thought’ articulates a 
process of transition, weakening, overcoming, and beginning anew. Both ‘the end of 
metaphysics’ in Heidegger and ‘the death of God’ argument in Nietzsche form the 
background against which Vattimo develops his postmodern critique of religion and 
secularism. The story of weakening is essentially kenotic: a mirroring of the emptying 
of God the Father into his Son. For Vattimo, religion comes to its truth via acts of 
internal self-destruction/transcendence (or in Nietzsche’s terms the ‘will to truth’ 
undoing itself). Vattimo’s re-evaluation utilises both Heidegger’s notion of 
Verwindung (‘Being’ as an event), and the kenotic dynamic in Christian thought, which 
                                                          
3 Enda McCaffrey, The Return of Religion in France: From Democratisation to Postmetaphyscis, 
Nottingham: Nottingham Trent University, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 82.   
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dissolves itself in the form of caritas. Christian love and truth as ‘event’ are 
characterised by the reduction of metaphysical and sacral violence, and the weakening 
of strong structures. This historiographical knowledge of ‘weak thought’ is the result 
of the hermeneutical and emancipatory interaction between ‘Being’, language, and 
culture. Every act of knowledge is multi-dimensional: it is ontological, linguistic and 
cultural. Each unmasks the traditional structures of power and weakens them. Power 
moves from God to the religious community. The deconstruction of Western 
philosophy is therefore seen as a post-modern defence of Christianity in a secularised 
form. The key philosophical figure of thought here is the self-destructive and self-
transcending principle of caritas, the principle which underwrites the continuous 
transformation of the Christian/philosophical tradition.  
Taylor’s work represents not so much of a revaluation of religion, but its continuing 
historical evolution. It points to a suggestive rethinking of the relationship between 
religion and secularity. In his essay “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of 
Secularism” he states, “we have a wrong model, which has a continuing hold on our 
minds. We think that secularism (or laicite) has to do with the relation of the state and 
religion; whereas in fact it has to do with the (correct) response of the democratic state 
to diversity.”4 He claims that there is a need for a radical redefinition of secularism. 
His contribution to the formation of the modern-secular-self and tracing the genealogy 
of secularisation, is at the core of my research. 
With the help of Taylor’s philosophy, this thesis attempts to re-think and re-invent the 
way we think and imagine ‘belief’ and ‘religious experience’. His theory of the 
overcoming (Verwindung) of traditional epistemology by ‘ontologising the 
disengaged’ by retrospective analysis is an attempt to trace and re-animate and extend 
the sources of secularity. He uses traditional epistemological claims in a deconstructive 
way. Taylor refers to these as a ‘closed world structure’. He reflexively posits a notion 
of ‘the self’ that undergoes an irreversible process of development culminating in the 
formation of ‘the secular self’. The self evolves and eventually leads to a shift from 
the enchanted (porous) to the disenchanted (buffered) sense. For Taylor, the 
Reformation provides the key to the historical moment concerning the formation of 
                                                          
4 Charles Taylor, Jϋrgen Habermas, Judith Butler and Cornel West, The Power of Religion in the Public 
Sphere, eds., Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2011, p. 36. 
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‘the buffered self’. He sees the ‘immanent frame’ that operates within a disenchanted 
world as logically unavoidable, and as underpinning the power of the mainstream 
secularisation theory. Within this frame, each human is charged with finding his or her 
own way of being human (Nova Effect), and their own spiritual path. Thus, Taylor 
visualises the possibility of a ‘a leap of faith’ and ‘conversion’ within the ‘immanent 
frame’ which in itself is poised between closure and openness to transcendence. As we 
shall see, Taylor’s most important achievement is not to negate transcendence but to 
explain the possibility of the transcendent in terms of a hermeneutic of ‘secularity’. 
Both Vattimo and Taylor propose that secular modernity is the result of religion, “but 
that religion has remained vital and unsurpassable, unassimilable, because our 
foundational concept of ‘the self’ has been made possible by (secularisation of) 
religion and in turn produces religious diversity. Or, in other words, by becoming 
secular, we also produce ever more diverse forms of experiencing religion....”5 
Accordingly it can be stated that both Vattimo and Taylor’s deconstructive 
hermeneutics of religion leads to a ‘never-having-gone-away-character of religion’ 
which is itself the basis of post-secular age religious experience. Thus, Vattimo and 
Taylor show how the hermeneutics of interpretation has changed reality not by 
rejecting metaphysical and epistemological claims to certainty and truth but by 
demonstrating how their hermeneutics of Verwindung/secularisation/kenosis recovers 
the possibility of religious experience. Whereas, the recent revival of religion has been 
exhibited more in fundamentalist movements, and ethno-religious conflicts, the return 
of religion in contemporary philosophy is characterised at its core by a deep tolerance 
for difference and otherness.  
Their dialectical conception of secularity and religion entails: 1) a process of reflexive 
re-evaluation, 2) a re-evaluation of transcendentalism, and 3) a retrieval of the notion 
of transcendence. In addition, their dialectical discourse on religion exploits the 
inexhaustible nature of religion, and its capacity to always be more than itself. In 
summary, this thesis defends the following: (1) thinking through the logic of secularity 
creates the conditions through which contemporary secularity be conceptualised and 
                                                          
5 Eduardo Mendieta, “Spiritual Politics and Post-Secular Authenticity: Foucault and Habermas on Post-
Metaphysical Religion”, in The Post-Secular in Question: Religion in Contemporary Society, eds., Philip 
S. Gorski, David Kyuman Kim, John Torpey, and Jonathan VanAntwerpen, New York: New York 




can be transformed into new nuances through the secular narratives of Vattimo and 
Taylor. (2) Modern secularism gives rise to charity and is not incommensurable with 
transcendence but articulates it as a way of being open to the other. To this end, the 
thesis is divided in to Four Parts consisting of Eight Chapters. 
Part One Chapters One and Two outline: 1) the field of this research, its context, its 
scope and method, and the questions addressed, and 2) definitions of the concepts of 
‘religion’ and ‘secularism’.  
Part Two Chapters Three and Four present Vattimo’s philosophy of ‘weak thought’, 
and ‘secularisation’. 1) ‘Weak thought’ breaks down and overcomes the barriers of 
metaphysical and dogmatic objectivism (Verwindung). 2) Vattimo’s concept of 
‘secularisation’ entails something more than the mere dissolution of the sacred. Rather, 
secularisation is a path retraced in reverse; a progress strived for, a process of kenosis, 
a realisation of the kenotic-charity.  
Part Three Chapters Five and Six elucidate Taylor’s reflection on the ‘formation of 
modern secular self’ and ‘secularityiii.6 These are surveyed in four segments: 1) the 
background to Charles Taylor’s concept of secularism, 2) his attempt at overcoming 
epistemology, 3) a re-appraisal of the sources of secularity, and 4) the development of 
‘secularityiii’. Taylor regards all four as a unified philosophical project. 
Part Four Chapters Seven and Eight include, 1) both a comparative and dialogical 
exchange between Vattimo and Taylor, 2) reflections on how Vattimo and Taylor 
improve and advance on each other’s positions, and finally 3) a review of the four 
leading arguments of the thesis. They are, 1) the re-engagement of religion in order to 
envision a non-religious religion, 2) ‘the self’s’ realization of inevitable being-for-the-
other, 3) Dogmatic conditions are replaced by charity taking precedence over truth. 4) 
The eventual prompting of a hermeneutic return of religion (from ‘sacred’ to ‘secular’) 




                                                          
6 Secularityiii stands for Taylor’s unique interpretation of ‘secularity’ explained in Chapter Two. 
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PART – I  
 
FIELD OF RESEARCH AND CENTRAL CONCEPTS 
 
Introduction 
The interrelated concepts of ‘religion’ and ‘the secular’ are increasingly prominent in 
philosophical discourse. The separation of the sacred and the secular as an epistemic 
and ontological dichotomy no longer holds philosophical currency. Religion’s 
reassigned place and renewed function in the public domain reveals a general logic 
that re-imagines religion’s discursive function. ‘Religion’ itself shifts relative to both 
a change of paradigms and historical events set in motion by secularism.  
The re-imagined place of the divine, and the return of religion today leave one with 
neither a strong philosophical reason for atheism, nor with reason to dismiss religion 
as an evil. Accordingly, there are developing trends in contemporary philosophy which 
define and attempt a hermeneutical effort to re-imagine and recover the place of 
religion in society. Vattimo and Taylor’s7 exceptional philosophy of secularism sets in 
motion a hermeneutics of Verwindung which elucidates secularism not as the end of 
Christianity, not as a total church-state separation, and not as the complete retreat of 
religion from the public sphere, but as the latest expression of Christian religion itself. 
Vattimo and Taylor thus set the scene for a greater understanding of ‘the post secular’ 
and the ‘return of religion’.  Vattimo suggests ‘a third way’ (which he calls ‘weak 
thought’) “contrary to the heavily metaphysical framework beneath the problem of 
                                                          
7 Along with Gianni Vattimo and Charles Taylor, those who currently argue for this approach include 
Rowan Williams, John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, Richard Kearney, Jens Zimmerman, and John 
Caputo. Rowan Williams envisions a transformational non-dogmatic faith that can capture the social, 
and imaginative world. Milbank attempts to recover an authentic and rational union of theology and 
philosophy, so that human beings can rediscover a vital, mysterious, and productive theological 
relationship to both God and the world. It reverses the decline of Christianity in public life by restoring 
the intellectual legitimacy of Christian theology over secularism. For Catherine Pickstock, “God exists 
by eternally expressing himself, and that even the simple and identically self-repeating non-identically 
repeats itself ad infinitum in the Logos (since the repeated divine unity is infinite”)”. (Catherine 
Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 196.) Richard Kearney 
makes an “anatheist” attempt to re-imagine the sacred. Jens Zimmermann’s philosophical 
hermeneutics and existential phenomenology argues for a religiously based humanism as a common 
ground between secular and religious thought. John Caputo’s ‘theo-poetics’ and ‘radical 
hermeneutics’ re-make God through imagination. 
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beginnings (first principle of Being), and contrary to a historicist metaphysics (in 
Hegel’s sense- Being not as first principle, but as process).”8 Taylor in turn proposes 
a new sense of what is meant by the historical and genealogical shift to secularity in 
the modern West. 
This thesis explores not only the deconstructive analysis of the concepts of the secular 
and religious, but also the ‘post-secular’ implications of the hermeneutic of 
Verwindung of both metaphysics (Vattimo) and epistemology (Taylor). For Vattimo, 
‘the post-secular re-imagining of religion’ made possible by the hermeneutic of 
Verwindung is a participatory process in the fate of being and religious ontology. 
However, for Taylor, this ‘post-secular re-imagining’ is a phenomenon in which the 
individual self undergoes an historical evolution culminating in the ‘secular self’. It 
also involves a revaluation of assumptions regarding ‘the secular’. The Verwindung of 
Vattimo and Taylor seeks a new way of conceiving the relationship between religion 
and the secular.  
In Chapter One, a systematic and logical clarification of ‘the Field of Research’ is 
provided.  This concerns, 1) the context surrounding ‘the title’ of the thesis, 2) the 
important ‘problems’ prevalent in the philosophical and political circles concerning 
both the return of religion and the post-secular, 3) the philosophical method used, 4) 
the scope and objective of the research, and 5) the principal research questions this 
thesis addresses. The historical relevance of the concepts of religion and the secular 
are explained in Chapter Two in the context of Vattimo and Taylor’s hermeneutics of 
secularism and religion. Special emphasis is given to the re-engagement of religion in 
Europe following the Enlightenment. Finally, special emphasis is given to the concept 
of ‘secularism’ in Vattimo and Taylor, which suggest the possibility of the emergence 






                                                          
8 Gianni Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought”, in Weak Thought, Gianni Vattimo and Pier 





 FIELD OF RESEARCH 
 
1.1 Field of Research 
One of the fundamental means of human self-expression is religion. Religion has 
undergone diverse genealogical and phenomenological changes and has generated a 
host of philosophical and sociological reflections. The Enlightenment critique of 
religion has induced a paradigm shift in how the presence of religion is imagined. As 
Charles Taylor observes that belief was unavoidable until the 1500’s, whereas today 
religion has become one option among many others. Modernisation, rationalisation 
and functional differentiation has led religion to retreat from the spheres of institutional 
social life, with a growing disenchantment and, eventually, to the demise of religion 
itself.9 
Consequent to the disenchantment and disappearance of religion from the ‘public 
sphere,’ a new philosophical, social, and political hermeneutic concerning ‘the secular’ 
arose in modernity. The secular emerges as an ontological category serving the 
spiritual, the metaphysical, and the sacred in ‘this world’. Following the 
Enlightenment, Counter-Enlightenment thinkers and deconstructive thinkers tend to 
find ‘secularism’ and ‘secularisation’ progressive. In the development of post-modern 
and post-secular thought, “secularisation is understood as an increasingly complex 
plurality of belief, unbelief, and suspension between the two, along with other creedal 
commitments.”10 Religion in post-secular culture is increasingly publicly manifested, 
propelled by global media, economic markets and foreign policies.11  
                                                          
9 The principal attempt that Taylor makes in his A Secular Age is to challenge this account of religion 
in the West.   
10 Michael Rectenwald, “Mid-Nineteenth-Century British Secularism and its Contemporary Post-
Secular Implications”, in Global Secularisms in a Post-Secular Age, eds., Michael Rectenwald, Rochelle 
Almeida, and George Levine, Boston: Walter de Gruyter Inc., 2015, pp. 43-64.  
11 Examples for ‘religion in post-secular’ culture can be, 1) different flourishing church communities in 
the USA, 2) many ethnic religious groups migrating to European countries and forming new 
communities that change the countries’ demographic and cultural compositions, and 3) the traditional 
Muslim communities worldwide.  
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Accordingly, religion and secularism have become the subject of wide-ranging 
scholarship. The new interest in religion and public life, has provoked a critical 
response in academic and public debate. ‘The secular’ is no longer seen as an enemy 
of religion, but as the very essence of religion. Vattimo and Taylor explain ‘the secular’ 
as rooted within each religion, particularly Judeo-Christianity. The thesis will explore 
the hermeneutic promise of religiousness inherent in ‘the secular’. The mutual 
entailment of the secular and religion offers a paradigm in which religion is neither 
merely private, nor purely irrational. This is not a negative approach but involves an 
historical and nihilistic re-evaluation of traditional religious metaphysics.  
 
1.2 Thesis, Problems, Methodology and Objectives 
Thesis: This project, entitled “From ‘Sacred’ to ‘Secular’? The Hermeneutical Future 
of Religion in the Thought of Gianni Vattimo and Charles Taylor” aims at a 
deconstructive analysis of religion and secularism, and an explication of its post-
secular implications. This thesis suggests that Vattimo’s theory of secularisation 
involves a paradoxical return to religion. This is a ‘qualified return’, and very much 
the outcome of Heidegger’s ‘the end of metaphysics’ argument and Nietzsche’s ‘death 
of God’. Secondly, my research proposes the need for a radical redefinition of 
secularism. Taylor argues in A Secular Age: “in any case, we are just at the beginning 
of a new age of religious searching whose outcome one cannot foresee” (SA, 534)12. 
Analysing Taylor’s argument, this research maintains that a new form of religious 
sensitivity may have emerged in our time. This research culminates in the proposal 
that a new way of being religious is possible.  
The integration of the secular and religious within a public sphere can pose diverse 
existential and ontological problems to the post-modern self. The following will be 
discussed.  
Problems: 1) Post-secularism involves the paradox of being religious and yet not 
being religious, being secular and yet not being secular. If this can be so, does religion 
                                                          
12 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, Harvard: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 
534. Hereafter, this text will be cited as SA with corresponding page number.  
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once again take precedence over science and reason? Is humanity put under the spell 
of modernity itself? 
2) Some thinkers suggest that “while religion seemed to be an ailing patient in the 
backwoods of historical development and evolution, it was in fact engaged in a 
worldwide revival     tour.”13Does the resurgence of religion point to de-secularisation? 
Does the post-secular return subvert the conventional narratives of both the ‘decline’ 
and the ‘privatisation’ of religion? 
3) Understanding what religion entails grasping its historical context and observing its 
consequences in ethical and socio-political life. Is religious revival progressive? If so, 
does the return of religion compromise its position in a secular state?  
4) Does Vattimo and Taylor’s philosophical celebration of historical genealogy do 
justice to a post-secular appropriation of religion? What is the ‘hinge’ or ‘the central 
epochal event’ that sets-in motion the recursive and circular movement of religion 
towards the secular? 
 5) Are the Reformation and the Enlightenment the only historical, philosophical and 
genealogical epochs that set-in motion the secular movement? What is the significant 
role that changing ‘social imaginaries’ play in this transformative evolution? 
6) This research considers whether Vattimo’s concept of caritas can bridge the 
opposition between religious and political fanaticism? Does caritas lead everyone to 
be a ‘weak thinker’ who participates in the very contingency and ‘throw-ness’ of one’s 
own being, and able to recognise the ‘otherness’ of the ‘other?’  
7) The principal aim of this thesis is to attempt a convalescing, a re-reading, re-
interpretation and deconstruction of the problems raised regarding religion and the 
secular in the West. The answers to these questions are of paramount importance to 
the humanities. The outcome of this research suggests how academies might advance 
research to the end of transcending the hermeneutic of the secular-religious dichotomy. 
This would have the advantage of informing environmental policy making, healthy 
international relations, and the persistent issue of race and gender inequality. 
                                                          
13 Philip S. Gorski, David Kyuman Kim, John Tropey and Jonathan VanAntwerpen, “The Post-secular in 
Question”, in The Post-secular in Question: Religion in the Contemporary Society, eds., New York and 
London: The Society of Research Council and New York University Press, 2012, pp. 1-22. 
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Methodology: The principal method used in this research entails a mode of 
hermeneutic deconstruction which attempts to re-construct the secular and the 
religious. The re-evaluation of the secular and religious is not concerned with 
calculating any increase or decrease in the number (of believers) but with a form of 
hermeneutical restructuring where the secular as a category invokes the return of 
another category: the religious, without either being annihilated or over emphasised.  
This deconstructive revaluation of ‘religion’ differs from conventional understanding 
of religious truth claims. The difference lies between epistemological claims to truth, 
and hermeneutical and evidential claims to truth and God. An epistemological proof 
of religious truth is beyond formulation but it can ‘truthfully’ be offered. This research 
does not make epistemological and metaphysical claims to truth, but offers a 
hermeneutical re-construction of the inter-relationship between religion and 
secularism.  
Secondly, an historical method is used to approach the possible meaning of the 
concepts of ‘religion’ and ‘secularism’. The method focuses on analysing ‘secular self’ 
that evolves historically. It is not based on a descriptive what, nor on a chronological 
description of when and where, but highlights the analytical study of the unfolding 
story of secularism and religion concomitantly shapes post-secular culture. The 
research invokes a post-secular culture where religion and the secular are not 
dichotomous divergent dichotomy. This interpretive method allows us to consider 
possible future outcomes of the principal questions under discussion. 
Thirdly, this work is not a comparative study between Vattimo and Taylor. The 
comparison of their thought is used as a tool to unearth the possible post-secular 
implications of the secular and religious. A dialogical exchange between them is 
attempted to suggest how each position might develop the other. The scope of this 
research is mostly limited to Western and American models of religion and secularism. 
However, references to other secular projects are included.  
Finally, the basic data source consists in the primary works of Vattimo and Taylor. 
Chapters Three to Six form an in-depth analytical study of their conception of the 
secular and religious as post-modern and post-secular categories. However, to contest 
and contrast the views of Vattimo and Taylor, the thinking of Rowan Williams, 
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Richard Kearney, John Milbank, John D. Smith, with occasional references to Rajeev 
Bhargava, José Casanova, and Talal Asad are also introduced.  
Objectives: 1) The hermeneutical, and existential objective of this research for 
contemporary society is the philosophical and ontological appropriation of the claim 
that “True Being never is, but sets itself on the path and sends itself, it trans-mits 
itself.”14 As Catherine Pickstock observes, the eternal God exists through his 
repetition, and repeats himself ad infinitum in the Logos.15 Therefore, the hermeneutic 
of Vattimo suggests that ‘Being’ is an ‘event’ which occurs, repeats, and appropriates 
to itself the dynamic of language and culture. ‘Being’ itself involves the process of 
transformation that leads to further transformations unendingly.  
2) Vattimo and Taylor explain the secularisation of religion as a self-critical process, 
not as something static but as something evolving through stages of reflective self-re-
appraisal. The proposed return of religion epistemically leads the believer through a 
self-critical process, where one finds oneself (1) in the ‘immanent frame’ and 
experiences the possibility of conversion and (2) discovers one’s own religious 
experience in the ‘otherness’ of the ‘other’. 
3) Taylor and Vattimo’s philosophical vocabulary is used in this thesis to identify the 
tendency of religion to actualise transcendence in immanence.  Following Nietzsche’s 
hermeneutic of the ‘will to truth’ Vattimo traces the self-interpretive truth of religion, 
which entails an internal self-deconstruction. In contrast, Taylor, rather like a 
positivist, is historical. His explanation of secularism begins with myth and fairytale 
followed by the Reformation, modern social imaginaries, the immanent frame, 
conversion and fullness. It is a re-recording of the historical evolution of religion. 
However, Vattimo is more concerned with the deconstructive dialectic of internal 
criticism.    
4) Through their hermeneutic of secularism, Vattimo and Taylor help shape a vision 
of a world-historical progress from a deeply religious past to a secular but re-engaged 
religious future. Consequently, this research envisions contemporary philosophy 
contributing to thinking more subtly about the future of religion. This research presents 
religion as holistically universal and as the adaptation of cultures and languages, which 
                                                          
14 Gianni Vattimo, “Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought”, pp. 39-52.  
15 Catherine Pickstock, Repetition and Identity, p. 194, 196.  
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goes beyond the sacred to the secular. The relative and pluralistic hermeneutic 
envisioned here is suggestive of a religion of being-for-the other that does not rely on 
metaphysical truth and vertical transcendence but on kenosis and caritas.  
5) This thesis also argues that a postmodern philosophical perspective suggests that 
individuals practice their own post-modern version of ‘free-lance’ secular religion. 
This religion, having undergone the process of Verwindung/secularisation is not bound 
by dogmas and precepts but based on kenosis and caritas. Thus, in this post-onto-
theological and post-secular epoch, it is possible to have a religious faith and 
experience without fixed precepts and most of all without an image of a metaphysical 
God. How this possibility arises is the subject of this thesis. 
6) The deconstruction of religion and secularism does not lead to destruction per se 
but to a reconstruction and the rebuilding of religious belief (hermeneutically), and 
secular culture (in social imaginaries). This thesis attempts to set in motion a new 
interpretation of religion by taking recourse to Vattimo and Taylor. We exploit ‘the 
possibility of inexhaustible interpretation’ and ‘the language turn’ in continental 
philosophy. This sets aside and convalesces tradition (rather than abandoning it) and 
rethinks religion in a way that leads to its constructive re-evaluation. 
 
1.3.Research Questions 
Throughout the thesis, the following questions will be considered. 
1) Do Vattimo and Taylor suggest a postmodern philosophical and onto-theological 
future in which individuals practice their own post-modern version of secular religion? 
2) Is it an existential and onto-theological necessity that religions, especially the 
Hebrew-Christian revelation, undergo a dialogical and interpretive process of 
weakening? 
3) Objective metaphysics has weakened through secularisation. Thus, (in this post-
onto-theological and post-secular epoch), is it possible to have a religious experience 
without the image of a metaphysical God? 
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4) Can the constituent essence of religion reconstructed via ‘weak ontology’ (Vattimo) 
and ‘fullness and conversion’ (Taylor) be reduced entirely to the categories of caritas 
and agape? 
5) Does the death of the metaphysical-moral God (Vattimo’s Nietzsche) and 
disenchantment (Webber’s Taylor) lead to the rise of new religious fundamentalism 
and re-enchantment (mystification)? 
6) How does Vattimo argue that secularity is the outcome of Christianity and how does 
it posit the post-onto-theological religious experience of caritas as the result of 
Verwindung?  How does Taylor’s work and especially A Secular Age, facilitate a 
plausible interpretation of secularism that helps to ‘break the spell of the immanent 
frame’ and accomplish ‘the conversion and fullness’ of religious experience? Guiding 
us through this material is the underlying question: How is it that the critique of 
religion displaces transcendence rather than rediscovers it within its own horizon?  
Even if this thesis does not achieve a comprehensive answer to these questions, it will 



















2.1 Vattimo and Taylor Re-engage the Concepts of Religion and Secularism  
Vattimo and Taylor present their ideas of religion and secularism within certain 
categorical arguments. In this chapter, we present the key arguments of Vattimo and 
Taylor regarding religion and secularism. We are doing this in order to clearly identify 
the territory of secularism and religion that Vattimo and Taylor develop. It helps to 
understand the hermeneutical language both use. This will open the post-modern 
significance of their arguments. Finally, their unique hermeneutics are introduced.  
Vattimo and Taylor attempt an ontological re-capturing and recovering of the meaning 
of religion and the secular. They regard religion and the secular as open historical 
structures. Religion and the secular are part of history but transcend historical 
structures. Taylor in his essay “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism”16 
states that a false model of secularism has a continuing hold on modern minds, 
especially regarding its relation to religion. Taylor feels the need for a radical 
redefinition of secularism. He uses the term ‘post-secular’ by which he does not mean 
a total reversal of the present scenario, i.e., an unwinding of what happened in Europe 
since the Enlightenment and Romanticism, rather it refers to a ‘time’ in which the 
hegemony of the main stream master narrative of secularism is increasingly 
challenged. Vattimo’s hermeneutical philosophy of ‘weak thought’ can be interpreted 
as a transition, weakening, overcoming, and a return. ‘The end of metaphysics’ in 
Heidegger and ‘the death of God’ in Nietzsche enable Vattimo’s postmodern 
interpretation of secularism and, thus, initiates the return of religion.  
Peter Berger distinguishes three distinctive options regarding secularity. They are: (1) 
the reductive option; to interpret tradition in terms of modern secularity, (2) the 
deductive option; to reassert the authority of a religious tradition in the face of modern 
                                                          
16 Charles Taylor, “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism”, in The Power of Religion in 




secularity, and (3) the inductive option which turns to experience as the ground of 
religious affirmation.17 These three options apply to Vattimo and Taylor’s conception 
of secularity. They undertake a reductive re-interpretation of tradition in terms of 
modern secularity. They attempt a deductive reconstruction and reassert the place of 
religion in post-modernity. Finally, their own personal experience is used inductively 
as the principal tool in explaining the complex nature of secularity. Vattimo’s nihilistic 
and Taylor’s historical genealogical method are not anti-religious but rather continue 
and reconstruct tradition that aims at separating church from state.  
Conventionally, Enlightenment thinkers imagined secularism as a framework of 
nonreligious ideas explicitly contrasted with religion. “To be a secularist in this sense, 
is to adopt a stance toward life that clearly separates a religious from a nonreligious 
way of being.”18 For Taylor, this is a misleading ‘subtraction story’. “Religion has not 
declined as much as expected. It is impossible simply to remove such a central 
dimension of culture.”19 For Taylor, post-enlightenment people live in ‘a secular age’, 
in which most people make sense of things entirely or mainly in terms of this worldly-
causality. In Taylor’s phrase, they think entirely within the ‘immanent frame’. It is a 
non-metaphysical, non-transcendent, knowledge which proves itself as sufficient to 
grasp a world that works entirely of itself. The ‘immanent frame’ is a normal, natural, 
tacit context for much or all of their actions.20 
Challenging Western secularism, Taylor offers three definitions. The first 
characterises secularism as the withdrawal of God and religion from ‘public space’. 
This he calls ‘secularityi’. Taylor explains;  
they (religion) have been allegedly emptied of God, or of any reference to ultimate 
reality. Or taken from another side, as we function in the various spheres of activity – 
economic, political, cultural, educational, professional, recreational – the norms and 
principles we follow, the deliberations we engage in, generally do not refer us to God 
or to any religious beliefs: the considerations we act on are internal to the “rationality” 
of each sphere – maximum gain within the economy, the greatest benefit to the greatest 
number in the political area, and so on (SA, 2). 
In the second definition, secularity “consists in the falling off of religious belief and 
practice, in people turning away from God, and no longer going to Church” (SA, 2). 
                                                          
17 Gerard Dekker, Donald A. Luidens, and Rodger R. Rice, Rethinking Secularisation: Reformed 
Reactions to Modernity, London: University of America, Inc, 1997, p. 3.  
18 Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen, Rethinking Secularism, eds., 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 8.  
19 Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen, p. 9. 
20 Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen, p. 10. 
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Taylor calls this ‘secularityii’. This describes the condition of Western Europe from 
the early twentieth century. Third definition of secularism is more relevant to present 
day Western Europe. “This is a move from a society where belief in God is 
unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one 
option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace” (SA, 3).21 This is 
named ‘secularityiii’. This sets a paradigm shift: where once it was virtually 
impossible not to believe, faith and adherence to religion have now become optional. 
Taylor develops the far-reaching consequences of secularityiii, i.e., its need to redefine 
not only the role of religious hierarchy but its relation to the political regimes. In 
Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship, Taylor observes that secularism 
entails a complex requirement. There is more than one virtue to be strived for i.e., 
liberty, equality and fraternity.22 
First, no one must be forced in the domain of religion, or basic belief. This is what is 
often defined as religious liberty including, of course, the freedom not to believe. This 
is what is also described as the ‘free exercise’ of religion, in the terms of the US First 
Amendment. Second, there must be equality between people of different faiths or basic 
belief; no religious outlook or (religious or areligious) Weltanschauung
23
 can enjoy a 
privileged status, let alone be adopted as the official view of the state. Then, thirdly, all 
spiritual families must be heard, included in the ongoing process of determining what 
the society is about (its political identity), and how it is going to realise these goals (the 
exact regime of rights and privileges). This (stretching the point a little) is what 
corresponds to fraternity.24 
However, the three modes of secularity do not do away with but all refer to ‘religion’ 
as: 1) “that which is retreating in public space, 2) as a type of belief and practice which 
is or is not in regression, and 3) as a certain kind of belief or commitment whose current 
conditions in this age are being examined” (SA, 15). In ‘secularityiii’ God and religion 
are not alien to the present political and social scenario but remain an essential factor 
of these. Modernity is secular not because religion is removed, but because religion 
occupies a different place, compatible with the sense that all social action takes place 
in profane time.  
                                                          
21 Hereafter any reference to this definition will be cited as ‘secularityiii’. 
22 Charles Taylor, “Forward”, in Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship, eds., Geoffrey 
Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. xi-xii. 
23 Weltanschauung, the German term for a ‘world‐view’, that is, either the ‘philosophy of life’ adopted 
by a particular person or the more general outlook shared by people in a given period, 
http://www.answers.com/topic/weltanschauung#ixzz1PcSP4YLS, accessed on 22/05/2011. 
24 Charles Taylor, “Forward”, in Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship, pp. xi-xii. 
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By contrast, Vattimo has a paradoxical understanding of the concept of secularism. In 
the commonplace definition, secularisation is a departure from Christianity. However, 
Vattimo’s is a counter-intuitive position regarding the secular. For him, ‘the death of 
God’ dissolves the strong reasons to be an atheist. ‘The death of God’, is an 
announcement of the consummation of the nihilistic process, even if this process is 
constructed as indefinite to avoid posting a metaphysical nothing.25 Vattimo, here 
relates secularisation to the essence of Christianity, while caritas is the limit of 
secularisation.26 He frames his account of secularisation with the help of his ‘weak 
thought’ i.e., ‘Being as weakening’, and ‘God’s tendency for weakening’. For Vattimo, 
“philosophy can call the weakening that it discovers as the characteristic feature of the 
history of Being as secularisation in the broadest sense.” (AC, 24)27. Tracing the source 
and impetus of secularisation in Christianity, Matthew E. Harris referring to John 
15:1528 observes that the message of Jesus (the event of the incarnation) seems less 
important for Vattimo than Jesus’ messages such as calling humans to be God’s 
friends, not servants (B, 25).29,30  
Vattimo’s re-orientation of hermeneutical philosophy is founded on two axioms: 1) 
weak thought, and 2) secularisation.  Based on ‘weak thought’, Vattimo re-reads René 
Girard’s concept of the ‘victim based mechanism’ and ‘the death of the violent natural 
God’. This presupposes the end of a metaphysical God and prepares for the rediscovery 
of a Christian God realised in the mystery of the incarnation (B, 41). It weakens ‘Being’ 
and secularises (Verwindung) the metaphysical claims of hierarchical religions. 
Vattimo sees the process of secularisation as the positive outcome of Jesus’ own 
teaching, as the continuation and the desacralising of the Biblical message. In this way, 
Christianity in praxis finds its truth in a secularised form. Accordingly, Vattimo and 
Taylor open the possibility for the emergence of a post-secular culture. 
                                                          
25 Matthew E. Harris, Essays on Vattimo: Religion, Ethics and History of Ideas, Cambridge: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2016, p. 141.  
26 The concept of caritas is explained in Chapter Four. 
27 Gianni Vattimo, After Christianity, trans., Luca D’ Isanto, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002, p. 24. Hereafter this text will be cited as AC with corresponding page number.  
28 John’s Gospel Chapter 15:15 reads, “No longer do I call you servants, for the servant does not 
know what his master is doing; but I have called you friends…” (The Holy Bible, Revised Standard 
Version). 
29 Gianni Vattimo, Belief, trans., Luca D’ Isanto and David Webb, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, p. 25. 
Hereafter this text will be cited as B with corresponding page number.  
30 Matthew E. Harris, Essays on Vattimo, p. 145. 
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2.2 The Emergence of Post-Secular Culture  
Traditionally, the decline of religious belief (secularisation) constituted the 
characteristic feature of modernity. However, many scholars argue that religion has 
not, after all, lost its societal and cultural relevance. Immigrant religions and 
alternative spiritualities exemplify the resilience of religion as a social and cultural 
force. Vattimo, Taylor, John Milbank, Rowan Williams, and Richard Kearney31 have 
conceptualised the ‘post-secular’32 and the place of religion in society. Interest in 
academia and politics concerning ‘the post-secular’ has broadened the current revival 
of religion and led to a re-imagination of social imaginaries. It is also related to 
religious and philosophical worries as to whether ‘the post-secular’ leads to a re-
enchantment of ‘the dis-enchanted-self’. For Habermas, ‘the post-secular’ is due to ‘a 
change in consciousness’. He attributes the ‘change in consciousness’ to three 
phenomena: (1) global conflicts inspired by religious strife, (2) religion gaining 
influence within national spheres, and (3) immigration of ‘guest-workers’, and 
refugees.33 Religion in a post-secular culture “claims a more conspicuous and public 
role in shaping legislation or determining social and political values, (and) poses 
renewed challenges.”34 One of the primary aspects of this research is to answer the 
question of how best to understand the changing religious-political landscape as a 
consequence of post-secular culture. This philosophical inquiry into ‘the post-secular’ 
is focused in a study of the new forms and ways of looking at religion as a re-imagined 
and revitalised cultural force. The answer lies within the hermeneutics of Vattimo and 
Taylor.  
Vincent Geoghegan argues that ‘post-secularism’ “is a polyvalent and contested term, 
signifying a scepticism and/or antagonism towards secularism. Post-secularism 
                                                          
31 I have chosen these thinkers because their philosophical views on secularism and religion, 1) have 
resemblance to that of Taylor and Vattimo, and 2) their philosophy contribute to a post-secular ‘re-
engagement’ of religion.  
32 However, these thinkers do not use the term ‘post-secular’ explicitly. ‘Post-secular’ is coined by 
Habermas.  
33 Jürgen Habermas, Tony Blair, and Régis Debray, “Secularism’s Crisis of Faith, Notes on Post-Secular 
Society”, in FALL, 2008, http://www.staff.amu.edu.pl/~ewa/Habermas,%20Notes%20on%20Post-
Secular%20Society.pdf, accessed on 12/02/2017.  
34 Justine Champion, “Why the Enlightenment Still Matters Today”, November 2012,  
https://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/why-the-enlightenment-still-matters-today, 
accessed on 12/01/2017. For example, the French government has struggled with debates around the 
implementation of the 1905 law of láicité amongst new Muslim communities. So also the wall of 




recognises the persistence or ‘resurgence’ of religion, (and) attempts to overcome the 
antimony of secularism/religion.”35 Habermas coins the term post-secular to describe 
the continuous reassertion and nuanced manifestations of religion in the public sphere. 
His philosophical aim is to solve the tension between radical multiculturalism, which 
interprets secularism as freedom from religion, and radical secularism, which is often 
associated with the French model of láicité.36 In a post-secular society, citizens both 
religious and non-religious, engage in reciprocal deliberation.”37 In short, for 
Habermas and Geoghen, the term ‘post-secular’ applies to ‘secularised societies’ 
(modern societies) in which religion emerges as a public influence, while the 
conventional secularist conviction that religion will disappear worldwide in the course 
of modernization is waning. 
In this research, post-secular is read in line with ‘the return of religion’, which is often 
associated (erroneously!) with the rise of fundamentalism. Philosophically, the ‘post-
secular turn’ entails a renewed interest in religion as a social and political force. 
Philosophical logic locates ‘the post-secular turn’ as participating in the general logic 
“that is often deployed as a discursive practice to mark a change of topic or theme, to 
announce a new programme or position.”38 For Taylor, this is an historically inevitable 
‘event’ whist for Vattimo ‘the post-secular turn’ is experienced recursively in his 
return to the religion of his childhood. It is not a sudden increase in religiosity but a 
‘new culture’ developed and grown, in tandem with a change in attitude. In its 
philosophical profundity, the change in attitude means not only “an increase in the 
meaningfulness of religion or a renewed attention to it, but a changed attitude by the 
secular state or in the public domain with respect to the continued existence of religious 
communities and the impulses that emerge from them.”39 Here a transformative shift 
is involved with the states’ relationship to religion. 
                                                          
35 Vincent Geoghegan, “Religious Narrative, Post-secular and Utopia,” in Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 3.2-3, 2000, pp. 205-224. 
36 Fatih Cicek, “Post-Secularism – Did Secularism and the Enlightenment Project Fail?” 
http://www.academia.edu/10429810/_Post-secularism_-
_Did_Secularism_and_the_Enlightenment_project_fail, accessed on 11/01/2017. 
37 Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008, p. 131. 
38 Gregg Lambert, Return Statements: The Return of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2016, p. 6.  
39 Hent de Vries, “Introduction: Before, Around, and Beyond the Theologico-Political,” in Political 
Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, eds., Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan, New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2006, pp. 1-90. (Hent de Vries quotes Hans Joas here from Hans Joas, 
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The term ‘post-secular’ remains muddled, and its precise meaning has still to be 
unveiled. For example, Muslim majority countries and most Eastern countries, 
including India, always maintained a religious allegiance. Rajeev Bhargava 
accordingly observes that “we in India have been always post-secular.”40 Indian 
political secularism has never been anti-religious but upholds religious neutrality. In 
the French case, there is clear post-secular trend. Accordingly, the term describes a 
new era in which secularisation has ended and religion is re-emerging. The need for 
renewed religious dialogue has motivated this research. To this end, I have undertaken 
a deconstructive critique of the secular, and a reconstructive critique of religion with 
the help of Vattimo and Taylor.  
Significantly, post-secular culture includes Taylor’s argument that secularity entails a 
new set of conditions in which both belief and unbelief occur. Vattimo calls for a post-
secular ‘weak religion’ which draws insights from the hermeneutics of nihilism and 
avoids all absolute assertions and distances itself from dogmatic structures. As we shall 
see, post-secular culture envisioned by the hermeneutics of Taylor and Vattimo, re-
imagines faith for the contemporary world. Secondly, post-secular religiosity supports 
cultural, linguistic, and political practices of pluralism. Finally, post-secular means 
neither ‘secular’ nor ‘religious’ but a co-habitation of both in mutual inclusivity. The 
plural and harmonious nature of both the religious and the secular is already well 
established in some countries. Former French President Nicholas Sarkozy comments, 
“rejecting a dialogue with religion would be a cultural and intellectual error. A positive 
secularism that debates, respects and includes, not a secularism that rejects”41 is 
needed. 
 
2.3 Secularism: A Historical Context 
The meaning and the implications of secularism are complex. Its meaning differs 
according to its various cultural, political and religious environments. “In its own 
history, secularism has always included a debate about whether the process was 
                                                          
Braucht der Mensch Religion? ῢber Erfahrungen der Selbstrranszendenz, Friburg in Breisgau: Herder, 
2004, p. 124.)  
40 Rajeev Bhargava, “We (In India) Have Always Been Post-Secular,” in Global Secularisms in a Post-
Secular Age, eds., Michael Rectenwald, Rochelle Almeida, and George Levine, Boston and Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 2015, pp. 109-136.  
41 Jürgen Habermas, Tony Blair, and Régis Debray, “Secularism’s Crisis of Faith, notes on post-secular 
society” in FALL, 2008, accessed on 12/02/2017.  
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irreversible and progressing, or indeed whether any such a large-scale change was 
happening at all.”42 With the advance of the ‘reconstructive hermeneutics’ 
secularism’s status as an ‘article of faith’ in the West is called into question. According 
to Taylor, the unstable nature of secularism is because ideas, institutions, arts, and 
formulae for production, and living, ‘circulate’ among societies and civilizations that 
are very different in their historical roots and traditional forms. He gives the examples 
of democracy, and non-violence.43 These do not just change but are modified, 
reinterpreted, and given new names wherever they are transposed. This is evident in 
the case of the ‘secular’. It occurs in many places but does not mean the same in each 
instance. It takes the form of a non-identical repetition in which there are always subtle 
differences in deployment.44 
Since secularism has developed in different contexts and from various traditions 
around the world, it is pluralistic in outlook. Its scope widens with “its association with 
‘progress’ and modernity, its assertions of rationality and neutrality, its claims of 
exclusivity about public life, as well as how this doctrinal logic unfolds in various 
contexts.”45 The pluralistic nature of secularism makes it an adaptable category. 
Accordingly, the individual ‘self’ can be different aspects of the whole picture of 
secularism’s plurality, contingency, and adaptability. Taylor calls this a ‘grand 
narrative’ which as product of the Enlightenment involves the spread of 
modernization. Taylor and Vattimo advance their ‘circular’ and ‘travelling’ aspects of 
secularism. Taylor “argues that Western secularity should be understood as the result 
of a fundamental change in sensibility marked by disenchantment, or the systematic 
                                                          
42 Herbert De Vriese and Gary Gabor, Rethinking Secularization: Philosophy and the Prophecy of a 
Secular Age, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009, pp. ix-x. 
43 Taylor observes that parliamentary democracy spread outwards from England, among other 
countries, to India; likewise, the practice of non-violent civil disobedience spread from its origins in 
the struggle for Indian independence to many other places, including the USA with Martin Luther King 
Jr. and civil rights movement, Manila in 1983, and the Velvet and Orange Revolutions of our time. 
(Charles Taylor, “Western Secularity”, in Rethinking Secularism, eds., Craig Calhoun Mark 
Juergensmeyer and Jonathan Van Antwerpen, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 31-53.).  
44 Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan Van Antwerpen, Rethinking Secularism, p. 31. 
45 Michael Rectenwald and Rochelle Almeida, “Introduction” in Global Secularisms in a Post-Secular 





repression of the ‘magical’ elements of religion.”46 Vattimo envisions secularism as 
the result of the diffusion of God taking a ‘weak form’. For Taylor, the whole breadth 
of the historical context for this shift is a movement towards reform within 
Christianity. Secularism is the consequence of this ‘great dis-embedding’ and appears 
as a variant form of religion itself and can be interpreted as the last expression of 
Christian religion itself, and can be seen also as new spiritualism that derives from the 
death of secularism.  
What form does this new secularism and Christianity take? Graeme Smith observes; 
“secularism is Christian ethics shorn of its doctrine. It is the ongoing commitment to 
do good, understood in traditional Christian terms, without a concern for the 
technicalities of the teachings of the Church…Secularism in the West is a new 
manifestation of Christianity, but one that is not immediately obvious because it lacks 
the usual scaffolding we associate with Christian religion.”47 Smith suggests one of 
the principal arguments of this thesis: that secularism has Christianity as its core. 
Vattimo and Taylor, through their philosophical argument bring forth what was hidden 
in secularism until now.   
There has been a paradigmatic change in secularisms meaning as a result of being 
critiqued by different disciplines. According to Easter Halman and de Moor; 
“secularism is the inevitable outcome of structural changes in society, due to the 
growing influence of rationalisation and individualism.”48 The structural and cultural 
changes in the West are primarily the outcome of both the Reformation and the 
Enlightenment which functioned as a check on any sort of absolutism, religious 
bigotry, or fanaticism. As Gerard Dekker argues, the effects of secularisation are 
distinguishable: (1) on the individual level where there is a decline of religiosity among 
individuals, (2) on the societal level where there is a restriction on the range of 
influence of religion on society, and (3) on the institutional level where there is an 
                                                          
46 Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Jonathan Van Antwerpen, Rethinking Secularism, p. 21. 
47 Graeme Smith, A Short History of Secularism, London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2008, pp.2-3. 
48 Gerard Dekker, Donald A. Luidens and Rodger R. Rice, Rethinking Secularisation: Reformed Reactions 
to Modernity, London: University of America, Inc, 1997, p. 1. Halman, and de Moor are quoted by 
these authors here. (Ester, Halman, and de Moor, 1993, p. 39). 
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adaptation of religion to society’s values.49 In the West, the concept of secularism is 
sometimes narrowed to the state-religion relationship.  
José Cassanova and Fatih Cicek disaggregate secularism into four different constituent 
categories:  
(1) Politically, the term implies the removal of religious domination from the public 
sphere and political authority and the transferal of political functions and institutions 
from the church to that of state (de-sacralising of politics); (2) socially and 
entrepreneurially it suggests a this-worldly orientation and the supremacy of individual 
reason and science in constructing society (de-consecration of values); and (3) 
philosophically, the liberation of man from ‘religious and metaphysical control over his 
reason, the breaking of all supernatural myths and sacred symbols,”50 and (4) an 
intellectual disenchantment from the magical image of the world through the theoretical 
mastery of nature with rationalization.51 
The political, social, philosophical, and intellectual categories allow secularism to 
appear around the globe in different forms under different pretexts and contexts. 
According to Akeel Bilgrami, secularism consists in three principal stances. First, it is 
a stance to be taken about religion. Secondly, unlike secular and secularisation, 
secularism is quite specific- it is the name of a political doctrine. Finally, secularism 
as a stance regarding a religion that is restricted to politics, it is not a good in itself.52  
Any attempt to define ‘secularism’ further adds to the indistinctness of this concept. 
However, this indistinctness paves the way for new meanings to be explored. Yet, one 
cannot claim to have a fixed definition of the word. As the socio-politico-religious 
environments undergo transition, it is important to attribute different values to the 
secular. Thus, I emphasise that the meaning of secularism becomes pluralistic and is 
not fixed. Vattimo and Taylor’s hermeneutic of secularism and religion further open 
the pluralistic nature of the secular. This constitutes an historical openness. Secularism 
                                                          
49 Gerard Dekker, Donald A. Luidens and Rodger R. Rice, Rethinking Secularisation: Reformed Reactions 
to Modernity, p. 2.  
50 José Casanova and Fatih Cicek quote Harvey Cox, The Secular City, 1965, p. 2.  
51 José Casanova, and Fatih Cicek, “Post-Secularism-Did Secularism and the Enlightenment Project 
Fail?”,http://www.academia.edu/10429810/_Post-secularism, 
Did_Secularism_and_the_Enlightenment_project_fail, accessed on 22/02/2017.   
52 Akeel Bilgrami, “Secularism: Its Content and Context,” in Boundaries of Toleration, eds., Alfred 
Stephan and Charles Taylor, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, pp. 79-81. Bilgrami observes 
that (1) the stance taken towards religion does not say anything specific or precise- yet it is an 
adversarial stance since surely secularism, in some sense, defines itself against religion. (2) It is a 
political doctrine to the extent that it takes a stance vis-s-vis religion, it does so only in the realm of 
the politics. (3)  It seeks what is conceived, by those who favour it, to promote certain other moral and 
political goods, and these are goods that are intended to counter what are conceived as harms, either 
actual or potential. Thus, secularism as a political doctrine arose to repair what were perceived as 
damages that flowed from historical harms that were, in turn, perceived as owing, in some broad 
sense, to religion. 
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is open to new meanings and a wide range of elucidations.  It is not only comprised of 
the religion-state separation but also includes equality among religions and, the 
irreligious sphere. Its pluralistic and historical nature allow secularism to appeal to 
‘substantive values’,53 either political, religious or cultural due to internal or external 
reasons. It is also vital to interpret the meaning of religion in the context of this 
research. 
 
2.4 Interpreting Religion    
Religion is an undefinable (Rosenzweig) and complex phenomenon. Nevertheless, 
there is a resurgence of religious forces whereby religion and belief have once more 
become driving forces in society. Religion is perceived by many “as a means of 
supplying what they see as a needed moral dimension to ‘secular-politics’ and 
‘environmental concerns’.”54 Notwithstanding, “the picture is complicated by the 
growth of fanaticism, by a suspicion amongst many that religion is a significant source 
of the world’s ills, and by a blanket denial by others of the legitimacy of non-religious 
approaches to life.”55 Islamophobia and anti-Semitism once again pose serious social 
issues.  Intra and inter-faith disputes and ethno-religious issues reshape societies in 
ways inconceivable. Distorted conclusions about the negative impact of religion 
produce anxiety, hatred, and fear of ‘the other’.56 In such a climate, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the complexity of ‘religion’ in a manner that does not become a tool of 
oppression and hatred. This is why Vattimo and Taylor restructure the Enlightenment 
critique of religion. For them, what makes religion post-modern and post-secular is not 
its metaphysical or dogmatic nature, but self-critique. 
The word religion “is derived from the Latin religio - meaning ‘what attaches or 
retains, moral bond, anxiety of self-consciousness, scruple’ - used by the Romans, 
before Jesus Christ, to indicate the worship of gods and demons. Cicero is quoted as 
                                                          
53 According to Akeel Bigrami, ‘substantive values’ are those values that some hold as values while 
others do not (Akeel Bigrami, “Secularism: Its Content and Context,” p. 81).  
54 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003, p. 1. 
55 Dr. Ed Kessler and Baroness Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, “Preface,” in Living with Difference: Community, 
Diversity, and the Common Good, A Report of the Commission on Religion and Belief in British Public 
Life, Cambridge: The Wolf Institute, 2015.  
56 The concept of ‘the other’ is explained in Chapter Eight.  
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saying that it comes from relegere (to read again, to re-examine carefully, to gather)57 
the meaning of which is “to carefully consider the things related to the worship of 
gods.””58 Religion can be described as a set of beliefs, feelings, dogmas and practices 
that define the relations between human beings and the sacred or divine. A given 
religion is accordingly, constituted by specific elements within a community of 
believers.  
Clifford Geertz defines “religion as (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish 
long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating concepts of a general 
order, (4) clothing these concepts with an aura of factuality.”59 Robert N. Bellah 
observes that Geertz left out belief in the supernatural or transcendent. It would seem 
that ‘symbols’ are basic to all religions. As they are related to language, religion 
instrumentalises language. If language is essential to religion, it is also culture bound.60 
Giving primacy to the linguistic and moral dimension of religion, Emile Durkheim 
defines ‘religion’ as a scheme of ‘beliefs and practices’ which unite those who adhere 
to them in moral and cultural communion.61 For Durkheim, ‘sacred’ is something set 
apart or forbidden, a realm of the non-ordinary reality. However, Vattimo and Taylor 
criticise the notion of a ‘non-ordinary realm’ in opposition to daily life. This becomes 
one of the principal themes of this research.   
Vattimo and Taylor’s hermeneutic of ‘re-engaging religion’ becomes possible, when 
religion is perceived as a ‘subject matter’ in Gadamer’s sense. ‘Subject matter’ is an 
embodied condition (Hegel), and is both conceptualised and practiced in social 
relationships, and language. More significantly, as a subject-matter it has the capacity 
to be otherwise. It is an interplay of actuality and potentiality. What is seen, is only a 
finite aspect of religion. Vattimo and Taylor try to unveil its more aspect. 
Hermeneutical deconstruction through ‘an inexhaustible interpretation’ and ‘the 
language turn’ are the philosophical frameworks with which both thinkers reveal how 
religion alters its modality constantly revaluating itself.    
                                                          
57 Cicero’s definition is further examined in Chapter Eight when dealing with the ‘return of religion’. 
58 “What is religion” in  http://atheisme.free.fr/Religion/What-is-religion-1.htm, accessed on 
13/01/2017. 
59 Robert Bellah quotes Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” in The Interpretation of 
Cultures, New York: Basic Books, 1973, p. 90. 
60 Robert Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution: From Palaeolithic to Axial Age, London: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2011, pp. xiv-xv. 
61 Robert Bellah, p. 1. 
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The post-counter-Enlightenment hermeneutic of Vattimo and Taylor serves as an 
ontological aid to recapture the philosophical and cultural importance of religion. 
According to Taylor, it is possible that the disenchanted post-enlightened ‘individual-
self’ ‘convert’ to different forms of religion and secular ideology. As Wayne Hudson 
remarks, “in the beginning of the third millennium there is a grudging admission that 
‘religion’ is harder to eliminate than nineteenth century thinkers believed.”62 
Consequently, we must elucidate the source of this emergent religion and secularism 
with the assistance of the Enlightenment critique itself.  
 
2.5 The Enlightenment Critique of Religion and Immanuel Kant 
The philosophical and cultural movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
that stressed freedom of thought over dogma became known as the Enlightenment. 
Reactionary in character, the Enlightenment prompted a vital revision in the way 
religion had been thought of since the medieval period.63 In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, the German intellectual movement called die Aufklärung fused 
with the French Siècle des Lumières. For Knud Haakonssen, “the Enlightenment was 
first and foremost a movement to preserve civilised society against any resurgence of 
religious enthusiasm and superstition…”64 For M. S. Recher, “the Enlightenment 
should be considered as one more exemplification of an intellectual and moral 
confrontation between religious and non-religious thought.”65 This confrontation was 
the result of the development of scientific methodology which displaced faith and 
mysticism as keys to understanding the universe. Bound up with this antagonism was 
a profound disdain for the power of the church and its clergy. Of concern to many 
                                                          
62 Wayne Hudson, “The Enlightenment Critique of Religion,” in Australian Journal of Theology 5, August 
2005, pp. 1-12. 
63 It should be noted that the word ‘religion’ was not in common use before the Enlightenment, while 
‘faith’ and ‘sacred’ were used frequently. In its Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment use, religion as 
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64 Knud Haakonssen, “Enlightened Dissent: An Introduction” in Enlightenment and Religion: Rational 
Dissent in Eighteenth-century Britain, ed., Knud Haakonssen, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996, p. 2. 
65 Mehmet Sait Reçber, Religion after Enlightenment: the Case for Islam,  pp. 305-314. Published 
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Enlightenment thinkers was the need to find a new moral basis for social order without 
a specifically doctrinal religious justification.  
In his book, In Defence of the Enlightenment, Tzvetan Todorov suggests “three values 
that permeate the core of the Enlightenment project: autonomy, universalism, and the 
principle of humanity.”66 Autonomy requires that the individual should be able to 
make choices about their life. Universalism maintains that all people are deserving of 
dignity and share fundamental rights. The principle of humanity requires that the 
individual should organise the world according to what is best for human beings. This 
coincides with the development of a social imaginary:67 the public sphere. “The 
gradual development and rise of the ‘public sphere’ entailed the dissemination of the 
written word, and the proliferation of venues at which ideas could be discussed.”68 As 
we shall see, these factors eventually serve the re-valuation of religion as possible. 
Vattimo and Taylor provide an alternative thinking not by drawing a dichotomy 
between religion and polity but by developing a post-modern hermeneutic of pluralism 
and mutual collaboration that re-locates religion in society. 
Though the Enlightenment was represented as the enemy of religion, it is more 
accurately characterised as being critical of various features of religion; superstition 
and supernaturalism. According to M. S. Reçber, “the criticism and revisionism 
suggested by at least some Enlightenment thinkers seems to have been aimed at a 
particular understanding of religion rather than at religion per se.”69  In this way, the 
Enlightenment primarily aimed at purifying religion of its metaphysical heritage and 
transforming it into something more humanistic. The Enlightenment can no longer be 
conceived as a philosophical anti-religious movement. According to Daniel Brewer,  
the Enlightenment designates not a past moment but a goal to be realized, a 
programme reflecting the desire to reform and regulate individual behaviour and 
collective social behaviours. Reformist, progressivist, and emancipatory, the 
Enlightenment project is fundamentally future-oriented, even to the point of 
seeming impossibly utopian. Rising up on a constantly receding horizon, it 
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represents a worthy goal, yet perhaps a constitutively and forever unrealizable 
one.70  
The Enlightenment was a ‘goal to be realised’. It was ‘future-oriented’. Vattimo and 
Taylor’s concept of ‘secularism’ re-reads the Enlightenment creation of a ‘science of 
ideas’ and ‘temples of reason’ and lifts them above the domain of any particular 
religious ideology or rationality.71 Vattimo and Taylor bridge the violent dichotomy 
between reason and religion. They struggle to bring out the positive potential of ‘the 
Enlightenment’ and to construct a notion of the ‘self’ that is a better believer and a 
better citizen. 
Since the Enlightenment, the scientific reaction against religion has become more 
circumspect. There has been a call for a more individualised understanding of religion. 
This shift in understanding was initiated by Immanuel Kant’s response to the question 
of ‘What is Enlightenment?’ For Kant, “Enlightenment is mankind’s exit from self-
incurred immaturity.”72 Kant defined ‘immaturity’ as, 
the inability to make use of one’s own understanding and decision of an issue or subject 
without the guidance of another. Self-incurred is this inability if its cause lies not in the 
lack of understanding but rather in the lack of the resolution and the courage to use it 
without the guidance of another. Sapere aude! Have the courage to use your own 
understanding! is thus the motto of enlightenment.73  
For Charles Taylor, a ‘pre-enlightened self’ which he described as ‘a porous self’74  
was influenced by external forces. Sapere aude, the ability to use one’s own reason or 
daring to think for oneself puts an end to the self-incurred ‘immaturity’ of the ‘pre-
enlightened-self’. Taken by itself, sapere aude is connected to the value placed on “the 
autonomy of rational individuals and the progressive function of the State for 
increasing collective well-being.”75 
Kant set asides traditional metaphysical theology but preserves a transcendental 
theology based on moral faith, for which God and immortality were necessary 
                                                          
70 Daniel Brewer, “The Enlightenment Today”, in The Cambridge Companion to the French 
Enlightenment, ed., Daniel Brewer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 1-2. 
71 Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer and Jonathan Van Antwerp, Rethinking Secularism, p. 8. 
72 Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy Series: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, 
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75 Daniel Brewer, “The Enlightenment Today”, p. 1.  
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postulates of practical but not theoretical reason.76 He was influential in developing ‘a 
philosophy of religion’ distinct from the ways both ancient and medieval thinkers dealt 
with the concept of God. Pre-Kantian scholarship was a ‘philosophical theology’.77 
‘Philosophy of religion’, however, functioned independently from formal theological 
inquiry and shifted its focus from religion as divinely revealed to religion as a human 
phenomenon. It sought a philosophy of religion able to establish the scope of human 
reason, without divine revelation.78 
Kant shifted the focus from religion ‘as divinely revealed’ to ‘religion as a human 
phenomenon’.79 The key elements of Kant’s shift concern the attributes of God which 
he discussed within the areas of rational psychology, cosmology, and rational 
theology. Kant’s significance lies in his attempt to see religion in terms of a symbolic 
(in contrast to a cognitive) field of human meaning, a field that “has been legitimated 
by the critically disciplined human reason…”80 Kant’s philosophy of religion placed 
limits on the theoretical claims about God and Christian doctrine. For Kant, “the 
concept of God functions properly only as a “regulative”- limiting- principle in causal 
accounts of the spatio-temporal order of the world.”81 Such limits, according to Kant, 
serve to “exhibit the authentic religious meaning of the doctrines on God, i.e., their 
bearing upon the moral freedom of human agents and the moral destiny of the human 
species as the unique juncture of freedom and nature.”82  
Kant’s critical philosophy, i.e., his philosophy of religion, demolished dogmatic and 
pre-critical metaphysics, “but only in order to establish a metaphysics which was 
‘transcendental’ in the sense derived from the universal architecture of human 
cognition.”83 Hudson observes that “Kant defended a transcendental theology which 
posed no threat to scientific inquiry as it made no strong ontological claims about 
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reality itself. It was open to challenge from a more historical approach which 
associated ‘religion’ with changes of ethical content and with forms of political, social 
and legal organisation.”84 The critique of Kant, and his understanding of ‘religion’ 
suggest how the Enlightenment was not merely a movement to attack the superstitious, 
dogmatic religion in the name of rationality. The important figures who advanced 
beyond the Enlightenment critique of religion were Lessing, Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, 
and finally Nietzsche. Vattimo and Taylor’s distinctive post-Enlightenment paths lead 
to a contemporary analysis of secularity. For Taylor, the broader historical context for 
these shifts was a ‘great dis-embedding’.85 Although, the Enlightenment critique of 
religion promoted ‘rational’ and ‘natural’ religion, the proper place of religion in 
society remains philosophically controversial.  
Vattimo and Taylor question the atheist opposition to religious belief. Vattimo argues 
for an atheistic Christianity based on atheism. He confessed that after a religious youth 
followed by a period of disenchantment, he experienced the paradox of recovering 
Christianity through Nietzsche and Heidegger. Taylor, however, argues that it is 
possible to think about the material world without reference to any transcendent power 
(a conception he calls ‘the immanent frame’).  
 
2.7 Post-Enlightenment Religion and Secularism  
The outcome of the Enlightenment were the humanising86 ideas of autonomy, 
universalism, and progress.  These gradually developed as the focus of a renewed 
public sphere. Consequently, the Enlightenment became the very cradle of modern 
Western secularism. As elucidated above, Kant’s insistence on the importance of using 
one’s own mind became a vehicle for secular trends. Subsequently, individual thought 
and reasoning became allied with sceptical inquiry and secular thought.87 In essence, 
it was an “inevitable shift from the traditional to the modern, a transformation from 
religious superstition to the superiority of rationality; from a deeply hierarchical status-
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based society to a rights-based society.”88 According to José Casanova, the 
Enlightenment critique of religion became an independent carrier of the process of 
secularisation especially when established religious structures became an obstacle to 
human self-flourishing.89 
The term ‘secular’ derives from the Latin saeculum has a dual connotation: referring 
to ‘this time’ or ‘now present’ and ‘this world’ or ‘worldly’. “The existence of a sacred-
profane division in Latin Christendom,90 can be characterised in terms of a horizontal 
and vertical division between ‘the other world’ (heaven) and ‘this world’. For José 
Casanova, this division was politically translated into the transcendental City of God 
and its ecclesiastical clerical embodiment on earth, and the City of Man.91 
Secularisation became an historical process that challenged such horizontal and 
vertical divisions.  
Nietzsche and Heidegger followed by Derrida, Foucault, Vattimo, and Virilio offer 
deconstructive commentaries or “a radically critical analysis of the social and 
intellectual practices common to the post-Enlightenment area.”92 The role of the 
Counter-Enlightenment thinker is to free ‘the other’ from the shackles of the illusions 
of secular reason. The ‘overcoming’ (Verwindung) of ‘metaphysics’ and ‘reason’, as 
we shall argue, leads to a renewed understanding of religion and secularism, not based 
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As stated above, this part of the thesis has outlined ‘the research field’ along with 
explaining ‘the concepts of religion’ and ‘historically contextualising secularism.’ The 
general presumption in the West is that ‘religion,’ and ‘secularism’ are two historical 
and phenomenological categories that cannot be easily theorised. Secularism became 
the epithet of modernity and democratic political states especially in the Western 
world. ‘Religion’ and ‘secularism’ are dichotomous terms whose philosophical and 
practical implications come into conflict. And yet, these distinguishable categories 
find a point of convergence. This research attempts to bridge their belligerent 
opposition. It attempts to ‘overcome’ the absolute truth claims of both religion and the 
secular. The question is how does the ‘truth’ of one finds its truth in relation to the 
truth of its other?     
This research takes its principal source from the hermeneutic philosophies of Vattimo 
and Taylor. Taylor’s view of ‘a secular age’, and Vattimo’s account of secularisation 
as the outcome of Christianity open a new area of philosophical debate centering on 
the hermeneutical and post-onto-theological interpretation of secularism and religion. 
Why does Vattimo argue that secularity is the outcome of Christianity and why should 
it lead to a post-onto-theological religious experience of caritas as Verwindung?  How 
does Taylor’s work facilitate an interpretation of secularism that ‘breaks the spell’ of 
the ‘immanent frame’ and accomplish ‘the conversion and fullness’ of religious 
experience? We shall argue that this deconstructive analysis of religion and secularism 
does not lead to a destruction but to a reconstruction of religious belief. It attempts to 
set in motion a new interpretation of religion. To this end, an analytical explanation of 
Vattimo and Taylor’s unique interpretation of religion and secularism are undertaken. 
In Part Two, I refer to Vattimo’s proactive thinking with regard to Nietzsche’s ‘death 
of God’. His argument does not imply the negation of religious orientation rather 







PART - II 
 
TOWARDS SECULARISATION AS KENOSIS 
 
“The twentieth century seemed to close with the end of the phenomenon that has 
been called secularisation.” Gianni Vattimo93 
 
Introduction 
Gianni Vattimo has facilitated the re-definition of the role of post-Enlightenment 
philosophy and religion beyond the boundaries of the academic community. In so 
doing, he has re-affirmed the political and religious responsibility of philosophers in 
the post-modern world. He has attempted to improve both the reifying and constrictive 
thinking of Enlightenment positivism, and Hegelian-Marxist historicism. Vattimo 
rejects atheistic rationalism, i.e., the belief that experimental natural sciences have an 
exclusive claim to truth and that history is inherently progressive. This belief assigns 
a provisional place to religion in modernity: religion is an error destined to be 
dismissed by scientific rationality. Moreover, religious experience is considered a 
moment to be overcome by reason’s self-unfolding towards a fuller and truer form of 
self-consciousness. However, in Vattimo and Taylor, both ‘belief in the objective 
truth’, and ‘faith in the progress of reason’ are unmasked by ‘the disenchantment’ of 
disenchantment with itself. ‘Demythologizing’ turns against itself, acknowledging that 
the ideal of the elimination of myth becomes itself a myth. Vattimo embodied and 
rearticulated this post-Enlightenment Zeitgeist formulating his own variant of critical 
hermeneutical philosophy. This transformative and hermeneutical process has been 
described as post-secular’ analogous to the post-religious epoch that followed the 
Enlightenment.  
Drawing cues from Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Gadamer, Vattimo offers a radical 
hermeneutical ontology. His principal contribution, the concept of ‘weak thought’ or 
                                                          
93Vattimo, Gianni, “After Onto-theology: Philosophy between Science and Religion”, in Religion After 
Metaphysics, Mark A. Wrathal, ed., Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003, pp. 29-36. 
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‘the ontology of decline’, offers a lucid and far-reaching alternative to Derridean 
deconstruction and Deleuzo-Guattarian post-structuralism. He observes that 
philosophical deliberations change with both the appearance and disappearance of 
different cultures, languages, and philosophical trends. Through his hermeneutical 
weak thought, Vattimo underscores the impossibility of seeking universal and stable 
principles or values in philosophy. Aided by Nietzschean ‘nihilism’, he argues against 
the possibility of logical and epistemological justification for universal truth. 
Consequently, God, the most extreme hypothesis for humanity, and its foundational 
principle was required to die, and the world to become a fable, a game of interpretation. 
Both the ‘death of God’ and the fabulisation of the world, weakened the principle of 
reality which in turn yielded different images of the world and caused divergent 
interpretations. According to Heideggerian ‘nihilism’, the world of techno-science, the 
Ge-Stell, reduces Being to a realm of calculable and manipulable beings in which 
human beings become mere objects of analysis. Vattimo elaborates nihilism by 
defining his project as a ‘philosophy of actuality’ and by seeking a logical thread in 
nihilism that provides the means for an existential analysis of post-modern society. His 
hermeneutical project attempts to rescue philosophy and to re-recover religion from 
the nihilistic ‘net’ by salvaging the dimensions of positive nihilism. This transforming 
occurrence (Ereigniss or event) has an experiential character that is both interpretive 
and emancipatory. 
Nietzsche’s ‘death of God’, Heidegger’s ‘end of metaphysics’, and a 
phenomenological re-appropriation of religious thought form the key to Vattimo’s 
philosophical deconstruction. His re-evaluation of religion by means of philosophical 
deconstruction and hermeneutical Verwindung, utilises ‘Being’ as an event and as the 
kenotic dynamic in Christian thought which dissolves itself in the form of caritas. 
Christian love and truth as ‘event’ is characterised by the reduction of metaphysical 
and sacral violence: it exhibits the weakening of strong structures. This 
historiographical knowledge of ‘weak thought’ is the result of the hermeneutical and 
emancipatory interaction between ‘Being’, language, and culture. Every act of 
knowledge is hermeneutical, and ‘Being’ is understood as language and history. Thus, 
Vattimo’s dialogical, non-foundationalist approach to continental philosophy unmasks 
the structures of power by overcoming of metaphysical claims. This deconstruction of 




In summary, Vattimo’s re-orientation of hermeneutical philosophy in the light of 
nihilism is founded on two axioms: (1) Weak Thought, and (2) Secularisation. 
Chapter Three develops ‘weak thought’ as an exhaustive philosophical outlook which 
breaks metaphysical and dogmatic objectivism. The evolutionary process of ‘weak 
thought’ is developed in three stages: (1) ‘the death of God’ and ‘metaphysical 
violence’, (2) ‘a nihilistic vocation’ and ‘truth as an event’ and (3) the ‘weakening’ of 
‘metaphysical dogmatism’.  
Chapter Four explains Vattimo’s concept of ‘secularisation’ as something more than 
the mere dissolution of the sacred, the estrangement from the divine, and the loss of 
religiosity. It is the path that is retraced in reverse; a progress strived for, a process of 
kenosis which seeks to recover a truth to the Biblical message. ‘Weak thought’ permits 
hermeneutical philosophy to rethink itself as the secularisation of the religious 
message of the West. Hermeneutics as the ‘koinė’ of this post-modern epoch liberates 
religion from metaphysics and leads to an anti-essentialist account of religion based 


















GIANNI VATTIMO’S CONCEPT OF ‘WEAK THOUGHT’ 
 
3.1 Life and Influences 
Frederiek Depoortere in Christ in Postmodern Philosophy: Gianni Vattimo, René 
Girard, and Slavoj Žižek,94 suggests that the life of Gianni Vattimo is organised around 
three different but related concerns, ‘politics, philosophy, and religion’. Beginning 
with religion, and the fervent Catholicism of his youth, Vattimo moved to politics and 
then on to philosophy. The failure of his engagement with politics and religion brought 
about a disillusion upon which he reflected philosophically. It was a seminal moment: 
it resulted in his return to religion but to a religion radically re-conceived. His 
intellectual and personal biography provides the context for any understanding or 
conceptualising of his philosophy of ‘Weak Thought’.  
The ‘prodigal Vattimo’95 was shaped by a critical and deconstructive approach to the 
concept of ‘the return of religion’. According to the Enlightenment and positivist ideas 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, religion appears as ‘residual’ forms of 
experience, destined to redundancy. Vattimo claims, however, that today religion 
appears as a possible guide for the future (B, 28). He takes his departure from 
Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s notions of nihilism marking the end-point of modernity 
which brings with it the task of confronting the implications of the end of metaphysics. 
Arguments for ‘the end of modernity’ and ‘the end of metaphysics’ are elaborated in 
his books from the 1980’s; The Adventure of Difference, The End of Modernity, and 
The Transparent Society.  His thought characterises a ‘journeying into difference’ 
which defends a ‘weak’ interpretation of Nietzsche and Heidegger. Inspired by the 
work of Réne Girard,96 Vattimo links the nihilistic vocation of ‘Being’ and 
Heidegger’s theory of the history of ‘Being’ as ‘the weakening of strong structures’. 
                                                          
94 Frederiek Depoortere, Christ in Postmodern Philosophy: Gianni Vattimo, Rene Girard, and Slavoj 
Žižek, New York: T & T Clark, 2008, p. 3. 
95 I see Vattimo’s return to religion as the prodigal son’s return to Father’s house. 
96 Vattimo read Girard’s of Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World (trans., P. Gregory, 
London: Athlone Press, 1987), and Violence and the Sacred (trans., P. Gregory, London: Athlone Press, 
1988). These books influenced Vattimo substantially in forming his notion of ‘the weak thought’. 
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This is, as we will see below, involves what he calls the ‘transcription’ of the Christian 
doctrine of the incarnation (B, 33-36). The incarnation or the end of metaphysics 
dismantles the ‘natural sacred’ and opens a path to secularisation.  
Vattimo has been influenced by different philosophers. Umberto Ecco, Luigi 
Pareyson, Karl Löwith, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Réne Girard, Richard Rorty are the 
most prominent. Vattimo explains Heidegger and Nietzsche’s role in transforming his 
idea of modern thinking in The Adventure of Difference. He observes; “[It] is my 
conviction that Nietzsche and Heidegger have done more than any other thinkers 
currently within our cultural horizon to transform radically the whole idea of thinking, 
so that since them ‘to think’ has come to mean something different from what it meant 
before.”97 The claim that ‘to think has come to mean something different from what it 
meant before’ is interpreted by Vattimo in relation to the Nietzschean problematic of 
‘the eternal return’, ‘the death of God’, and the Heideggerian ‘overcoming of 
metaphysics’. Vattimo takes Heidegger’s ‘critique of humanism’ or Nietzsche’s 
announcement of an ‘accomplished nihilism’ as ‘positive’ moments in a philosophical 
reconstruction, rather than as symptoms of decadence (EM, 1)98.  
Vattimo in the End of Modernity explains how Nietzschean and Heideggerian 
‘postmodern’ and ‘anti-Enlightenment’ thought positively and progressively made 
‘weak thought’ possible. He explains, “[T]he ideas of Nietzsche and Heidegger, more 
than any other, offer us the chance to pass from a purely critical and negative 
description of the postmodern condition, typical of early twentieth century Kulturkritik 
(critique of civilization or culture) and its more recent offshoots, to an approach that 
treats the postmodern condition as positive possibility and opportunity” (EM, 11).  
The distinctiveness of Vattimo depends on how he differs from, and progressively 
deconstructs, Nietzsche and Heidegger by introducing ‘weak thought’ and conjoining 
it with the notion of secularisation. Weak thought claims that this conjunction leads to 
a recovery of religious experience (Ricouer). In Belief, he declares that he prefers both 
to other thinkers because “their thesis, based on a given interpretation of their work, 
                                                          
97 Gianni Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference: Philosophy after Nietzsche and Heidegger, trans., 
Cyprian Blamires with the assistance of Thomas Harrison, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993, pp. 1-2. 
98 Gianni Vattimo, End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture, trans., J. R. 
Synder, Oxford: Polity Press, 2002, p. 1. Hereafter this text will be cited as EM with corresponding 
page number.  
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seems to be above all in harmony with a specifically Christian religious substratum 
that has remained a living part of me” (B, 33). How does Vattimo develop his notion 
of ‘weak thought’?  
 
3. 2 Evolution of ‘Weak Thought’ 
In Belief, Vattimo suggests that his Christian inspiration makes itself felt in his reading 
of Heidegger’s ‘being’ precisely in its characterisation as ‘weak’. Il Pensiero debole 
(weak thought) is an expression Vattimo used in an essay “Toward an Ontology of 
Decline” (1979). He claims that it has become the label of a “philosophical trend or 
(even) a school of thought, whose borders are even now uncertain”99 (B, 34). Vattimo 
drew the phrase from an essay by Carlo Augusto Viano100 and goes as to define it not 
as “the idea of thinking that is more aware of its own limits, that abandons its claims 
to global and metaphysical visions, but above all a theory of weakening as the 
constitutive character of Being in the epoch of the end of metaphysics” (B, 35).  
The political and historical source of ‘weak thought’ is his Il sogetto e la maschera: 
Nietzsche e il problema della liberazione101 of 1974. This book became a political and 
philosophical manifesto for the democratic Left in Italy. However, his own students, 
some of whom were arrested for their Leninist activities misunderstood the book. The 
conceptual problem started for Vattimo when they wrote letters full of ‘metaphysical 
and violent rhetorical subjectivity’. Vattimo could not accept these either morally or 
philosophically. He came to the realisation that his “Nietzschean superman 
revolutionary subject” had been misinterpreted. Reading these ‘metaphysical’ letters 
made Vattimo realise that the ethical interpretation of nihilism and of Heidegger’s 
ontological difference created and justified ‘weak thought’. However, ‘weak thought’ 
came to life not out of fear of terrorism but as a response to the terrorist interpretation 
of Italy’s democratic Left.102 
                                                          
99 Santiago Zabala, Weakening Philosophy; Essays in Honour of Gianni Vattimo, ed., London: McGill-
Queen’s University Press,2007, p. 12. 
100 Carlo Augusto Viano “Reason, Abundance, and Belief,” in Crisi delle regione [The Crisis of Reason], 
ed., Aldo Giorgio Gargani, 1979, quoted by Santiago Zabala in Weakening Philosophy, p. 12. 
101 The English translation of the book is The Subject and I’s Mask: Nietzsche and the Problem of 
Liberation, Milan: Fabbri Bompiani, 1974. 
102 Santiago Zabala, pp. 12-13 and Frederiek Depoortere, pp. 6-7. 
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Vattimo links ‘weak thought’ with the rediscovery of Christianity. He was uncertain 
about his personal journey when he made the substantial link between Christianity and 
‘weak thought’. It might have “happened in the wake of the experience of suffering, 
sickness and death of people who were dear to him...” (B, 36). He recalls Réne Girard’s 
work, Of Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World, which may have made this 
link possible. Vattimo further suggests; “the weak reading of Heidegger and the idea 
that the history of Being has, as a guiding thread, weakened the structures of the 
claimed peremptoriness of the real as given ‘there’ outside, was in effect nothing other 
but the transmission of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation of the Son of God” (B, 
36). 
In After the Death of God, Vattimo enumerates a new hermeneutical nuance for weak 
thought. When the objective world consumes itself, it gives way to a growing 
subjective transmission not of individuals but of communities, cultures, sciences, and 
languages. Vattimo theorises this as weak thought,103 as a going ‘beyond the oblivion 
of metaphysics’. Vattimo raises the concern; “to what extent does the weakening of 
the principle of reality that [...] occurs in the transition to post modernity, respond to 
the needs that inspire the effort to overcome metaphysics and modernity?”104 His 
answer specifies the existential implications of ‘weak thought’ which supply 
philosophical reasons for preferring a more liberal, tolerant, and democratic society 
rather than an authoritarian and totalitarian one (NE, 19).  
In his co-edited book After the Death of God (2007) John D. Caputo clarifies Vattimo’s 
‘weak thought’. In the essay, ‘Spectral Hermeneutics: On the Weakening of God and 
the Theology of the Event’, Caputo states that Vattimo has described a two-sided 
process of weakening. “The [first] process is the weakening of Being, from an 
objective metaphysical structure into interpretation [‘event’ in the Heideggerian sense] 
or ...into the ‘world as a picture’...The second process is the weakening of God, which 
is described in Pauline language as emptying (kenosis)” (ADG, 17-18). The double 
processes of the weakening of Being and of God are the correlates of what Vattimo 
                                                          
103 Gianni Vattimo and John D. Caputo, After the Death of God, ed., Jeffrey W. Robbins and forward by 
Gabriel Vahanian, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 40. Hereafter this text will be cited 
as ADG with corresponding page number. 
104 Gianni Vattimo, Nihilism and Emancipation, ed., Santiago Zabala, trans., William McCuaig and 
forward by Richard Rorty, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, p. 19. Hereafter this text will be 
cited as NE with corresponding page number.  
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calls ‘weak thought.’ I explain the evolution of the weak thought as a ‘going beyond’ 
of metaphysics and as the consequences of God’s death.  
 
3.2.1 Violence and Metaphysics 
Vattimo argues that the obligation of ‘the self’ in the present epoch is to reflect on the 
link between violence and metaphysics (AC, 113). This idea is attributed to Nietzsche 
and Heidegger as the imposition of destructive strength that is anticipated to cause 
destruction. Behaviour that ignores David Hume’s law tends to be violent.105 
Reflections by Theodor W. Adorno, and Emmanuel Levinas also explore the relation 
between metaphysics and violence.106 “Metaphysics becomes a source of ‘violence’ 
when it claims to have reached the truth. In metaphysical thought, ‘truth’ is identified 
with immutable principles and axioms, and the certainty of the doubting ego. When 
truth becomes the possession of one human being, then it dangerously turns into a 
source of violence.”107 Vattimo in The Adventure of Difference observes that the 
metaphysical tradition is a tradition of violent thinking.108(AD, 5).  It is the belief that 
‘one person’, ‘a system’ or authority has access to objective truth.  
Vattimo argues in After Christianity that an awareness in the concept of violence might 
put an end to such violence. Violence, he claims, ultimately draws from the need, the 
                                                          
105 “Hume’s Law, recalls, and refers to the observation...that it is not possible to move from the 
description of a natural behaviour to the assertion of a norm without presupposing another thesis 
(i.e., that what happens in nature is good in itself, [and all the resistance against this naturally oriented 
goodness is violence])” (A C, 114). 
106 “The atrocious actions carried out by Nazism in the first part of the twentieth century against 
numerous human beings considered as “inferior categories” help us to understand the risks that may 
hide behind the word “truth” as it is used in some contexts. Adorno and Levinas, who are qualified 
witnesses of what happened during the Nazi period, join in the refusal of metaphysics...Violence nests 
in metaphysical thinking and manifests itself in various ways, as “knowledge” organizing everything 
on the basis of a rational system where everything must be explained as well as through the “brutal 
conquest of beings through violence.”” (Silvia Benso and Brain Schroeder, Between Nihilism and 
Politics: The Hermeneutics of Gianni Vattimo, ed., Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010, p. 
102.) 
107 Silvia Benso and Brain Schroeder, Between Nihilism and Politics: The Hermeneutics of Gianni 
Vattimo, p. 102. 
108 Gianni Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference: Philosophy after Nietzsche and Heidegger, trans., 
Cyprian Blamires with assistance of Thomas Harrison, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993, p. 5. Hereafter 
this text will be cited as AD with corresponding page number. Vattimo explains, “All the categories of 
metaphysics are violent categories: Being and its attributes, the ‘first’ cause, man as ‘responsible’, and 
even the will to power, if that is read metaphysically as affirmation or as the assumption of power over 
the world.” (AC, 115)  
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resolve, and the desire to reach and be taken up into the first principle (AC, 117). 
Through an intricate complex chain of influences, metaphysical violence deeply 
influences many of the more controversial aspects of ‘Christian Morality’.109 For 
example, the idea of natural rights grounded in the idea of a ‘natural’ brotherhood of 
men had the historical function of diminishing the violence of extreme cultural 
fragmentation.110 “This transformation is bound up with the same principle that, 
according to Heidegger, has put an end to metaphysics: the fact of its becoming, from 
the ideal prefigureations of reality’s rationalisation, an effective law for the functioning 
of the rational world of technology and the power grounded in it” (AC, 115). Therefore, 
violence in Christianity maintains its link to metaphysics.111 This ‘unholy’ alliance of 
Christianity with metaphysics as the ‘science of ‘Being’ is a key reason for violence 
entering Christianity. Vattimo suggests two reasons for this: (1) “the responsibilities 
that the Church inherited as the only remaining temporal power after the dissolution 
of the Roman Empire”, and (2) “the identification of Christian existence with classical 
philosophical existence: the human being can realise humanity fully by raising it to a 
knowledge of first principles”112 (AC, 117, and AC, 114-117).  
With the help of Nietzsche and Heidegger, Vattimo looks to ‘overcome’ the vicious 
circle of the violence within metaphysics. He agrees with Heidegger that it is not 
possible to ‘overcome’ metaphysics or to abolish it by conceiving of it merely as a 
matter of opinion. Notwithstanding the inability to ‘overcome’ the violence of 
metaphysics in a radical manner, Vattimo depends on Heidegger to find a solution. He 
advances the theory of weakening, suggesting that “Being has to be sought outside of 
the metaphysics of objectivity precisely for ethical reasons, and the latter must guide 
us in our elaboration of the consequences of a non-metaphysical conception of ‘Being’ 
                                                          
109 Vattimo gives the examples of the ‘blessing’ of sexuality in marriage, which grants that institution 
the same legitimacy as a just war...Vattimo is also critical of Catholic teachings that demand that the 
laws of the state must conform to the laws that the Church claims to be “natural.” (AC, 115) 
110 Vattimo gives the example of the “natural brotherhood of man” and when and how it fell into crisis 
and began to reveal its violent foundations. (AC, 115)  
111 Vattimo observes that metaphysical violence deeply affects many of the most controversial aspects 
of ‘Christian morality’; especially the case of ‘sexual morality’. He explains this with the help of Dilthey; 
“According to Dilthey, metaphysics lasted well after Kant because the philosophical meaning of the 
new Christian concern with interiority, subjectivity, and, ultimately, freedom emerges only after a long 
period during which the metaphysical objectivism of antiquity continued to prevail.” (AC, 114-116) 
112 Vattimo further explains, “in this view, the commandment of charity appears totally consequential. 
What ultimately matters is knowledge of the truth, which involves detachment from the sensible good 
so that struggle for survival and conflict with others may be reduced. However, the positive meaning 
of forgoing violence is not an (ethical) openness to the other.” (AC, 117-118) 
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i.e., an ontology of weakening. To be clear: the Christian inheritance that ‘returns’ in 
weak thought is primarily the Christian precept of charity and its rejection of violence” 
(B, 44).   
Together with ‘weak thought’, Vattimo adopts both a Nietzschean notion of ‘the death 
of God’ and ‘the fabulisation’ of the world to substantiate his Heideggerian 
interpretation of ‘overcoming metaphysical violence’. Thus, metaphysical violence 
gives way to hermeneutical nihilism, the fixed world of subject and object dissolving 
into a play of interpretations. With this conception of the end of metaphysics, 
Nietzsche anticipates the complex meaning of many, if not all, the discourses that have 
been at the centre of philosophical attention since the end of the nineteenth century. 
Vattimo suggests that there is a link between metaphysics and violence that is 
reducible to a definite schema. He argues that this may perhaps have an implication 
more similar to Nietzsche’s approach to metaphysics. “The unmasking of metaphysics 
that marks the advent of nihilism reveals its ties to a condition of violence and is an 
act of violence itself.”113 It is related to an inseparable aspect of the crisis of 
metaphysics, a crisis that occurs in relation to a manifestation of violence as such. 
Vattimo argues:   
[This] could occur in the more evident sense that once metaphysical beliefs are 
weakened, there is no longer anything that limits the conflictual nature of existence, the 
struggle between weak and strong for a supremacy no longer legitimated by anything  
(natural or divine laws etc.) but by the mere fact of imposing itself; or it could occur in 
the sense that seems decisive for Nietzsche (and for the problem of metaphysics in 
general), whereby the weakening of metaphysical beliefs not only uncovers the violence 
of existence for what it is and makes it no longer possible, but is born as the result of an 
outburst of violence.114 
These two features of the link between metaphysics and violence should be considered 
together. Vattimo observes that the theoretical unmasking undertaken by the school of 
suspicion and the practical-political coming to light of violence without limits (as 
mentioned above) “summarise the transformations and crises that philosophy has 
undergone in the last one hundred years.”115 However, for Vattimo, it is possible to 
unmask the metaphysical violence in the ‘fabulisation of being’ and ‘the death of 
metaphysical God’.  
                                                          
113 Gianni Vattimo, “Conclusion: Metaphysics and Violence” in Weak Philosophy; Essays in Honour of 
Gianni Vattimo, ed., Santiago Zabala, London: McGill University Press, 2007, pp. 400-424. 
114 Gianni Vattimo, “Conclusion: Metaphysics and Violence”, pp.400-424. 
115 Gianni Vattimo, “Conclusion: Metaphysics and Violence”, pp. 400-424. 
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3.2.2 The Death of God: Self-sacrifice or Historical Inevitability 
In a dialogue with Jeffrey W. Robbins, Vattimo proposes two complementary 
meanings for ‘the death of God’: (1) Nietzsche’s anthropological argument that 
mankind has killed God because he is no longer a necessity, deconstructs the primitive 
conception of God as a necessity. Obedience to God demanded laws and rules which 
in their pursuit of truth promoted science and technology which then revealed God as 
an unnecessary hypothesis. In Nietzsche’s mind, God was as a lie. Vattimo, however, 
is more convinced of a non-literal interpretation of the death of God. (2) This is the 
death of Christ on the Cross. Vattimo explains, “Why? Because it is exactly after 
Christianity, or the event of Christianity, that it becomes possible to no longer believe 
in the classical, rational gods of the Greeks”116 (ADG, 90). The event of Christ’s death 
kills metaphysics. Christianity turns the attention of man inward so that philosophy 
and religion become more subjective (ADG, 89-90).  Vattimo sees a parallel between 
nihilism and Christianity, “because Jesus came into the world not to demonstrate what 
the ‘natural’ order was but to demolish it in the name of charity” (FT, 59). The death 
of Christ reveals that the core of the idea of Christianity is the negation of a necessary, 
objective, rational (i.e., eternal) structure of the world. Ethical Christianity should 
involve the dissolution of faith in the metaphysical structure of the world. The 
Nietzschean understanding of the death of God corresponds to the ‘death of God’ 
introduced by Christianity, i.e., “no structure, no objective or eternal God” (ADG, 91). 
This unearths its resemblance in the Heideggerian idea of the dissolution of 
metaphysics, which realises itself in Vattimo’s theories of secularisation and kenosis. 
This final dissolution of both supreme values and the metaphysical belief in an 
objective and eternal order of ‘Being’ marks the advent of nihilism.117  
Vattimo contends that the Nietzschean claim that ‘believers have killed God’ should 
not be read literally. Vattimo detects a resemblance between ‘death of art’ and ‘death 
                                                          
116 Gianni, Vattimo, A Farewell to Truth, trans., William McCuaig and forward by Robert T. Valgenti, 
New York: Columbia Press, 2011, p. 58. Hereafter this text will be cited as FT with corresponding page 
number. 
117 It is remarkable to note that Vattimo’s ‘death of God’ bears a resemblance to Thomas J. J. Altizer’s 
theory of ‘the death of God.’ Both Vattimo, and Altizer were influenced by Nietzsche. They both share 
similar accounts of God’s emptying/humiliation in history to make himself immanent. However, 
Vattimo observes that other ‘death of God’ theologians including Altizer did not “articulate an explicit 
theory of secularisation, and of the death of God as the positive affirmation of divinity based on the 
idea of incarnation.” (AC, 37).   
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of God’ arguments. He writes, “when discussing the death of art, we are speaking 
within the framework of an effective perverted realisation of the Hegelian absolute 
Spirit. Or rather... we are speaking within the framework of an accomplished 
metaphysics that has arrived at its end, in the sense in which Heidegger, (who sees 
Nietzsche’s work as a philosophical anticipation of this) speaks of such an occurrence” 
(EM, 51-52). The ‘death of art’ is not to be understood as a ‘notion’ corresponding to 
a certain state of things. Rather, it is an ‘event’ (an announcement) that constitutes the 
historical and ontological constellation in which one moves. “This constellation is a 
network of historical and cultural events and of the words which belong to them, at 
once describing and co-determining them” (EM, 52). The ‘death of art’ concerns, in 
the geschicklich sense, what is ‘destined’ (EM, 52).  The Nietzschean ‘death of God’ 
also has ‘the character of an announcement’ (AC, 13) within history. In this sense, ‘the 
death of God’ can be characterised as an historical inevitability. The end of 
metaphysics is also an announcement (event) that cannot be ascertained objectively, 
‘one to which thought is called to respond’. “It is an event that transforms the existence 
of the person who receives the announcement...” (AC, 13). Only if the characteristic 
of ‘event’ and ‘announcement’ are properly conceived, can one “recognise the 
analogy, or close continuity, between the Nietzschean doctrine of the death of God,” 
the ‘death of art’, “and the end of metaphysics” (AC, 13). For Vattimo, this 
philosophical trinity provides the general framework of post-modern experience. 
Vattimo turns to Nietzsche to elucidate the post-modern implications of the ‘death of 
God’. In Gay Science he argues: 
God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, 
the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has 
yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What 
water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games 
shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we 
ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?118 
As Vattimo suggests in his explanation of the death of God, belief in God is no longer 
a powerful instrument of rationalisation in academic disciplines. The scientific world 
view paved the way for technology with “its reassuring effects that facilitate existence” 
(AC, 12). According to Vattimo, “[T]his is why Nietzsche argues that believers have 
killed God” (AC, 12). And yet, when announcing ‘the death of God’ Nietzsche 
                                                          
118 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Bernard Williams ed., Josefine Nauckhoff, trans., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001, Section 125, The Madman. 
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anticipates that his shadow will continue to be cast upon the world. The announcement 
of ‘the death of God’ or ‘the end of metaphysics’ does not close off Nietzsche’s 
argument with religion (AC, 11-12). Vattimo strongly defends Nietzsche against the 
criticism that he is the ‘murderer of God’. “Nietzschean doctrine has only the character 
of an announcement;119 Nietzsche is not advocating an atheistic metaphysics, which 
would imply the claim to describe reality correctly as something from which God is 
excluded” (AC, 13). ‘The death of God’ or ‘the end of metaphysics’ is not a discovery 
‘Being’ is a mere objectivity reduced by science. It is rather a series of events that 
transforms existence and beliefs through post-metaphysical interpretation.  
Vattimo foresees a renewal of religion as a consequence of the events of ‘the death of 
god.’ For him, it is an existential and onto-theological necessity that religions 
(Christianity) undergo a dialogical and interpretive process of weakening. It is the 
moral God of philosophers who has died. Vattimo finds many indications that the death 
of the moral God has paved the way for the renewal of religious life (AC, 15-16). The 
‘death of God’ and the ‘end of metaphysics’ are not merely the discoveries of a 
philosopher or school of thought.  It is ultimately associated with a series of ‘events’ 
that have transformed existence, “of which post-metaphysical philosophy gives an 
‘interpretation’ rather than an objective description” (AC, 15). If so, the ‘death of God’, 
is an historical ‘event’, the ‘self-sacrifice’ of God himself. Vattimo feels significantly 
that the ‘death of God’ has liquidated the philosophical basis for atheism: “it seems 
that the main philosophical outcome for the death of metaphysical God and of the 
almost general discrediting of philosophical foundationalism is the renewed possibility 
of religious experience” (AC, 16). Vattimo accordingly proposes a post-metaphysical 
interpretation and a renewed possibility of the return of religion through his praxis-
oriented philosophy. Accordingly, religious experience without the image of the 
metaphysical God is possible.   
 
 
                                                          
119 The ‘death of God’ as an announcement should be taken beyond its literal meaning. Vattimo 
explains, “It should be taken in the light of the general phenomenon of the lightening of existence 
brought about by the rationalisation that was initially related to belief in God. This phenomenon has 
made useless and obsolete the radical hypothesis concerning the existence of a Supreme Being as the 
ground and ultimate telos of the world” (AC, 12).  
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3.3 Nihilistic Vocation 
Vattimo interprets nihilism, first, in a Nietzschean sense. Nihilism can be defined as 
belief in the truth of a fiction which is not recognised as fiction but as reality. Nihilism 
is “the dissolution of [all] ultimate foundations, the understanding that in the history 
of philosophy, and of the Western culture in general, ‘God is dead’, and ‘the real world 
has become a fable’” (NE, xxv). Nihilism, in this sense, is an historical process by 
which the highest values (Being, God) devalue themselves. Thus, for Nietzsche, 
nihilism is the ‘death of God’ and ‘the devaluation of the highest values’. To 
understand Heideggerian nihilism in its relation to Nietzsche’s, Vattimo “attributes to 
the term ‘value’ – which reduces Being into itself – the rigorous sense of ‘exchange-
value’” (EM, 21). Therefore, nihilism is the reduction of ‘Being’ into ‘exchange-
value’, i.e., into things and commodities. If one follows the main thread supplied by 
the nexus nihilism/value, one may say after Nietzsche that nihilism is the consumption 
of the use-value in exchange-value. Vattimo explains; “nihilism does not mean that 
Being is in the power of the subject; rather, it means that Being is completely dissolved 
in the discovery of value, in the infinite transformations of universal equivalence” 
(EM, 22). By ‘exchange values’, Heidegger and Nietzsche refer to the values by which 
we order and organise our lives. They encompass every idea and concept that we 
imbue with value from religion, morality, and philosophy. What Nietzsche calls for is 
a kind of self-consciousness about the fact that values are posited to enhance our lives. 
Instead of being enslaved by values posited by rulers or predecessors, we must reclaim 
the function of positing values, such that we can enhance our lives. Positing values is 
what Nietzsche sees as the full exercise of the will to power and as a solution to the 
problem of nihilism. With this interpretation, Heidegger fundamentally diverges on 
the grounds that Nietzsche, in his ‘devaluation of the highest powers hitherto’ has 
presupposed a kind of Cartesian interpretation concerning the meaning of Being that 
binds him to the limits of the very value-thinking he despises. In this regard, Vattimo’s 
position on nihilism can be understood by referring to a phrase that often appears in 
Nietzsche’s work, namely that of ‘accomplished nihilism’. Accomplished nihilism can 
be construed as the “situation in which man rolls from the centre toward X” (EM, 19). 
It also resembles Heideggerian nihilism, in which at the end, ‘there is nothing left’ of 
‘Being’ as such.  
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Vattimo traces the roots of an accomplished nihilism to the superfluity of highest 
values. This is possible because the conditions of existence are less violent and less 
prone to pathos after the death of God. The liquidation of the highest values does not 
signify the establishment or re-establishment of a situation of ‘value’ in the strong 
sense (EM, 24). He asserts that nihilism, like the ‘fable’, maintains in Nietzsche’s 
philosophical vocabulary some of the same traits that it has in everyday language. Seen 
from the perspective of ‘accomplished nihilism’, “this occurrence can be understood 
in terms of the generalization of exchange-value in our society” (EM, 25). 
Vattimo sketches a commonsensical link between Heideggerian nihilism, and 
Nietzschean nihilism. Vattimo explains; “[T]his characterisation of nihilism is 
constructed by Heidegger in such a way as to include that accomplished nihilist 
Nietzsche, even if, for Heidegger, it seems possible and desirable to go beyond 
nihilism, while for Nietzsche the accomplishment of nihilism is all that we should wait 
and hope for” (EM, 20). Thus, for Nietzsche, nihilism is the death of God and the 
devaluation of highest values; it is the reduction and annihilation of ‘Being’ into value 
(EM, 20). According to Heidegger, the reduction of ‘Being’ to value places Being in 
the power of a subject who ‘recognises’ values. Here in the Heideggerian sense of 
nihilism, ‘Being’ relies on the power of the subject, rather than existing in an 
autonomous, independent, and foundational way. 
Concerning the existential nuances of nihilism, Vattimo casts Heidegger as a 
philosopher who has a nostalgia for ‘Being’. Heidegger writes that Ge-Stell120 is also 
a ‘flashing up of the Ereignis’,121 “or of the advent of being in which every 
appropriation (every giving-forth of something qua something) occurs only as a trans-
propriation” (EM, 26). Vattimo explains further; “this process of dizzying circularity 
strips both humanity and ‘Being’ of every metaphysical characteristic. The trans-
propriation in which the Ereignis of Being realised is, in the end, the dissolution of 
Being in exchange-value, that is in language and in the tradition constituted by the 
transmission and interpretation of messages” (EM, 26). In the epoch of exchange-value 
                                                          
120 Gestell is used by Heidegger to describe enframing. We may wonder what does Heidegger means 
by “enframing”? Enframing – Gestell, is the essence of modern technology – die Wesentliches der 
Technologie. With respect to Heidegger’s mindset, Gestell is the way in which truth reveals itself as 
the ‘standing-reserve’ – die stehender Pufferspeicher, http://monday-
wtfs.blogspot.co.uk/2012/03/enframing-gestell.html, accessed on 12/03/2015. 
121 Ereignis is translated often as "an event," but is better understood in terms of something "coming 
into view." It comes from the German prefix, er-, comparable to’re-' in English. 
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everything is given in a more evident and exaggerated fashion. This narration is 
articulated by the mass media, which is inextricably intertwined with the tradition of 
messages, language, and culture. Therefore, this conception of ‘Being transforming 
into exchange-value’, i.e., the world becoming a fable, is nihilistic even insofar as it 
leads to a weakening of the cogent force of reality. 
Vattimo refers to nihilism as the end-point of modernity where ‘weak thought’ takes 
precedence over objectivist metaphysics. His notion of the ‘return’ of/ return to 
religion is deeply informed by his nihilism (B, 29). Developing the relation of nihilistic 
vocation to Christian religion, Vattimo, in Farewell to Truth (FT, 59) explains that 
nihilism equals Christianity because Jesus came into the world not to demonstrate what 
the ‘natural’ order was, but to demolish it in the name of charity. In his concept of 
nihilism as the end-point of modernity, ‘weak thought’ takes precedence over 
metaphysicalism. It leads to the ‘fact’ that there is no universal and stable conception 
of truth, but rather truth is interpreted as an event.  
 
3.3.1 Truth as Event versus Correspondence 
Vattimo’s theory of truth is influenced by Nietzsche and Heidegger’s notions of Being. 
He does not reject truth per se (FT, viii) but recognises it as something construed. His 
‘weak thought’ is the renunciation of both claims to universal truth, and to stable order 
of reality. Analysing Nietzschean and Heideggerian ‘truth’ and ‘being’, Vattimo 
constructs a hermeneutical ontology of truth. While relying on the deconstruction of 
Heidegger’s critique of truth as correspondence, Vattimo expresses the doubt that 
“without some idea of evidence, and correspondence, it is not possible to secure 
these122 applications of the notion of truth, without which thought seems to abdicate 
its vocation?”123 This can be answered only by either reconstructing or constructing 
the positive terms of a hermeneutic conception of truth. For Vattimo; “it is precisely a 
meditation on the insufficiency of the idea of truth as correspondence of judgment to 
thing that has set us on the path of Being as event” (BI, 76). 
                                                          
122 “Defending the validity of an assertion or in putting forward a rational critique of the existing order, 
or in correcting a false opinion and so passing from appearance to truth…” (BI, 75). 
123 Gianni Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy, trans., D. 
Webb. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, p. 75. Hereafter this text will be cited as BI with corresponding 
page number.  
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Nietzsche, on the other hand, says Vattimo, “thinks that what exists is the pure 
conflictual interplay of force and power, a conflict among interpretations with no 
mooring in any objective norm that could decide truth” (FT, 4). Vattimo states that 
being and truth are not to be understood as objective data that precede the application 
of ‘conceptual schemes’. 
[W]e can speak of Being only at the level of the events in which the ever-varying 
modes that structure the world of human historical experience are instituted. Being 
is not an object, it is the aperture within which alone man and the world, subject 
and object, can enter stability on the subject (which arises only within the specific 
apertures), Being should be thought of as “event”: Being is not, properly speaking, 
but rather “comes about”, happens (EN, 6). 
Vattimo’s ‘non-metaphysical’ notion of truth and ‘Being’ conceives of truth and 
‘Being’ as event, (Ereignis) rather than as objects endowed with permanence and 
stability. In other words, truth and ‘Being’ are constantly interpreted, re-written, and 
remade (EM, xx). Jon R Synder in his ‘Translator’s Introduction’ to The End of 
Modernity describes the process of eventing.  He explains, “while truth can certainly 
be experienced by us, it can never be appropriated and transmitted to others as a kind 
of rational knowledge” (EM, xx). If truth is characterised as rational knowledge, as an 
object, it loses its eventual nature as something that occurs in the unique circumstances 
of each interpretive encounter. An event never begins or ends within the temporality 
of time and an event remains an event so long as it continues to effect history and 
language. An event can also show itself only in part, as its other parts are withheld as 
a promise to be revealed. If there is a truth event, what it withholds will be brought out 
only by critique and philosophy. Vattimo seeks to bring out the inside (that which is 
withheld) of the event through his ‘weak thought’.  
 
In After Christianity, Vattimo argues that a way out of modernity cannot be achieved 
by retrieving the concept of ‘Being’ as a stable and eternal, supra-historical structure, 
but rather by thinking more radically of Being as event. He explains, “Being gives 
itself as an announcement or ‘sending’ as Heidegger says, that comes from the tradition 
of which postmodern thought is the heir”124(AC, 43). The system of values itself 
                                                          
124 Vattimo further explains that such “a sending forth belongs to the history of salvation developed 
by Joachim of Fiore, in so far as it retains all the features of what Joachim called the beginning of the 
age of spirit” (AC, 43). However, Vattimo has “rediscovered Joachim’s teachings by starting from the 
thesis of the end of metaphysics, that is, the idea that Being announces itself as event and destiny of 
weakening” (AC, 44). 
52 
 
becomes an infinite process of event and transformation. It is in this transforming event 
and into this flux of values that the traditional metaphysical being has begun to dissolve 
and disappear. ‘Being’ itself is forever subject to further eventing and revaluation. It 
goes through “the interpretative process through which the value that has previously 
been assigned to something is exchanged for another equivalent value” (EM, xxi). 
Brian Schroeder argues that “it is a transforming occurrence.”125 Insofar as it is 
transformative, such an event has an experiential character. Moreover, this 
transformation is connected to an interpretative work of reconstructing of meaning that 
is also emancipatory in the sense of Verwindung. Snyder says that this experience can 
be called ‘postmodern’ and has its origin in the reduction of everything, including 
‘Being’ to exchange value and may be called the infinite interpretability of reality (EM, 
xxi).  
The infinite interpretability of reality allows the ‘weakening’ of metaphysical ‘Being’ 
and truth (EM, xxi). Vattimo contends that the experience of infinite interpretability 
has led to ‘the weakening of the cogent force of reality’: it has made ‘all that is given 
by metaphysics as real, necessary, peremptory and true’ into another interpretive 
possibility amongst others (EM, 27). The metaphor of ‘weak thought’ describes the 
possibility of post-modernity and its related hermeneutic ontology. Hermeneutical 
ontology facilitates the possible interpretation of our condition or situation. ‘Being’ is 
nothing outside of its event, and that event occurs when ‘Being’ historicises itself and 
we subsequently historicise ourselves (EM, 3). The infinite interpretability and ‘event’ 
nature of truth and ‘Being’ eventually led to ‘the weakening’ of the Christian faith.  
 
3.3.2 Weakening Christian Faith 
As Vattimo explains in Belief, the ‘circularity of his life-situation’126 that prompted his 
‘departure’ and ‘return’ to religion embodied the weakening of Christian faith. Vattimo 
finds a relation between his personal Christian inheritance and Nietzschean- 
Heideggerian nihilism. He explains, “I should say that the Christian inspiration makes 
itself felt in my reading of Heidegger precisely in its characterisation as ‘weak’” (B, 
                                                          
125 Silva Benso and Brian Schroeder, Between Nihilism and Politics: Hermeneutics of Gianni Vattimo, 
 p. 3. 




34).  However, Vattimo does not point to a time when the link between ‘weak thought’ 
and Christianity happened in his life. His explanation is that it may have been during 
the experience of suffering, sickness and death of those dear to him (B, 35-36). 
Taking recourse to Girard’s Violence and Sacred, Vattimo explains that the sacred is 
deeply related to violence. Harmony can be established only by finding the scapegoat 
on which to focus violence (B, 37). While retaining the status of a sacrificial victim, 
the scapegoat is invested with sacred attributes. This scapegoat-victim is retained in 
the Bible with Jesus as the perfect victim. Girard argues against this Christian thought. 
He says that “Jesus’ incarnation did not take place to supply the Father with a victim 
adequate to his wrath; rather, Jesus came into the world precisely to reveal and abolish 
the nexus between violence and the sacred. He was put to death because such a 
revelation was intolerable to a humanity rooted in the violent tradition of sacrificial 
religions”127 (B, 37 and CTWF, 27). Vattimo goes beyond Girard to explain the 
nihilistic recovery of Christianity. He argues that Girard’s violent God does not shun 
his metaphysical attributes. Unless these are disbanded, the end image of God or the 
‘death of God’ of Nietzsche cannot be realised (B, 38-39). 
‘Weak thought’ should not be taken as a negative preparation for the return of religion. 
“By contrast”, Vattimo explains, “the incarnation, that is God’s abasement to the level 
of humanity, what the New Testament calls God’s kenosis, will be interpreted as the 
sign that the non-violent and non-absolute God of the post-metaphysical epoch has as 
its distinctive trait the vocation for weakening...” (B, 39). Vattimo experiences this 
weak ontology as the ‘transcription’ of the Christian message as a great event, as a 
kind of decisive recovery. It helped him re-establish continuity with his religious 
origins. This reflection “paved the way for a conception of secularisation characteristic 
of modern Western history as an event within Christianity linked positively to Jesus’ 
message and to a conception of the history of modernity as a weakening and 
dissolution of ‘Being’” (B, 40-41). If the natural sacred’s violent mechanism is 
                                                          
127 Gianni Vattimo and Rene Girard, Christianity, Truth, and Weakening Faith: A Dialogue, ed., Pierpalo 
Antonello, and trans., William McCuaig, New York: Columbia University press, 2010, p. 27. Hereafter 
this text will be cited as CTWF with corresponding page number.  Vattimo further elaborates, “in fact, 
the non-victimary reading of the Scripture was already there in the original teachings of Jesus, but as 
the Vulgate text of John 1:5 has it, “et lux in tenebris lucet, et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt.” 
The light – of life, flowing from the word/verbum/logos – shines in the darkness and the darkness could 
not comprehend it.” (CTWF, 79-80) 
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unveiled and undermined by Jesus, it is possible that secularisation is a positive effect 
of Jesus’ teaching, not a way of moving away from it. 
For this reason, Carmelo Dotolo comments, “secularisation is able to re-propose the 
question of God as the question of contemporary reality, but on the condition that one 
does not substitute God for the metaphysical one, even if freed from the sacred 
arrangements of the natural religion.”128 This argument finds greater clarity in Beyond 
Interpretation. Vattimo explains, “we are led to the hypothesis that hermeneutics itself, 
as a philosophy with certain ontological commitments, is the fruit of secularisation as 
the renewal, pursuit, application, and interpretation of the substance of the Christian 
revelation, and pre-eminently the dogma of the incarnation of God” (BI, 52). Vattimo 
maintains that reading Girard on ‘weak thought’ helped him to ‘complete’ Heidegger, 
to clarify the meaning of Girard’s thought and eventually to reopen communication 
between contemporary post-metaphysical philosophy and Judaeo-Christian tradition 
(CTWF, 78). For Vattimo, ‘weakening of Christian faith’ is realised through the 
hermeneutic of ‘overcoming metaphysics’, that is by weakening all absolute claims to 
stable foundations. 
 
3.3.3 Overcoming Metaphysics 
Taking a cue from Nietzsche, Vattimo writes, “metaphysics is itself an act of violence 
because it wants to appropriate the ‘most fertile regions’ hence of the first principles, 
to dominate and control” (ADG, 43). Aristotle in his metaphysics expresses the same 
opinion that the wise know all by knowing the first cause, and are thereby able to 
control and determine all its effects. “Our tradition is dominated by the idea that if we 
only had a stable foundation we could move and act more freely” (ADG, 43). Nietzsche 
and Heidegger postulated theories of the ‘death of God’ and the ‘overcoming of 
metaphysics’ by deconstructing this traditional understanding of foundationalism, i.e., 
‘Being’ as stable, truth as objective, and the existence of God. By overcoming 
metaphysics, Heidegger speaks of a process of emancipation. Vattimo supplies 
                                                          
128 Carmelo Dotolo, “The Hermeneutics of Christianity and Philosophical Responsibility” in Weakening 




philosophical reasons for preferring a liberal, tolerant, and democratic society rather 
than an authoritarian and totalitarian one” (NE, 19). 
As we have established, Vattimo elucidates his argument about the overcoming of 
metaphysics from the Nietzschean and Heideggerian nihilistic perspective. Vattimo is 
aware of the conflicting encounters that occur whenever the possibility of overcoming 
metaphysics is recognised. He observes that “[m]etaphysics cannot be overcome but 
only verwunden - accepted, distorted, and continued...” (AC, 119). It will be difficult 
to think of perfection if not as the identification with Being itself, God, the Supreme 
principle. It is hard to think of metaphysics, or of any essential knowledge, if other 
than as the theoretical appropriation of first-principles. Therefore, it will be difficult to 
ground the law if not in an incontrovertible, unquestionable and given structure, which 
as such can also legitimate the use of force (AC, 118-119). 
Vattimo examines the Nietzschean and Heideggerian ‘overcoming’ of metaphysics as 
an approach that generates a positive possibility. Nietzsche’s accomplished nihilism 
and Heidegger’s Verwindung of metaphysics are not a critical overcoming (EM, 11) 
but a constructive one within the post-modern condition. Santiago Zabala comments 
on this post-modern condition explaining, “Vattimo does not regard post-modernity as 
a radical ‘rapture’ with modernity because for him postmodernism is a new attitude to 
the modern...”129 Vattimo for all his constructive analysis of modernity and 
‘overcoming metaphysics’ makes use of two of Heidegger’s central philosophical 
concepts: Überwindung and Verwindung. 
 
3.3.4 Überwindung vs Verwindung 
Verwindung is set in opposition to Überwindung or ‘overcoming’ and implies a 
transition from one phase or moment to another ‘higher’ one in a given process. ‘Weak 
thought’ performs a Verwindung of the era of metaphysics. The Verwindung of the 
metaphysical tradition is at once a recovery from, recuperation, convalescence, and 
resignation from metaphysics and its strong notion of ‘Being.’ The Hegelian 
Aufhebung is a philosophical predecessor to Verwindung because in its negation 
                                                          
129 Santiago Zabala, Weakening Philosophy, p. 14. 
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Aufhebung re-affirms what is negated, lifted up, and re-affirmed.130 Vattimo does not 
propose a total and categorical overcoming of the perverted realisation of the absolute 
spirit, or of the death of art, but rather a healing of it and a resignation to it. He describes 
how the ‘death of art’ constitutes the end of metaphysics prophesied by Hegel, as lived 
by Nietzsche and as registered by Heidegger. However, Vattimo observes that thought 
stands in opposition to Verwindung regarding metaphysics and is not abandoned like 
an old, worn-out garment, for it still constitutes our ‘humanity’. We yield to 
metaphysics, we heal ourselves from it, we are resigned to it as something that is 
destined to us (EM, 52). For Vattimo, “Verwindung indicates something analogous to 
Überwindung, or overcoming, but is distinctly different from the latter. It has none of 
the characteristics of a dialectical Aufhebung (abolish/sublation [my emphasis]) and it 
contains no sense of a ‘leaving-behind’ of a past that no longer has anything to say to 
us. Precisely this difference between Verwindung and Überwindung can help us to 
understand in philosophical terms the ‘post’ in ‘postmodernism’” (EM, 164).  
 
Verwindung has its philosophical origin in Nietzsche, but it was Heidegger who first 
introduced the concept into philosophical discussion. He speaks about “the problem of 
the sense of being an epigone, that is, the problem of an excess of historical 
consciousness that plagues the nineteenth-century humanity” (EM, 165). Nietzsche 
argues that it can be cured with the help of the ‘supra-historical’ or ‘eternalising’ forces 
of religion and art. However, with the publishing of Human All Too Human, 
Nietzsche’s position concerning ‘historical sickness’ underwent a change (EM, 165). 
He proposed recourse to supra-historical and eternalising forces which bring into play 
the dissolution of modernity through a radicalisation of its own constitutive tendencies. 
Modern and contemporary philosophy goes beyond or is healed of its ‘historical 
sickness’ through a slow ‘weakening’ that brings it along with us as we convalescence 
from its era and its errors. 
 
                                                          
130 By Aufhebung, Hegel designates a movement in which what is lower is surpassed and yet always 
preserved by being elevated into what is higher, gathered up into it. Aufhebung is also translated as 
sublation, which means to “out/up-lift. In Hegel, the term Aufhebung has the apparently contradictory 
implications of both preserving and changing/abolishing (the German verb aufheben means both "to 




“Modernity is the era of overcoming the new which rapidly grows old and is 
immediately replaced by something still newer, in an unstoppable movement that 
discourages all creativity and defines the latter as the sole possible form of life” (EM, 
166). According to Vattimo, overcoming is typically a modern category, and therefore, 
does not enable us to use it as a way out of modernity. He replaces an unthinking notion 
of modernism as violent change with a more plausible and reflective notion, i.e., 
overcoming. (EM, 166). According to Vattimo, there is no escape from modernity by 
appeal to externalising forces, but only by a dissolution of its own inherent tendencies 
(EM, 166). Snyder explains; “truth, when its claims are carefully analysed in their own 
terms, reveals itself to be ‘a value which dissolves into itself’, or in other words, no 
more and no less than a belief without foundation...and his (Nietzsche’s) discovery of 
it is the moment of emergence of philosophical post-modernity” (EM, xIviii). 
Nietzsche radicalises modernity by reducing it to a series of material and ‘chemical’ 
reductions of value. This ‘chemical’ analysis leads to the discovery that truth is a value 
which dissolves itself. Thus, through ‘chemical analysis’, “the very notion of truth is 
dissolved: or in what amounts to the same thing, God, ‘dies’, slain by religiosity and 
by the will to truth which believers have always had, and which now leads them to 
recognise God himself as an error which one can do without” (EM, 167). This 
dissolution of truth is seen as the kenosis of God the Father131 or the Verwindung of 
the metaphysical notion of truth. 
 
It is the kenosis, or weakening, of God the Father, “sending himself to human beings 
by making himself immanent history and scripture, as a live and saving message of 
good news.”132 Nietzsche argues that this nihilistic conclusion offers a way out of 
modernity and could be designated as the moment of the birth of post-modernity in 
philosophy. Since the notion of truth no longer exists and metaphysical foundations no 
longer function there can be no way out of modernity other than through critical 
overcoming; for the latter is part of modernity itself (EM, 167). Therefore, for Vattimo, 
post- modernity is possible only through the process of ‘weak thought,’ i.e., through 
Verwindung or kenosis. 
                                                          
131 Paul’s Letter to Philippines 2:7. It reads, “but he emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, 
becoming as human beings are; and being in every way like a human being.” (The Holy Bible, The 
Revised Standard Version) 
132 Santiago Zabala, Weakening Philosophy, p. 376. 
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Vattimo explains Verwindung, as a ‘twisting’, convalescence-alteration of existing 
structures, whether they are religious, political, or cultural in some other respect, rather 
than their total annihilation or destruction. It “indicates a ‘going beyond’, that is both 
an acceptance [or ‘resignation’] and a deepening, whilst also suggesting both a 
‘convalescence,’ ‘cure’ or ‘healing’ and a ‘distorting’ or ‘twisting’ (EM, 172). Joan 
Stambaugh, has described the difference between Überwindung and Verwindung in 
terms of incorporation. She says;  
[W]hen something is overcome in the sense of being überwunden, it is defeated and left 
behind. This is not the sense Heidegger intends here. When something is overcome in 
the sense of being verwunden, it is, so to speak, incorporated. For example, when one 
‘overcomes’ a state of pain, one does not get rid of the pain. One has ceased to be 
preoccupied with it and has learned to live with it. Thus, to overcome metaphysics 
would mean to incorporate metaphysics, perhaps with the hope, but not with the 
certainty, of elevating it to a new reality.133  
Vattimo observes in Christ in Postmodern Philosophy; “we should leave the logic of 
Überwindung or ‘overcoming’ behind and turn to the logic of Verwindung. This 
distinction between two terms gives more clarity to the meaning of Verwindung.  It 
refers to “‘turning into new purposes’, ‘surpassing’, ‘twisting’, ‘resigning’, and 
‘accepting ironically’.”134 He explains that the Verwinden era of metaphysics means 
to ‘overcome’ it, but not in the commonly accepted sense of a ‘leaving behind’ or 
abandoning and ‘going beyond’; rather it means to go beyond metaphysics by 
accepting and being resigned to it, while seeking at the same time to be cured of 
metaphysics by twisting it in a different direction in order to drain off its strength. 
 
Vattimo recaps that metaphysics cannot be set aside like an opinion. Nor can it be left 
behind like a doctrine in which one no longer believes, rather, it is something which 
remains within one, like the traces of an illness or a kind of pain to which one is 
resigned. For him, Verwindung, “which we experience as the sole possible form of 
post-metaphysical thought, is not only a matter of thought: rather, it concerns ‘Being’ 
as such” (EM, 179). It can be argued that nihilism is not an error of the mind but the 
destiny of ‘Being’ itself. This destiny of ‘Being’ is actualized with the help of 
Verwindung, and Vattimo argues that the hermeneutical being of ‘Being’ (that 
underwent the process of Verwindung) is not to be ignored or overlooked but 
experienced in every human situation.  
                                                          
133 Joan Stambaugh, The Finitude of Being, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992, p. 84. 
134 Frederiek Depoortere, Christ in Postmodern Philosophy, p. 6.  
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The history which we recollect has the structure of the Verwindung of recollection and 
distortion. Since it appears to be a very abstract generalisation, Vattimo translates 
Verwindung into a familiar term; secularisation. “Secularisation/Verwindung would 
describe the course of history not as a linear progression or as decadence, but as a 
course of events in which emancipation is reached only by means of a radical 
transformation and distortion of its very contents” (EM, 179). This Verwindung and 
distortion of the metaphysical ‘Being’ is described by Vattimo as the kenosis. The 
notion of kenosis is seen as the epicentre of the End of Modernity. Accordingly, 
Verwindung does not deny metaphysical ‘Being’ but rather remedies and heals it. 
Vattimo considers this as an opportunity for the philosophical reconstruction of 
religion.  
 
Having explained the development and growth of the hermeneutic of ‘weak thought’, 
we now analyse how ‘weak thought’ becomes the hinge of Vattimo’s concept of 
























VATTIMO’S CONCEPT OF SECULARISATION 
 
4.1 Vattimo’s Concept of Secularisation 
We have established that Vattimo through his hermeneutic of ‘weak thought’ and 
‘death of God’ presupposes the end of a metaphysical God that prepares for the 
rediscovery of a Christian God. The rediscovery of religion is possible only when the 
prejudice of natural religion is removed. The meaning of the end of metaphysics is to 
reveal in ‘Being’ an essential inclination to assert its truth through weakening (B, 39). 
Therefore, weak ontology functions as an aid for the return of religion. As for Vattimo, 
‘returning home’ experience allows him to re-establish continuity with his religious 
tradition. The discovery of the link between the history of Christian revelation and the 
history of nihilism helped him to interpret the history of the West in terms of the 
Christian message. This “paved the way for a conception of secularisation 
characteristic of modern Western history, as an event within Christianity linked 
positively to Jesus, and to a conception of Western modernity as the history of the 
weakening and the dissolution of Being” (B, 40-41). 
 
Vattimo elucidates secularisation as the positive result of Jesus’ teaching. He explains; 
“[I]f the natural sacred is the violent mechanism that Jesus came to unveil and 
undermine, it is possible that secularisation- which also constitutes the Church’s loss 
of temporal authority and human reason’s increasing autonomy from its dependence 
upon an absolute God, is precisely a positive effect of Jesus’ teaching, and not a way 
of moving away from it” (B, 41). Based on this argument, and not seeking a 
paradoxical and picturesque implication of the concept of secularisation, Vattimo 
adheres to a ‘positive’ account of secularisation with the help of Max Webber135 and 
Norbert Elias.136 Secularisation is understood as lay modernity being constituted above 
all as the continuation and de-sacralisation of the Biblical message (B, 41-42).  
                                                          
135  Max Weber’s “analysis of the sociology of religion is remembered for its thesis that modern 
capitalism is the effect of the Protestant ethic, and more generally for the idea that the rationalization 
of modern society is unthinkable outside the Judaeo-Christian monotheistic perspective.” (B, 41-42 
and CTWF, 28) 
136 Norbert Elias’ “works seek to illustrate the modern transformations in power as formalizations that 
increasingly diminish the absoluteness of the ‘sacred’ person’s sovereignty. In the course of this 
process modern subjectivity is secularised as well.” (B, 42 and CTWF, 28) 
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Secularisation becomes central to Vattimo, because it underlines his principal notion 
of ‘weak thought’. The relevance of secularisation and its post-metaphysical nihilistic 
relation to the Christian message is elucidated in diverse statements given by Vattimo. 
(1) “[Secularisation] comprises all the forms of dissolution of the sacred characteristic 
of the modern process of civilisation. It is the mode in which the weakening of Being 
realises itself as the kenosis of God, which is the kernel of the history of salvation; 
secularisation shall no longer be conceived of as abandonment of religion but as the 
paradoxical realisation of Being’s religious vocation” (AC, 24). (2) “[S]ecularisation 
as a ‘positive’ fact, signifies the dissolution of the sacred structures of Christian 
society, the transition to an ethics of autonomy, to a lay state, to a more flexible 
literalism in the interpretation of dogmas and precepts, should be understood not as 
the failure of or departure from Christianity, but as a fuller realisation of its truth, which 
is, as we recall, the kenosis, the abasement of God, which undermines the ‘natural’ 
features of divinity” (B, 47). (3) “Secularisation is the way in which kenosis, having 
begun with the incarnation of Christ, but even before that with the covenant between 
God and ‘his’ people, continues to realise itself more and more clearly by furthering 
the education of mankind concerning the overcoming/Verwindung of originary 
violence essential to the sacred and to social life itself” (B, 48). (4) Referring to 
twentieth century theological literature, secularisation is defined as “the purification 
of the Christian faith, the progressive dissolution of the ‘natural’ religious attitude in 
favour of a more open recognition of faith’s authentic essence” (B, 47). Finally, in 
Belief, secularisation is described as “the constitutive trait of an authentic religious 
experience. It means precisely a relation of provenance from a sacred core from which 
one has moved away, but which nevertheless remains active even in its ‘fallen’ 
distorted version, reduced to purely worldly terms” (B, 22-23).  
 
In a dialogue with Jeffrey W. Robin, Vattimo elucidates the correlation between the 
return of religion with the simultaneous process of secularisation. He suggests a variety 
of meanings for this connection and proposes the two most important ones. (1) “It is 
exactly because of the loss of a unified religious authority that there is a sort of rebirth 
of religiosity. Real religious authority relies on secularisation because religious 
authority is no longer single or uniform and there is no longer a central religious 
authority. (2) Secularisation and the new religiosity are also related by a sort of 
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therapeutic connection...”137 (ADG, 95). By means of secularisation, hermeneutical 
philosophy plays a vital role in this religious revival, and helps to repeat and re-
discover new possibilities for religion. “It is precisely because the God of Greek 
philosophy is dead that it is possible to listen to the Bible again” (ADG, 97). Here 
secularisation works as an impetus to abandon atheism. “Religion can have religious 
meaning only with the help of philosophy, that is, with the help of a theory of 
secularisation that recognises in the many traits of the modern world, the basic features 
of Christianity”138 (ADG, 97). Therefore, secularisation has influenced Christianity 
with a sense of acknowledging and accepting the problems of the world. Christianity 
in praxis finds its truth in a secularised form of democratic society. It is the 
desacralisation of the Christian message regarding ethics - less violent politics, shared 
power, etc. (ADG, 98). 
 
As explained, Verwindung and the distortion of metaphysical ‘Being’ is the process of 
secularisation. Carmelo Dotolo139 remarks that interpreting secularisation means 
following the intentionality of Verwindung. Verwindung in this perspective is 
understood not in terms of dialectical overcoming. Verwindung recognises “the very 
weakness of Being emergent in the process of secularisation of modernity in its link 
with religion.”140 Since weak thought is the motivational link between the Verwindung 
of metaphysics and nihilism (desacralising), it points to weakening as the structural 
characteristic of Being in post-modernity. If such thought (weak thought) has 
rediscovered its nihilistic vocation in the ontological decline of strong structures and 
the meaning of weak thought inscribes itself in the process of secularisation of 
philosophy, it is no wonder that weak thought is the exponent of the secularising 
process of Christianity and that “maybe secularisation is that which reopens the way 
to the transcendent.”141 Notably, secularisation is able to re-propose the question of 
God and Being, because weak thought being the transcription of the Christian message, 
discloses itself in the incarnation (kenosis) of God in the post-modern world as a 
                                                          
137 Vattimo, I think, tends to use ‘therapeutic’ in the sense of ‘restorative.’ He uses the example of the 
restoration of religious practice in Italy, though his concern is secular religiosity.  
138 Vattimo gives the example of the Jesuits and Voltaire during Enlightenment: “Voltaire was more 
religious than the Jesuits were religious because the Jesuits were becoming the guardians of the 
traditional order of the society, while Voltaire was leading the case for the society of man.” (ADG, 97) 
139 Carmelo Dotolo, “The Hermeneutics of Christianity and Philosophical Responsibility”, pp. 348-368. 
140 Carmelo Dotolo, pp. 348-368. 
141 Carmelo Dotolo, pp. 348-368. 
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progression of modernity. This deconstruction of the Verwindung/kenosis of God, and 
its progression to post-modernity is where hermeneutics plays its philosophical and 
ontological part in ripening the fruit of secularisation.  
  
4.1.1 Secularisation as Progress 
The signal feature of ‘weak thought’ and secularisation is to go beyond metaphysics 
and the sacred. It initiates possibilities for a new interpretation of religion and ethics. 
Secularisation acquires philosophical profundity when it is understood as a continuity 
and progress, and not as rupture. In this sense, secularisation is able to explain Western 
philosophical tradition by means of both historicism and post-modernism. 
Accordingly, secularisation is considered a process of transition, and a change of 
emphasis that is an historical awareness and belief in progress, which in itself is yet 
another secularisation (EM, 8). In post-modernity, secularisation indicates a 
‘historicisation of history’. It can be interpreted as a break with modernity, or as a 
continuation of modernity; a more radical application of its historical outlook. It is not 
destruction but an improving, and overcoming of historicity. Thus, the post-modern is 
inherently present in the modern. 
 
A link also develops between modernity, secularisation, and ‘the value of the new’. 
The following points are central, 
(1) Modernity is characterised as the era of Diesseitigkeit, namely the abandonment of 
the sacred vision of existence and the affirmation of the realm of profane value instead, 
that is, of secularisation. (2) The key point of secularisation, at the conceptual level, is 
faith in progress...This occurs because progress depicts itself ever more insistently as a 
value in and of itself...Progress is just that process which leads towards a state of things 
in which further progress is possible... (3) This extreme secularisation of the 
providential vision of history is simply the equivalent of affirming the new as the  
fundamental value (EM, 101). 
 In this process of secularisation and ‘the value of the new’, art functions as an 
anticipation. This suggests that post-modernism was present in modernity from its very 
beginning, in the form of art’s pre-occupation with the new. “For art, these limitations 
and forms of metaphysical founding have long since been abandoned” (EM, 101). 
Therefore, secularisation itself contains a tendency toward dissolution. However, 
Vattimo “does not understand post-modern secularity as progress in the meaning that 
nineteenth century historicism ascribed to it. The post-modern notion of progress is 
one which is continuously aware of its own historicity and the artificiality of life 
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conditions.”142  It means an end to its unitary pretensions, not a return to a pre-scientific 
mode of existence. Secularisation in the end secularises itself; secularises the idea of 
progress and dissolves it. “This dissolution is linked on the one hand to the very 
process of secularisation itself” (EM, 102). It is an event that enables one to distance 
oneself from the mechanism of modernity (EM, 104). Such dissolution is not only 
experienced in the field of science and technology but also in the field of arts. Here, 
too, one is struck by the dissolution of the value of the new. This is understood as the 
age of post-modernity143 (EM, 105).   
 
The characteristic post-modern trait within secularisation is the dissolution of 
progress. The very idea of progress becomes a routine in modern societies due to the 
domination of technology and modern communication media. It belongs to modernity 
to ‘out-grow itself’ to see the idea of progress in an historical way, to discern that there 
might be no such thing as progress and teleology in history, and that even the idea of 
history may be mistaken or at least be out dated. Now let us look at Vattimo’s 
understanding of secularisation as kenosis.  
 
4.1.2 Secularisation as Kenosis  
Sometimes words move from one field of language to another. In modern philosophy, 
this applies to the original Greek word kenosis first used by theologians. Since 
philosophy’s religious turn, present-day philosophers use the concept of kenosis to 
search out new ways of speaking about God in an era after the ‘death of God’.144 
Vattimo makes a connection between secularisation and the end of metaphysics as a 
form of kenosis, by which the Christian God sheds more and more of his traditional 
metaphysical properties, bringing forth the truth of Christianity (B, 46-48). Vattimo 
tries to give a new interpretation of kenosis in the context of contemporary continental 
philosophy. The history of the West has the structure of Verwindung, in the senses of 
both recollection and distortion. Since this is a very abstract generalisation, 
                                                          
142  Marcel Sarot, Michael Scott, and Maarten Wisse, Postmodern Condition and the Meaning of 
Secularity: A Study of Religious Dynamics of Postmodernity, ed., Ars Disputandi 
(http://www.ArsDisputandi.org) 2011, assessed on 12/10/2013, p. 192. 
143 As for Vattimo, “post-modern cannot be reduced to a mere fact of cultural fashion. From 
architecture to the novel to poetry to the figurative arts, the post-modern displays, as its most 
common and most imposing trait, an effort to free itself from the logic of overcoming, development, 
and innovation.” (EM, 105) 




Verwindung is translated into a familiar term: secularisation. 
“Secularisation/Verwindung would describe the course of history not as a linear 
progression or as decadence, but as a course of events in which emancipation is 
reached only by means of radical transformation and distortion of its very content” 
(EM, 179). This Verwindung and distortion of the metaphysical ‘Being’ is described 
as kenosis. This is an opportunity for a philosophical reconstruction of ‘Being’ in 
relation to the truth of Christianity. 
 
Since ‘weak thought’ and secularisation are analysed in relation to the formative role 
of the Christian message, this understanding of secularisation paves the way for the 
emergence of hermeneutic tool of kenosis. With kenosis, Western philosophy 
overcomes metaphysics and rediscovers its roots in the Western religious tradition (BI, 
43). This means that along with the significant role of hermeneutics in the rationalist 
philosophy of the West, hermeneutics also played an influential interpretive role in the 
religious West. Vattimo explains the hermeneutic link between nihilistic ontology and 
Christian religion.  
It can rediscover its own authentic meaning as nihilistic ontology only if it recovers its 
substantial link, at source, with the Judaeo-Christian tradition as the constitutive 
tradition of the West. In other words: modern hermeneutic philosophy is born in Europe 
not only because here there is a religion of the book that focuses attention on the 
phenomenon of interpretation, but also because this religion has at its base the idea of 
the incarnation of God, which it conceives as kenosis, as abasement and, in our 
translation, as weakening (BI, 48). 
 
Consequently, secularisation and hermeneutics in turn are rooted in Christianity as the 
religion of kenosis. 
The word kenosis is derived from the Greek κένωσις means ‘to empty’ or to ‘make 
empty’. The theological meaning of the term is taken from the verb ἐκένωσεν 
(ekénōsen) as used in Philippians 2:7 which reads that “he [Christ] emptied himself” 
(NRSV). Introducing Renė Girard into this nihilistic philosophy, Vattimo identifies the 
‘violent God’ with the God of metaphysics. It would indicate that God can be identified 
with the violent sacrality of natural religiosity145 (B, 37-39). In contrast, the core of the 
New Testament is the incarnation, “God’s abasement to the level of humanity, which 
                                                          
145 Girard advanced his study of the two-fold thesis that there is a close connection between violence 




is described as kenosis”146 (B, 39). This is the Verwindung of ‘Being’, and the 
secularisation of the sacred in Christ. Accordingly, kenosis is “the removal of all the 
transcendent, incomprehensible, mysterious and even bizarre features that so many 
theorists term ‘the leap of faith’” (B, 55). 
According to Laurens ten Kate, kenosis is a significant concept “that evoke[s] the 
complex relationship between God and humanity, between transcendence and 
immanence, between the Sacred and the profane, between the Other and the Self, in 
short, the religious relationship, or the specific and enigmatic relationship we call 
religion.”147 Since the term is linked to ‘friendship’ and ‘religion’, many philosophers 
have an interest in kenosis148. Kate proposes two opposing meanings for the concept: 
1) the infinite distance between God and humanity - kenosis here means the ‘emptying’ 
or the exhausting, of any positive relationship between God and human beings,149 and 
2) the proximity of the divine and human worlds.150 Slavoj Žižek defends the idea of 
kenosis as ‘infinite proximity’ in the second sense of the term. “To him, the ‘death of 
the Son of God’ on the cross - the pre-eminent kenotic event - is a mysterious, but 
ultimately ‘happy event’, ‘giving birth to a new subject no longer rooted in a particular 
substance, redeemed of all particular links’. Kenosis is a ‘happy event’ because here 
God and human beings come together to form a new humanity that sheds its old 
nationalistic and ethnic identities.”151 John Milbank defines kenosis as the incarnation 
of God in human language (B, 11). “Language is a gift from the Creator, in which He 
himself is involved via Christ’s kenosis – emptying, exhausting himself in becoming 
man – it serves as the ‘meeting point’ of the divine and the human. Christ’s kenosis is 
supposed to involve the disruption of the logos with its claims to identity, unity and 
universality.”152 
                                                          
146 Vattimo explains, “God’s abasement to the level of humanity, what the New Testament calls God’s 
kenosis, will be interpreted as the sign that the non-violent and non-absolute God of the post-
metaphysical epoch has as its distinctive trait the very vocation for weakening of which Heideggerian 
philosophy speaks.” (B,39) 
147 Laurens ten Kate, “Econokenosis: Three Meanings of Kenosis in ‘post-modern’ Thought on Derrida, 
with reference to Vattimo and Barth”, in Letting Go: Rethinking Kenosis, Universiteit Utrecht, 2002, 
pp.285-310. 
148 Laurens ten Kate, pp. 285-310. 
149 Laurens ten Kate, pp. 285-310. 
150 Laurens ten Kate, pp. 285-310. 
151 Laurens ten Kate, pp. 285-310. 
152 Laurens ten Kate, pp. 285-310. 
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Parallel to the political and linguistic critique of kenosis, an existential and experiential 
approximation of kenosis can be observed. Luca D Isanto, comments that Vattimo 
finds closeness between the kenotic message of the gospel and nihilistic philosophy. 
“Kenosis...is understood as the hope for a peaceful humanity” (B, 8), but the analogy 
with nihilism does not imply a “conversion to Christianity, but rather an interpretation” 
(B, 9). Being is not an a priori principle that can be described or represented in a 
sensible intuition. Being is rather an event that occurs as an announcement of language 
and is oriented towards spiritualisation and kenosis. This is manifested in history and 
language through Christ’s incarnation disclosing that the divine is entirely absorbed 
with historicity and language. Incarnation becomes ‘fact’ insofar as it reveals God as 
a peaceful, dialogical word (B, 11). 
Nihilism is understood as kenosis and as the self-exhaustion of the transcendent. It 
announces itself with the logic of religion (B, 12). This argument is explained in 
Beyond Interpretation.   
[T]he kenosis that occurs as the incarnation of God and most recently as secularisation 
and the weakening of Being and its strong structures (to the point of dissolution of the 
ideal of truth as objectivity) takes place in accordance with a ‘law’ of religion, at least 
in the sense that it is not by its own decision that the subject is committed to a process 
of ruin, for one finds oneself called to such a commitment by the ‘thing itself’ (BI, 53).  
The logic of nihilism coincides with the logic of kenosis, the law which carries to its 
logical conclusion a conception of ‘the historicity as belonging’.153 This is an aid 
primarily to interpret postmodern secularisation as taking place within the context of 
the Christian tradition. By articulating secularisation as kenosis, truth can be saved 
from a mere deconstruction of metaphysics. 
The theology of Joachim of Fiore (1135-1202)154 functions as a tool for Vattimo to 
deconstruct metaphysics and enter a new realm of thought (AC, 31and BI, 49-51). The 
deconstruction of metaphysics and the process of secularisation as kenosis is realised 
                                                          
153 ‘Historicity as belonging’ is a hermeneutical theory of Dilthey and later Heidegger. Vattimo uses this 
in Belief. “Dilthey’s thesis is that the object of understanding (text, culture, myth) in the human 
sciences cannot be distinguished from the subject of understanding. The human subject always 
already belongs to the matter (text, culture, myth) which he or she wants to understand, therefore, 
the object does not ‘lie’ in front of the interpreter.” (Wilhelm Dilthey, Introduction to the Human 
Sciences, trans. Ramos J. Bentanzos (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988) (Vattimo uses this 
passage in the foot note of Belief, p. 12) 
154 Three ages make up Joachim’s scheme of history. They are modelled on the three persons of the 
Trinity. The first is the stage in which we have lived under the law; the second is that in which we live 
under grace; the third is one in which we shall live in a more perfect state of grace.” (AC, 29-30)  
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in the era of Spirit which is realised in post-modernity. Secularisation is an 
“interpretive application of the biblical message on ‘a level’ that is not strictly 
sacramental, sacred or ecclesiologic” (AC, 48). However, it is possible to set a limit 
for the entire process of secularisation and kenosis. The hermeneutics of kenosis itself 
sets the limit of the process of secularisation. Hermeneutics is used here not to interpret 
gospel stories ironically, or to re-construct ancient myths, but to re-think more 
concretely the secularisation of Christianity as the liberation of the plurality of myths.  
Commenting on Vattimo’s kenotic philosophy, and its existential relevance for post-
modernity, Thomas G. Guarino155 suggests that the kenotic action of God preached 
through hermeneutic philosophy comes to fruition in philosophy’s renunciation of 
strong, objective structures. Christianity adheres to charity (caritas) rather than 
making any hard claim to final truth.  In kenotic Christianity, the source and paradigm 
of secularisation is actualised and open to further realisation. 
 
4.1.3 Kenosis as Caritas 
The whole history of Western thought is an ongoing struggle with the objectivism of 
classical metaphysics and the new philosophy represented by secularisation. However, 
Vattimo interprets Western history and metaphysics as a fuller realisation of God’s 
kenosis. This raises the question whether the process has any limit. Arguably, 
secularisation has only one limit and that is caritas (B, 62-65, AC, 48, and ADG, 39). 
This is not an end-point, or a limit that can be reached, rather it designates the 
dissolution of limits. Though the event of Christianity sets in motion the process of 
secularisation, it is possible to find in Scripture a limit to secularisation. Scripture is a 
progressive guide to desacralisation, that is, charity (ADG, 41) as the means to the 
spiritualisation of the biblical message and impacts on “all spheres of life as the post-
modern outcome of modernisation seen effective in cultural, political, and social 
pluralism” (AC, 48-49). The precept ‘Dilige, et quod vis fac’ (Love, and do what you 
will) by St. Augustine, clarifies the criterion of caritas (B, 64). The transformation of 
                                                          
155 Thomas G. Guarino, Vattimo and Theology, New York and London: T & T Clark International, 2009, 




Christianity in charity is possible through a preference for love rather than for the 
justice, severity, or the majesty of God. It is clear that the New Testament recognises 
this (love) as the supreme principle of humanity (B, 64). The Gospels and early 
Christian writers (Patrology) show the prominent virtue of charity. St. Paul speaks of 
three virtues, faith, hope, and love, but the greatest of these is love.  
The hermeneutical nature of truth is increasingly determined by agreement with 
others156 (ADG, 43). This suggests the dissolution of truth’s objectivity through 
kenosis: charity replaces truth.157 If there is a truth around which we all gather, it must 
happen in dialogue, which in itself is the result of charity. Dialogue happens only as a 
result of reciprocity. Christianity moves in a direction that enhances its practical moral 
and dialogical charity (ADG, 44). Even Christ’s message grew with history through 
the hermeneutical process. Accordingly, the future of Christianity is more purified and 
based on pure love (ADG, 45). Jesus says; “where two or more of you are gathered in 
my name, I will be there” (Matthew 18:20). ‘In my name’ can mean ‘for love’s sake’ 
or ‘for Christ’s sake’. When gathered for the sake of love, I will be there. Thus, love, 
or charity is the presence of God (ADG, 45). The paradoxical representation of this is 
that ‘Christ who was identified with truth’ can be in post-modern speech and 
categorised as kenotic-charity158 (ADG, 43, AC, 103), i.e., if forced to choose between 
Christ and truth, one should choose Christ.  
Vattimo prefers Nietzsche to Dostoyevsky, despite the former’s ironic choice for 
Christ at the price of truth. This is because Vattimo finds Nietzsche more faithful to 
the gospel especially in his announcement of the ‘death of God’159 (AC, 104). 
Nietzschean affirmation of the death of God is not merely the literal repetition of the 
crucifixion, but rather the affirmation of the radical expression of Dostoyevsky’s 
paradox. Nietzsche sees it as the very meaning of the history of Europe, of the West, 
or of Christian modernity. “The death of the moral God marks the impossibility of 
                                                          
156  Vattimo explains, “we do not, and perhaps cannot, agree when we have found the truth, but we 
may say that at least we have found some truth when we have agreed upon something.” (ADG, 43) 
157 ‘Charity taking precedence over truth’ is explained in Chapter Eight.  
158 Vattimo uses the example of the progressive diminishing of the validity of a famous saying, “Amicus 
Plato sed magis amica veritas, (Plato is my friend, but truth is a better friend) used by Dostoyevsky. 
Vattimo explains; “Dostoyevsy represents a paradoxical case, since beginning with Jesus’ words “ego 
sum via, veritas et vita,” the inclination of Christian thought has been to identify Christ with truth, thus 
denying the possibility that there might be any difference between the two terms. 
159 Vattimo distinguishes Nietzsche’s death of God, as the ‘death of the moral God. “The God who has 
been killed by his followers is only-and rightly-the moral God.” (AC, 104) 
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preferring truth to friendship, because the meaning of that death is that there is no 
‘objective’, ontological truth that might be upheld as anything other than friendship, 
will to power, or subjective bond” (AC, 104-105). Those who pronounce ‘amicus Plato 
sed magis amica veritas’ do so out of ‘love’ for another, or for themselves, or for the 
tradition. The event of ‘truth’ reflects this pronouncement, and Heidegger’s notion of 
Ereignis finds its place here. Nietzsche’s ‘death of God’ and Heidegger’s ‘Ereignis’ 
are the most radical heirs of the anti-metaphysical (kenotic-caritas) principle that 
Christ brought into the world160 (AC, 109). However, Nietzsche and Heidegger remain 
captive to Greek objectivism and fail to fully develop Christianity’s anti-metaphysical 
revolution. The redefining of Christianity in terms of anti-metaphysical revolution is 
possible only through charity (AC, 111). The central role of the ‘Other’ in Levinas, the 
philosophy of ‘communication’ in Habermas161, and the theory of ‘charity’ in 
Davidson162 contribute to the centrality of Christian Caritas in Vattimo. The Christian 
understanding of kenotic-caritas is an announcement from the historical event of the 
incarnation and speaks of the nihilistic vocation of ‘Being’. In this process “every ontic 
structure is weakened in favour of ontological Being, namely the Verbum, Logos, 
Word shared in the dialogue that constitutes us as historical beings” (AC, 112).  
Through the hermeneutic of interpretation, truth becomes charity and Being becomes 
an event. The biblical notions of kenosis and caritas paradoxically become the result 
of ‘weakening’ and ‘secularisation’ thought. Consequently, philosophy of 
                                                          
160 Vattimo refers again to Dilthey. He observes that there is a deep Christian element in Dilthey’s ‘the 
history and dissolution of metaphysics. “Indeed, Dilthey writes that whereas metaphysics as a science 
has become impossible, the metaphysical element of our life as personal experience, that is, as moral-
religious truth remains...” (AC, 109) 
161 Jürgen Habermas considers his major contribution to be the development of the concept and 
theory of communicative reason or communicative rationality, which distinguishes itself from the 
rationalist tradition by locating rationality in structures of interpersonal linguistic communication 
rather than in the structure of the cosmos. This social theory advances the goals of human 
emancipation, while maintaining an inclusive universalist moral framework. This framework rests on 
the argument called universal pragmatics – that all speech acts have an inherent telos (the Greek word 
for "end") – the goal of mutual understanding, and that human beings possess the communicative 
competence to bring about such understanding.  
162 The principle of charity, also referred to as the principle of “rational accommodation” by Donald 
Davidson, entails that in each instance of interpretation, the interpreter employs a theory of belief 
and a theory of meaning simultaneously to identify the beliefs of the speaker. The speaker is 
considered a rational agent and the utterances of the speaker are accommodated as being 
meaningful.  Davidson’s charity principle acts as a guide in the act of interpretation, which prescribes 
that we interpret a speaker as having true beliefs, 
http://philosophyofsocialcognition.pbworks.com/w/page/16442009/Charity%20and%20interpretati
on, accessed on 20/06/2014. 
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interpretation, according to Vattimo, has become the koine of Western philosophical 
thought.  
4.1.4. Hermeneutics as Koine 
The philosophy of interpretation today is referred to as hermeneutics and Vattimo has 
specified it in terms of ‘Koinė’, common language, “in which philosophical thought 
after Heidegger and Wittgenstein, after Quine, Derrida and Ricoeur, has spread as a 
universal, philosophical language.”163 The term hermeneutics, a Latinized version of 
the Greek hermenetice, has been part of common language from the beginning of the 
seventeenth century.164 This word is connected to the name of the God Hermes, the 
reputed messenger and interpreter of the gods. The attributed function of hermeneutics 
is the exegesis of sacred text, especially Christian sacred text. According to Santiago 
Zabala, hermeneutics not only evolved in response to the ‘religious’ need to determine 
correct rules for the valid interpretation of the Bible, but also to the ‘scientific’ 
empiricist foundationalism of logical positivism.165 Zabala also describes the 
‘hermeneutical circle’166 that articulated in the nineteenth century. This hermeneutical 
circularity of interpretation is essential to understanding the post-modern approach to 
religion. If every interpretation is itself based on another interpretation, the circle of 
interpretation cannot be escaped or overcome completely as is suggested by 
Verwindung.167  However, for Vattimo, interpretation is conceived as a process of 
weakening by which the weight and eternity of objective structures and truth are 
weakened. Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God is an example. ‘God is dead’ 
                                                          
163 Santiago Zabala, Weakening Philosophy, p. 15. 
164 https://www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermeneutics/, accessed on 28/03/2014.The history of 
hermeneutics stretches back to ancient history where Plato used this term in his dialogues contrasting 
hermeneutical knowledge to that of Sophia. 
165 Santiago Zabala, Weakening Philosophy, p. 15. Logical positivism “created series of political and 
cultural changes, just as Martin Luther’s Protestant Reformation and Thomas Kuhn’s explanation of 
the structure of scientific revolutions did...They both showed that religious faith and scientific 
knowledge change not through the confrontation of the official interpretation with hard facts but by 
a social struggle between contending interpretations of intrinsically ambiguous evidence.” 
(Weakening Philosophy, p. 15)  
166 “The hermeneutical circle” was first developed by Schleiermacher. Charles Taylor explains it clearly: 
“What are we trying to establish is a certain reading of texts or expressions, and what we appeal to as 
our grounds for this reading can only be other readings. The circle can also be put in terms of part-
whole relations: we are trying to establish a reading for the whole text, and for this we appeal to 
readings of its partial expressions; yet because we are dealing with meaning, with making sense, where 
expressions only make sense or not in relation to others, the readings of partial expressions depend 
on those of others, and ultimately of the whole.” (Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: 
Philosophical Papers 2, p.18). 
167 Santiago Zabala, Weakening Philosophy, p. 16.  
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is not an objective ‘claim’ but rather ‘an announcement’. Hermeneutical philosophy 
does not teach that ‘God is dead’ or that ‘God does not exist’, rather it announces that 
individual experiences have been transformed through the process of hermeneutics in 
language and culture so that one no longer believes in ultimate objective truth.168 
In Beyond Interpretation, Vattimo explains his argument concerning how 
hermeneutics has become the ‘Koinė’ of Western culture. He elucidates his argument; 
“[T]his may of course be due, at least in part, to its weak hypothesis that does not 
affirm a great many precisely shared philosophical beliefs, but rather describes an 
overall climate, a general sensibility, or simply a kind of presupposition that everyone 
feels more or less obliged to take into account”169 (BI, 1). This transition from biblical 
exegesis and the textual of hermeneutics to the point where it coincides with the very 
experience of the world is, in fact, the result of a transformation in the way truth is 
conceived and interpreted. This is a ‘shift’ of emphasis and has implications for what 
hermeneutics is. ‘If’ there is truth outside the confines of scientific method, there can 
be no experience of truth that is not interpretive - this is almost a truism in today’s 
culture170 (BI, 4-5). This is the very meaning of koinė. 
Vattimo argues that it is impossible to prove the truth of hermeneutics without 
presenting it as the existential response to a history of ‘Being’ interpreted as the 
occurrence of nihilism. This argument is justified as follows: “if hermeneutics, as the 
philosophical theory of the interpretive character of every experience of truth, is lucid 
about itself, as no more than an interpretation, will it not find itself inevitably caught 
up in the nihilistic logic of Nietzsche’s hermeneutics?” (BI, 7). This ‘logic’ may be 
encapsulated in the statement that there can be no recognition of the essentially 
interpretive character of the experience of truth without the death of God and without 
the fabling of the world or, what amounts to the same thing, of Being (BI, 7-8). 
Therefore, to accept hermeneutics as an interpretation and not as a metaphysical 
                                                          
168 Santiago Zabala, Weakening Philosophy, p. 16.  
169 Vattimo says that in this generic sense of the term ‘hermeneutics’; not only Heidegger, Gadamer, 
Ricoeur, and Pareyson are hermeneutical thinkers but also Habermas and Apel, Rorty and Charles 
Taylor, Derrida and Levinas. What brings them all together is a ‘family resemblance’ (to use a 
Wittgenstein vocabulary) or a sense of family, or a common atmosphere (BI, 1). However, it can be 
argued that hermeneutics is a philosophy developed along the Heidegger-Gadamer axis. According to 
them, hermeneutics reveals its constitutive characteristics: those of ontology and liguisticality. 
Heidegger regards interpretation primarily from the point of view of the meaning of Being and 
Gadamer places his emphasis primarily from the point of view of language. (BI, 2-3)  
170 Vattimo takes cues from Gadamer’s Truth and Method to explain this.  
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description ‘is a matter of taste’171 (BI, 8). It is more than a choice, but ‘simply a matter 
of registering a taste of mind’ that remains totally inexplicable to oneself and to others 
(BI, 8). To summarise, Western philosophical schools and Vattimo arrive at the 
recognition of the interpretive ‘essence’ of truth by way of generalisation and by ‘a 
matter of taste’ that happens through the act of registering an individual taste of 
mind172 (BI, 9).  
Hermeneutics is legitimate as a narrative of modernity, and above all a narrative of the 
meaning of ‘Being.’ In a decisive way, Vattimo through his turn to the Heideggerian 
‘left’173has helped to make hermeneutics the hegemonic philosophy of this epoch. The 
Heideggerian ‘left’ refers to the forgetting of ‘Being’ and the nostalgic commitment 
of philosophy to its ‘recollection’. It transforms itself into Beings’ 
weakening/exhausting, into Being’s dissolving destiny; that is, into modernity as ‘long 
goodbye’ to Being.174 Hermeneutics can belong to modernity only in as much as the 
grounds of its ‘truth’ can be set forth on the basis of the fulfilment within nihilism of 
the principle of reality (BI, 42). 
In the next section of the thesis, we shall expand the arguments of Vattimo explaining 
Charles Taylor’s concept of secularism, but in summary, four important conclusions 
established are as follows: (1) Hermeneutics presents itself as the koinė of Western 
thought, as an alternative to metaphysical rationality and its claim to the objectivity of 
truth, (2) Nihilistic hermeneutics is constituted as an ontology of being. It presents 
itself as a post-metaphysical ontology of interpretation, (3) Vattimo configures his 
hermeneutic within the context of the Western post-Marxist democratic left with the 
help of Gadamerian hermeneutics, which goes back to Heidegger and Nietzsche, 4) 
Hermeneutical analysis re-evaluation based on the transformation of Western 
rationality ‘after the death of God’ to hermeneutical emancipation which is the result 
of the secularisation and the incarnation of the Gospel message. 
                                                          
171 “Taste” refers to communis, that is, to a historically evolved way thinking. My choice is not a 
subjective preference, but I am able to choose something because, I am historically situated  
172 Vattimo refers to Kant and especially the Kantian theme of the transcendental function of reason, 
with the vital additional ingredient of the existentialist ‘discovery’ of the finitude of Dasein (BI, 9). 
173 Vattimo has recourse to Heidegger’s reading of what he calls the history of ‘Being’ as the story of a 
long-goodbye, of an ultimate weakening of Being. He alludes here to the left and right of Hegelian 
schools. By right, Vattimo means an interpretation of his overcoming metaphysics as an effort, in spite 
of everything, to somehow prepare a ‘return of Being’. (BI, P13) 




Vattimo has not only gone beyond Nietzsche and Heidegger but pushed hermeneutics 
to a place that none of its founders (Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Pareyson, Ricœur, or 
Gadamer) ever imagined it could reach, namely of ‘weak thought’.175 This 
hermeneutical conception of ‘weak thought’ is intended to extinguish the final flashes 
of metaphysics and to resist the belief that only objective knowledge and sovereign 
decision can guarantee peaceful co-existence. ‘Weak thought’ is an attempt to 
reconstruct rationality in a post-metaphysical way, opening the doors of this epoch to 
a construal of post-secular (kenotic) religious experience. It not only opens itself to an 
alternative direction but also re-evaluates the tradition. The relationship between God 
and the believer is not conceived as power-laden but as a gentler turning to new 
purposes (Verwindung). The post-secular kenotic God of Christianity hands over His 
essentialist claim to ontological truth to man. Mankind must now encounter and 
construct truth in his own existential circumstances. This is expressed in the ‘eventual’ 
nature of truth that embraces itself in the capacity to listen, to respect, and to give equal 
‘freedom’ to the truth claims’ of all. 
Weak thought contemplates the end of metaphysics from the religious point of view. 
‘Being’ becomes an event of Logos. Logos is a ‘dialogue’, dialogue the sum of inter-
subjective discourse.176 Inter-subjective, dialogical weak thought facilitate a re-
thinking of religion, re-positioning it to play a role in political and religious life. 
Christianity allows itself to be more ‘charitable’ to truth claims and Western 
Christianity will once again be able to respond to current political and scientific issues 
with a renewed spirit of enthusiasm. Vattimo insists on charity, because it can be 
thought of as a meta-rule that obliges us to consider different people’s practices and 
preferences (FR, 59). If charity is considered as a meta-rule and takes precedence over 
truth, the future of Christianity and of the Church will be to become an ever more 
refined disposition to charity (FT, 78-79). The hermeneutical opening of interpretation 
assists Christianity to develop its own essence as charity, not dogma. This kenosis of 
                                                          
175 Santiago Zabala, Weakening Philosophy, p. 400. 
176 Gianni Vattimo and Richard Rorty, The Future of Religion, ed., Santiago Zabala, New York: 




individual choice allows an attitude of openness to religious cultures. Religion based 
on caritas promotes hospitality and reduces the violence of the sacred.  
Vattimo aims at a Verwindung of Christianity, a healing, and convalescence. However, 
critics argue that he attempts this ‘healing’ of Christianity by referring to only a few 
themes such as the incarnation, death and resurrection177 of Jesus. Further, his 
references from Scripture in dealing with such an extensive subject are limited to Jn. 
15:15178, and Phil. 2:7.179 It is questionable whether he reads these passages in isolation 
from the Scriptural context. However, Vattimo’s significant contribution concerning 
‘caritas’ should be read beyond the constraints of its theological implications. Caritas 
is openness towards the infinite interpretability of the world and opens doors of 
interpretation to ethical and political life. The genuinely charitable person should live 
‘weak thought’ and not claim to be the custodian of truth and is tolerable towards all 
positions.  
However, I feel that Vattimo is less than comprehensive in his interpretation of religion 
and is limited by his use of Nietzschean and Heideggerian ‘nihilism’. It is unexpected 
that he finally returns to religion,180 but it is nihilism and the end of modernity that 
allows for a new and transformative interpretation of religion. In his understanding of 
Christianity, transcendence is reduced to immanence; the church is identified with the 
emancipated world, and revelation is equated with continued secularisation.181 This 
raises the question of whether Vattimo’s ‘weak thought’ surpasses Enlightenment 
notions of religion and rationality or is to be seen as the continuation and further 
development of that tradition. Vattimo’s approaches to violent metaphysics and the 
violence of the sacred raises the additional issue whether metaphysics or an articulation 
of the sacred is possible without violence. Is weak thought itself without violence? His 
‘weak thought’ in its conceptual understanding is not an absolute principle and does 
                                                          
177 Although, Vattimo does not use the concepts of ‘resurrection’ and ‘resurgence’, these are useful to 
explicate his idea of secularism. Resurgence must not be considered as equivalent to healing of an 
ailing body; it would be perhaps more appropriate to think of (resourcement), re-sourcing, a going 
back to the dialectical potential of within in the religion that allows as the body of practices to renew 
and extent itself.    
178 “No longer do I call you servants, for the servant does not know what his master is doing; but I have 
called you friends, for all that I have heard from my Father I have made know to you” (Jn 15:15 from 
The Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version). 
179 “But emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men” (Phi 2:7 from 
The Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version).  
180 Please refer to 3.1 for the reasons of Vattimo’s ‘return to religion’. 
181 Thomas G. Guarino, Vattimo and Theology, p. 157. 
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not claim to be metaphysical. However, Vattimo fails to fully justify his ‘weak claim’ 
because his caritas which operates as the hinge of secularisation can be understood as 
an absolute principle, i.e., a transcendent principle that limits secularisation.  
I see Vattimo as not sensitive enough to see the God of Old Testament God as a loving 
God. There is a little justification for the textual disharmony between the Old 
Testament and the New Testament that Vattimo tries to identify (the God of the OT as 
metaphysical and violent, and the God of the NT as incarnated kenosis, secularisation 
and caritas) (B, 83 and AC, 37).  I also feel that he neglects the religious experience of 
people who are devoted believers, because he is less than charitable and sceptical of 
traditional religious beliefs in his hermeneutical interpretation of Christianity. This 
does violence to a conventional religious believer. Vattimo only concentrates on the 
kenotic dimension of Christianity and fails to see the aspect of resurrection of the body. 
Emptying comes to fulness through resurrection. His concepts of ‘weak thought’ and 
‘secularisation’ cannot be articulated as definitive philosophical positions, but rather 
as possible deliberative possibilities for future development.  
The vagueness of Vattimo’s philosophical position on ‘secularism’ is improved in 
Charles Taylor’s work. Taylor’s conception of secularism is broader than Vattimo’s. 
Vattimo’s version can be faulted for being nihilistic and prey to Christian apologetics. 
Taylor takes his cues from historical and traditional narratives. Taylor also traces ‘the 
epiphany’ of secularism to the overcoming of ‘epistemology’, while for Vattimo, 
secularisation is the result of the overcoming ‘metaphysics’ and ‘being’ (Verwindung). 
I argue in Part Three (with the help of Taylor) that ‘secularism’ and ‘secularisation’ 
do not merely involve ‘the church-state separation’ and ‘the alienation of religion from 
the state’ but an opening towards new potentials of beliefs in the modern world. As we 
shall see, Taylor reflexively posits a notion of ‘the self’ that undergoes an irreversible 
process of development culminating in the formation of ‘the secular self’. The self 
evolves and eventually leads to a shift from the enchanted (porous) to the disenchanted 
(buffered) sense of self. For Taylor, the Reformation provides the key to the historical 
moment concerning the formation of ‘the buffered self’. He sees the ‘immanent frame’ 
that operates within a disenchanted word as logically unavoidable, and as underpinning 
the power of the mainstream secularisation theory. Within this frame, each human is 
charged with finding his or her own way of being human (Nova Effect), and their own 
spiritual path. Thus, Taylor visualises the possibility of a ‘a leap of faith’ and 
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‘conversion’ within the ‘immanent frame’ which with regard to transcendence in itself 
is poised between closure and openness. As I shall explain, Taylor’s most important 
achievement is not to negate transcendence but to explain the possibility of the 





















PART – III 
 
RE-THINKING SECULARISATION 
“None of us grasps the whole picture. None of us could ever grasp alone everything 
that is involved in our alienation from God and his action to bring us back. But there 
are a great many of us, scattered throughout history, who have had some powerful 
sense of this drama” (SA, 754). 
 
Introduction 
The increasing reappearance and re-evaluation of religion has led to a complex series 
of philosophical interventions. As Eduard Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen note, 
“the very categories of the religious and the secular- and secularism and religion - are 
being revisited, reworked, and rethought.”182 Along with Vattimo, Taylor183 initiates a 
radical revisiting of ‘the mainstream secularisation theory’. He introduces an 
alternative ‘reform master narrative’ (SA, 267-269).184  
Taylor’s ‘reform master narrative’ is the completion of and an improvement on 
Vattimo’s ‘weak thought’. Vattimo’s dialogical, non-foundationalist approach to 
metaphysics and modernity aids understanding Taylor’s secularism. Vattimo’s ‘weak 
thought’ and ‘secularism’ cannot be articulated as a definitive philosophical position, 
but rather as a possible resource for further development. In Vattimo, transcendence is 
arguably reduced to immanence and the sacred is subjected to the violence of critique. 
Taylor, through his historical and genealogical analysis of ‘the immanent frame’, 
offers a broader approach to the transcendent. Taylor improves on Vattimo’s 
philosophical position concerning secularisation as an event within Christianity, the 
                                                          
182 Eduard Mendieta and Jonathan Vanantwerpen, The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, eds., 
Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2011, p. 1.  
183 Ruth Abbey describes Taylor as “one of the most influential and prolific philosophers in the English-
speaking world.” Ruth Abbey, Charles Taylor: Philosophy Now, ed., Teddington: Acumen Publishing 
Limited, 2000, p. 1. 
184 Taylor’s concept of secularism is limited to those “who lived and live in the West, or perhaps 
Northwest, or North Atlantic world – although secularity extends also partially and in different ways 
beyond this world.” (SA, 1) 
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hermeneutic of Verwindung, weak ontology, limitlessness of kenosis and Caritas, and 
the interminability of Nietzschean death of God.185   
Taylor’s formation of the modern-secular-self and genealogy of secularisation in the 
West are the core concerns of this section of the thesis. These attempt to re-evaluate 
how we think and imagine ‘belief’ and ‘religious experience’. Taylor opposes 
traditional secularisation theory in which the decline of religious belief is initiated by 
the incompatibility of modernity with religion.  
Taylor’s ‘master narrative’ too is not a return to the magnification of faith but to re-
capturing the wonder of faith. His method involves “tracking back and forth between 
the analytical and historical” (SA, 29). José Casanova describes Taylor’s secularism as 
analytical, phenomenological, and genealogical.186 “Analytically, it explains the 
structural interlocking of the cosmic, social, and moral orders that constitute the self-
sufficient immanent frame within which we are constrained to live and experience our 
lives, secular as well as religious.”187 It is phenomenological because of his unique 
sense of ‘secularity’ and his notion of ‘fullness’. It is genealogical because “Taylor 
unabashedly presents his account as a ‘master narrative’ which he defines as a ‘broad 
framework of how history unfolds’” (SA, 573).188 His goal is not to describe the 
‘conditions of belief’ as a descriptive what, nor as a chronological when, but rather to 
track back to an analytic how. His secularism is about the modern transformation and 
deconstruction of religion as a construction of the self that gradually evolves as ‘the 
secular self’. The anthropocentric self, aware of its capacity to reflectively disengage 
(SA, 42) is responsible for Taylor’s unique concept of ‘secularityiii’.  
The ‘formation of the secular self’ and secularityiii are elucidated in Part Three of this 
thesis. It is divided into two chapters and four segments: (1) the background to Taylor’s 
secularism, (2) his attempt at overcoming epistemology and the epiphany of 
secularism, (3) a re-appraisal of the sources of secularity, and (4) the development of 
secularityiii. These are presented as strands of a unified philosophical project. 
                                                          
185 The philosophical substance of these points is explained in Chapter Seven.  
186 Jose Casanova, “A Secular Age: Dawn or Twilight?” in Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age, eds., 
Michael Warner, Jonathan VanAntwerpen and Craig Calhoun, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2010, pp. 265-281.  
187 Jose Casanova, “A Secular Age: Dawn or Twilight?”, pp. 265-281.   
188 David Storey, “Charles Taylor’s Secular Age: Breaking the Spell of the Immanent Frame”, in 
Rethinking Secularisation: Philosophy and the Prophecy of a Secular Age, eds., Herbert De Vriese and 
Gary Gabar, Cambridge: Cambridge School of Publishing, 2009, pp. 179-218. 
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Chapter Five offers an insight into Taylor's philosophy. It explains the self-
interpretability and dialogical nature of ‘the individual self’ and traces the sources of 
secularity by ‘overcoming’ traditional epistemology. He uses epistemology in a 
deconstructive way as ‘closed world structure’ (CWS). Chapter Six argues that 
Taylor’s notion of ‘the self’ undergoes an irreversible process of progressive evolution 
leading to the formation of ‘the secular self’. It is the result of a constant evolving that 
initiates a shift from the enchanted189 to the disenchanted self. For Taylor, the 
Reformation is the key to the formation of ‘the buffered self’. Social imaginaries 
structure the way people imagine themselves within the modern moral order. His 
account of the development of ‘secularityiii’ is explained in relation to Exclusive 
Humanism190, the Nova Effect, and the Age of Authenticity. Taylor’s ‘immanent 
frame’, exposed to ‘openness’ and ‘closure’, is explicated as logically unavoidable and 













                                                          
189 ‘Enchantment’, ‘disenchantment’, ‘porousness’, and ‘bufferedness’ are introduced as modes of ‘the 
self’s’ development. These concepts are explained in chapters five and six.   
190 ‘Exclusive Humanism’, ‘the Nova Effect’, and ‘the Age of Authenticity’ are presented by Taylor 







5.1 Taylor’s Life and Influences 
In his book entitled Charles Taylor: Thinking and Living the Deep Diversity,191 Mark 
Redhead argues that Taylor’s confrontation with political fragmentation192 is firmly 
shaped by his intellectual, political and spiritual engagements particularly, his identity 
as a bi-cultural193 citizen in Canada. Intellectual, spiritual, and political engagements 
inter-twin in Taylor’s life. His Catholicism aided him towards politics, and his 
intellectual endeavours.194 As was the case with Vattimo,195 the intellectual, political 
and spiritual aspects of Taylor's life frame the foundation of his approach to 
secularism. 
Nicholas H. Smith observes that Taylor’s life and philosophy demonstrate his 
confrontation with the philosophy of ‘actuality’.196 Following Heidegger, and 
Merleau-Ponty, Taylor argues that it is a mistake to presuppose that an understanding 
of the world is primarily mediated by representations. It is only through an 
unarticulated background that representations can make sense. For Charles 
Guignon,197 Taylor sees in Wittgenstein and Heidegger “a new type of inquiry into the 
conditions for the possibility of intentionality,” indeed, a type of “quasi-transcendental 
                                                          
191 Mark Redhead, Charles Taylor: Thinking and Living Deep Diversity, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, INC., 2002, p. 16. 
192 Redhead observes that Taylor’s life was a constant struggle to mediate the contrasting normative 
forces at work within the context of political fragmentation. Redhead defines a politically fragmented 
state as “one whose members increasingly identify with the concerns of specific groups rather than 
the country as a whole” (Mark Redhead, Charles Taylor: Thinking and Living Deep Diversity, p. 1).  
193 Redhead describes Taylor as a “bicultural subject” because Taylor was the son of an English-
speaking father and a French speaking mother. He grew up in Quebec in a bilingual household.  
194 Mark Redhead, p. 16. 
195 Frederek Depoortere observes that Vattimo’s philosophical life was the result of the three different 
but related realm of politics, philosophy, and religion.  
196 Nicholas H. Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals and Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002, 
p. 11. 
197Charles Guignon, “Philosophy after Wittgenstein and Heidegger”, in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 50, 1990, pp. 649-672.   
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inquiry.”198 Taylor sees Wittgenstein, like Heidegger, as a philosopher challenging the 
Enlightenment picture of human agency as essentially disengaged, and monological,199 
offers instead a conception of an embodied, dialogical and practice-embedded agency.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Taylor elucidates a new moral order as a response to the domestic and international 
disorder brought about by the wars of religion. He relies on John Locke and Hugo 
Grotius to explain this development200 and distinguishes between paleo-Durkheimian, 
neo-Durkheimian, and post-Durkheimian201 social forms. This is based on the insight 
that religion is always an expression of the society in which it exists, as well as being 
an essential form that creates and sustains the societys. Robert N. Bellah remarks; 
“Taylor uses this typology to characterise the relation of people with religion as it is 
brought out in the way they practice it in accord or discord with the community, that 
is, with the state.”202 Now let us see how Taylor develops his notion of ‘the self’.  
 
5.2 Man as Self-Interpreting Animal 
Taylor’s distinctive philosophical interest distinguishes him from other hermeneutical 
philosophers. The methodology of hermeneutics does not seem to be his principal 
concern. As Smith explains,  “it is meaning, not the reflective act of interpretation, and 
meaning in relation to human existence, rather than to literary texts, that is first in the 
                                                          
198 Charles Guignon, “Philosophy after Wittgenstein and Heidegger”, pp. 649-672.    
199 Charles Guignon, pp. 649-672.   
200Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004, p. 3. 
Hereafter this text will be cited as SI with corresponding page number. 
201 A paleo-Durkheimian social form is one in which religion is deeply embedded in the entire social 
structure such that it is not a differentiated sphere, nor even a very partial one. In this sense, most 
pre-modern religions would be paleo-Durkheimian, and for Taylor’s purposes medieval Europe would 
be an example of this form. A neo-Durkheimian social form is one in which religion is partially 
disembedded from the traditional social structure of kinship and village life but comes to serve as an 
expression of a larger social identity, namely the newly emerging nation state in the West. Then Taylor 
posits a post-Durkheimian social form in which radical individualism no longer relates to a social form. 
Individuals are oriented to their own very diverse forms of spirituality and no longer think of their 
religion in terms of overarching social formations. Of course, Taylor argues that post-Durkheimian 
forms never wholly replace earlier ones, which continue to exist, sometimes with a significant 
influence, as is the case of neo-Durkheimianism in the United States, though most of Europe is post-
Durkheimian. http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2007/11/23/after-durkheim/ , accessed on 02/02/2015.  
202 Robert N. Bellah, A Secular Age: After Durkheim, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2007/11/23/after-
durkheim/, accessed on 22/02/2015. 
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order of Taylor’s concerns….”203 He is concerned with ‘any science’ that can be called 
‘hermeneutical’ and which deals with “one or another of the confusingly interrelated 
forms of meaning.”204 The notion of ‘meaning’ plays a central role in the 
characterisation of human beings at the phenomenological level of ordinary speech. 
Taylor explains:  
[T]here is a quite legitimate notion of meaning which we use when we speak of the 
meaning of a situation for an agent. And that this concept has a place is integral to our 
ordinary consciousness and hence speech about our actions. Our actions are ordinarily 
characterized by the purpose sought and explained by desires, feelings, and emotions. But 
the language by which we describe our goals, feelings, desires is also a definition of the 
meaning things have for us. Moreover, our understanding of these terms moves 
inescapably in a hermeneutical circle (PP2, 19). 
 
This includes first, “an object or field of objects, about which we can speak in terms 
of coherence or its absence, of making sense or nonsense” (PP2, 15). Secondly, it is a 
distinction made between sense, or coherence, “and its embodiment in a field of 
carriers or signifiers” (PP2, 15). Thus, ‘meaning’ can admit more than one 
‘expression’ of a subject interpreted. Taylor, further makes a distinction between 
‘meaning’ and ‘expression’. 
This distinction can only be relative because there can be occasions where no clear 
difference can be drawn between what is said and its expression. It can be argued that 
this is the fundamental and normal condition of meaningful expression. Nevertheless, 
this according to Taylor, does not fully do away with the distinction between meaning 
and expression. There is also a third condition for any science to become 
hermeneutical, and that is ‘sense’ (PP2, 16) which is “distinguishable from its 
expression, which is for or by a subject” (PP2, 17).  
In advance of the explanation of how these conditions are realised in the ‘sciences of 
man’, Taylor enumerates the relevance of having the right understanding of the 
“science of man as hermeneutical” and human beings as “self-interpreting animals.”205  
He explains: 
I believe that what we are as human agents is profoundly interpretation-dependent, that 
human beings in different cultures can be radically diverse, in keeping with their 
                                                          
203 Nicholas H. Smith, “Taylor and the Hermeneutic Tradition”, in Charles Taylor: Contemporary 
Philosophy in Focus, ed., Ruth Abbey, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 29-51. 
204 Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers 2, Philosophy and Human Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985, p. 15. Hereafter this text will be cited as PP2 with corresponding page number.  
205 Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers 1, Human Agency and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985, p. 45. Hereafter this text will be cited as PP1 with corresponding page number.  
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fundamentally different self-understandings. But I think that a constant is to be found in 
the shape of the questions that all cultures must address.206  
 
According to Nicholas H. Smith, this ‘right understanding’ is an answer to the 
questions; “what interpretations are interpretations of” and “what interpretation tells 
us about human existence.”207 For Taylor, interpretation is not carried out in isolation. 
It hinges on the language one receives from society and culture. “What interpretations 
are interpretations of” is at its root an epistemological issue about ‘meaning’, but “what 
interpretations tells us about human existence” is an ontological issue. Taylor observes 
“that it is an ontological issue which has been argued ever since the seventeenth 
century in terms of epistemological considerations” (PP2, 17). The response to the 
question of what interpretations are interpretations of, is ‘meaning’. “A successful 
interpretation is one which makes clear the meaning originally present in a confused, 
fragmentary, cloud form” (PP2, 17). Something is meaningful that has prima facie or 
potential meaning, needing to be interpreted. The potential purpose of interpretation is 
to bring out that meaning or make it more vivid.  
Thus, according to Germain McKenzie-Gonzalez, Taylor’s account of self-
interpretation is not arbitrary. It “refers to ‘purposes’ humans give to themselves, 
which guide their actions and efforts.”208 The implied purposefulness of humans is 
teleological in the sense that ordinary language also possesses purpose and goals that 
guide our actions. Such purposefulness, according to Taylor makes man a being-in-
dialogue. “Man is above all a language-animal” (PP1, 216). It is through dialogical 
relationships and conversations that one becomes human. Taylor explains; “the re-
discovery of my own identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I 
negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others… My own 
identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others.”209 
 
Consequently, the narrative nature presupposes self-interpretability of human identity. 
It means that “human existence is expressive of and constituted by ‘meanings’ shaped 
                                                          
206 Charles Taylor, “The Moral Topography of the Self,” in Hermeneutics and Psychological Theory: 
Interpretive Perspectives on Personality, Psychotherapy, and Psychopathology, eds., Stanley B. Messer 
Louis A. Sass, and Robert L. Woolfolk, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988, pp. 298-320. 
207Nicholas H. Smith, “Taylor and the Hermeneutic Tradition”, pp. 29-51. 
208 Germain McKenzie-Gonzalez, Charles Taylor’s Hermeneutical View of the Social Sciences, Catholic 
University of America, Washington, DC., 2015. (This is not a completed work)  
209 Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 231. 
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by self-interpretations.”210 This ontological thesis is fundamental to Taylor’s 
philosophy of secularism. McKenzie-Gonzalez observes that human “narratives are 
individually constructed in dialogue with the other, society, and in the context of a 
given culture.”211 From this perspective, Taylor’s secularity is justified as follows: 
I have tried to give a master narrative of secularity. And one of the central ideas is that 
one only understands what secularity is through the narrative. The aim is to criticize, and 
perhaps replace, a widespread understanding of secularity as the inevitable by-product of 
modernization, however this is understood. Generally, it is seen as consisting of processes 
like economic growth, industrialization, social and geographical mobility, urbanization, 
the development of science and technology, the advance of instrumental reason and the 
like (SA, 28-29). 
 
Smith observes that Taylor’s ‘sciences of man’ are “developed in plural and contingent 
ways across history and between cultures that need to be examined as such through a 
hermeneutic reflection.”212 Accordingly, ‘hermeneutical reflection’ is the key to 
Taylor’s philosophy. It serves as the source of his socio-political-philosophical 
arguments. Vattimo also identifies hermeneutics as the Koiné in which ‘the technic of 
hermeneutic’ has spread as a universal philosophical language.  
The hermeneutic nature of Taylor’s ‘social science’ has its philosophical background 
in Dilthey’s Verstehen orientated to social science.213 Verstehen means ‘reaching an 
understanding’. Dilthey was the founder of this Verstehensphilosophie. It was 
improved by Heidegger (PP2, 15) and Gadamer, who refined it and identified it as 
‘philosophical hermeneutics’. It “is a way of thinking about social sciences as 
essentially interpretive”.214 Hermeneutics is used as a tool to ‘overcome epistemology’ 
that aids to trace the source of ‘secularity’. 
 
5. 3 Overcoming Epistemology: Epiphany of Secularism 
In his preface to Philosophical Arguments, Taylor observes that the Cartesian tradition 
privileges the problem of knowledge before proceeding to learn and philosophise 
about God, the world, or human life (PA, vii). Taylor’s argument relates to the nature 
of knowledge as all deliberations on God and the world represent a knowledge claim. 
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Taylor sees this Cartesian bias towards giving epistemology ‘pride of place’ as an 
illusion. Taylor states, “[e]pistemology, once the pride of modern philosophy seems in 
a bad way today” (PA,1).  
Taylor attempts a retrospective analysis of epistemology. Hubert L. Dreyfus defines 
epistemology as a study of that radical gap between what is inside the mind and what 
is outside in the world, for a subject to have knowledge of the world.215 The heart of 
epistemology is a belief in a foundational enterprise (PA, 2).216 Epistemology claims 
to clarify what makes knowledge valid and what that validity consists in. Classical 
epistemologists take their cue from what were identified as the successful sciences of 
their day. However, Taylor observes that the arguments about the source of valid 
knowledge were not supposed to be empirical. It is because, “the actual foundational 
science was not itself supposed to be dependent on any of the empirical sciences, and 
this was obviously on pain of a circularity that would sacrifice its foundational 
character” (PA, 2). To overcome epistemology requires overcoming foundationalism.  
Ruth Abbey states, “Taylor’s aim in overcoming epistemology is not to jettison this 
(foundationalist) approach to knowledge outright but to restore it to its proper, limited 
space. He wants to resituate rather than repudiate the epistemological model.”217 “Not 
to jettison…but to restore” can be read in relation to Vattimo’s Verwindung of 
metaphysics. In this respect, Taylor takes cues from Hegel, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, 
and Wittgenstein. He questions three notions associated with epistemology: (1) ‘the 
picture of the subject as ideally disengaged’, free and rational. (2) ‘the punctual view 
of the self’218 and (3) the social consequence of the first two: an atomistic explanation 
of society as constituted by or ultimately to be explained in terms of, individual 
purposes (atomism) (PA, 7). Taylor approaches these three notions by illustrating how 
the epistemological tradition relates to some of the most controversial spiritual ideas 
of the preceding centuries. The first entails a classical dualism in which the subject 
withdraws from the body. It involves the displacement of the subject from the world. 
                                                          
 
215 Hubert L. Dreyfus, “Taylor’s (Anti-) Epistemology” in Charles Taylor: Contemporary Philosophy in 
Focus, ed., Ruth Abbey, Teddington: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2000, pp. 52-83. 
216 Taylor takes his cues from Rorty’s book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. (Richard Rorty, 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton: 1979, p.132.) 
217  Ruth Abbey, Charles Taylor: Philosophy Now, p. 178.  
218  Punctual view of the self is ideally ready as free and rational to treat the world and even some of 
the features of his own character-instrumentally, as subject to change and reorganisation in order to 
secure the welfare of himself and others (PA, 7). 
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The second originates in the ideals concerning both the government and reform of the 
self. The third also acquired from social-contract theories of the seventeenth century, 
re-appears in many of the assumptions of contemporary liberalism and mainstream 
social science (PA, 7-8). For Taylor, it is vital to overcome these ideals. This means 
coming to grips with epistemology by considering representationalism in relation to 
foundationalism (PA, 8). 
 
5.3.1 Foundationalism and Representationalism 
The word ‘foundationalism’219 is associated in epistemology with giving apriori status 
to the theory of knowledge. Its goal is to validate and render certain knowledge claims. 
Taylor observes that foundationalist reasoning is meant to be shaken loose from the 
parochial perspective, i.e., detached from the peculiarly human perspective on things. 
For example, the condemnation of secondary qualities to describe reality that is no 
longer in anthropocentric terms but in ‘absolute’ (PA, 40). Overcoming epistemology 
means “abandoning foundationalism” (PA, 2).  
Representationalism is defined as “the philosophical position that the world we see 
in conscious experience is not the real world itself, but an internal representation of 
that world. We know only our ideas or interpretations of objects in the world. The veil 
of perception prevents first-hand knowledge of anything beyond it.”220Ruth Abbey 
defines representationalism as “conception of knowledge as occurring when humans 
form inner mental pictures or representations of the outside world. The truth or 
accuracy of the knowledge generated depends on how exactly they fit between the 
inner representations and the independent reality they portray.”221 Taylor does not 
consider this inner-outer dichotomy indicative of a Cartesian dualism but as broader 
                                                          
219 Foundationalism is a view in epistemology that knowledge must be regarded as a structure raised 
upon secure, certain foundations. These are found in some combination of experience and reason, 
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discovered his foundations in the ‘clear and distinct’ ideas of reason, 
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than the epistemological theory that claims, “knowledge is the correct representation 
of an independent reality” (PA, 3). 
Taylor is influenced by Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
and Ludwig Wittgenstein and their dislike of the moral and spiritual consequences of 
traditional epistemology.222 Their arguments find their source in Kant’s “argument 
from transcendental conditions.”223 They start from the intuition that the central 
phenomenon of ‘experience’ or ‘the clearing’ is not made intelligible by the 
epistemological explanation in either its empiricist or rationalist variants (PA, 9).224 
The latter offer incoherent knowledge. Representations are self-enclosed, i.e., they 
cannot be identified and described in abstraction from the ‘outside’ world and yet 
nevertheless point toward and represent things in that outside world (PA, 9).  
Taylor gives a rather different view of what it means to overcome epistemology. (PA, 
13). The Canadian Philosopher explains: 
[O]vercoming the distorted anthropological beliefs through a critique and correction of 
the construal of knowledge that is interwoven with them and has done so much to give 
them undeserved credit, ...and through a clarification of the conditions of intentionality, 
we come to a better understanding of what we are as knowing agents – and hence also 
as language – and thereby gain insight into some of the crucial anthropological questions 
that underpin our moral and spiritual beliefs (PA, 14).   
This critique and overcoming of epistemology opens a possibility for having better 
knowledge of the knowing agent himself/herself. Though Taylor intends a radical 
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discontinuity with tradition in this overcoming, in one respect there is still a continuity. 
He argues:   
it carries forward the demand for self-clarity about our nature as knowing agents, by 
adopting a better and more critically defensible notion of what it entails. Instead of 
searching for an impossible foundational justification of knowledge or hoping to 
achieve total reflexive clarity about the bases of our beliefs, we would now conceive 
this self-understanding as awareness of the limits and conditions of our knowing, an 
awareness that would help us to overcome the illusions of disengagement and atomic 
individuality and instrumental reason (PA, 14). 
This allows the epistemological project both a measure of ‘self-responsible reason’ and 
a new meaning. Husserl thinks of this as struggling to realise the fundamental task of 
achieving reflexive clarity.225 Furthermore, the fact that we are agents and embodied 
beings means that we live on earth in a qualitatively different way than disembodied 
beings. In the words of Ruth Abbey, “the body is both an enabling and constraining 
feature in our knowledge. It limits, for example, the ways in which we can perceive the 
world. We are, moreover, always orientated in space by being embodied, so that spatial 
orientation is a vital component of human experience.”226 
The reference here is the relationship between engaged, embodied identity and 
representational knowledge. For Taylor, engaged, embodied identity is prior to, and 
indeed the precondition of representational knowledge. The representational approach 
to knowledge must be founded on this wiser way of being in the world. Taylor makes it 
possible by appreciating the significance and normality of engaged, embodied identity. 
 
5.3.2 Embodied and Engaged Agent/Knowledge 
There is a weakening (not in the same sense as Vattimo’s -diminishing) consensus 
among philosophers about the need to overcome the epistemological legacy of the 
scientific revolution. There is a disagreement over what overcoming means and what 
thereafter.227 His aim is not a radical overcoming (Überwindung) but a work of restoring 
‘it’ to its proper and limited space (Verwindung). Taylor explains:  
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[T]he disengaged identity is far from being simply wrong and misguided, and besides, 
we are all too deeply imbued with it to be able really, and authentically to repudiate it. 
The kind of critique we need is one that can free it of its illusory pretensions to define 
the totality of our lives as agents, without attempting the futile and ultimately self-
destructive task of rejecting it altogether (PP1, 7).  
For Taylor, the “approach to knowledge is embedded within a prior ontology of 
engaged, embodied agency, from which it tries to abstract itself.”228 This engaged, 
embodied nature is the primordial feature of human existence that has been veiled by 
the traditional epistemological model. Here Taylor is under the influence of Hegel and 
observes that embodiment is fundamental to subjectivity.229 Being embodied, humans 
experience the universe differently from a disembodied being. The human body 
enables, constrains, and limits knowing. However, embodiment also helps the human 
to be oriented in space which is an essential aspect of human experience. Taylor defines 
the embodied agent as one who, 
[…] acts to maintain equilibrium upright, who can deal with things close-up 
immediately, and has to move to get things farther away, who can grasp certain kinds of 
things easily and others not, can remove certain obstacles and not others, can move to 
make a scene more perspicuous; and so on (PA, 62).  
He understands humans as focused on the world; as beings with a definitive purpose. 
“[T]his picture of the embodied agency challenges not just the tendency towards 
minimising the body’s impact on ordinary ways of knowing but also the very 
possibility of an inner/outer separation that characterises the representational approach 
to knowledge.”230 It is not just knowledge about the world alone that Taylor discusses 
when he talks about embodiment. He includes self-knowledge and self-interpretation. 
Through his account of engaged, embodied agency/knowledge, Taylor postulates a 
different type of knowledge claim. As Abbey explains, “Taylor’s concern in dealing 
with representational epistemology is not only to unearth its own enabling conditions 
that reside in a more ordinary way of knowing and doing, but also to draw attention to 
the concept of the tacit background itself.”231 Taylor’s explanation stretches from 
engaged embodiment and ordinary coping at one end to a highly abstract, disengaged 
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scientific theorizing at the other. It articulates the relationship between the tacit 
background and reflective, theoretical knowledge. Disengaged knowledge can be 
explained as “highly self-conscious and artificial. It strives for a sort of understanding 
that does not come readily. Engaged embodiment is the opposite of its knowing. It 
expresses itself in a doing that is unreflective and unselfconscious.”232 However, “the 
disengaged model relies on engaged embodiment for its realisation. While it strives to 
think of the world in a disembodied, disinterested way, it still reposes upon and relies 
on the ordinary abilities of coping in the world.”233 This knowledge pattern evades the 
ontologizing mistakes that Taylor attributes to epistemology’s disengaged theorizing 
is one, rather than the only type of knowledge. In addition, he acknowledges its 
dependence on a more primitive and ordinary way of being and doing in the world.234 
The inevitable entanglement of the disengaged/disembodied from the 
engaged/embodied, and its (disengaged agents’) reliance on ordinary coping, prompts 
Taylor advocate an ‘ontologising the disengaged’. Taylor tries to overcome the 
constrictions of disengaged agent/knowledge through ‘ontologising the disengaged’. 
 
5.3.3 Ontologising the Disengaged 
Taylor explains the disengaged subject as “free and rational to the extent that one has 
fully distinguished himself from the natural and social worlds, so that his identity is 
solely defined in terms of what lies outside him in these worlds. The subject even 
withdraws from one’s own body, which one is able to look on as an object” (PA, 7). 
Rational can be another word for disengaged that seems to distance itself from the 
ordinary and embodied. 
Taylor, while acknowledging the consequences of the erosion of belief, postulates the 
possibility that the notion of a disengaged self can be positive. This new ‘localization’ 
of self explains the self-defining nature of the modern self. The concept of the self as 
totally becoming an object to itself, and detaching itself from the cosmic-moral-absolute 
that surrounds it, brings forth the image of the self as disengaged.235 The modern sense 
of self involves the faith that one can understand and define oneself without reference 
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to any aspect of wider reality. Hence the image of the modern self as disengaged.236 The 
disengaged self does not perceive itself as oriented towards any cosmic order, the self 
makes of its world an object.237 
Taylor presents disengagement as both mental and intellectual. The mind prescinds its 
involvement in ordinary existence and aspires to a more detached, disinterested 
perspective on the world (SS, 149). The most important feature of this doctrine is that it 
engages both a moral ideal as well as an epistemological doctrine. Disengaged 
knowledge orients humans towards strong evaluations and aims at a monopoly of the 
knowledge of self and the world. 
The representationalist account of scientific knowledge has expanded into a theory of 
knowledge. A limited approach to understanding has become normalised as an approach 
to all knowledge. Taylor describes this as ontologising the disengaged perspective by 
reading it into the constitution of mind itself.238 It is “the dominant conception of the 
thinking agent that both Heidegger and Wittgenstein had to overcome shaped by a kind 
of ontologising of the rational procedure. That is, what were the proper procedures of 
rational thought were read into the very constitution of the mind and made parts of its 
very structure” (PA, 61). Ontologising the disengaged perspective took two major forms: 
dualism and monistic mechanism.239 Taylor explains, 
With the decline over centuries in the credibility of dualism, mechanism has gained ground. 
But what has helped to underpin the credibility of both, or rather of the view that sees them 
as the only two viable alternatives, is the power of the disengaged model of mind, which 
draws on the prestige of the procedures of disengagement, channelling its authority into a 
picture of the mind. What I called the ontologizing move brings about this transfer (PA, 67). 
Disengagement involves breaking free from the perspective of embodied experience in 
dualistic form. Dualistic form provides disproportionate importance to the senses and 
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imagination in our account of knowing. In the monistic mechanism, thinking is an event 
realised in a body. Like dualism, mechanism underpins the disengaged perspective, 
because this perspective is necessary to do justice to a mechanistic world (PA, 67).  
In the process of transposition or ontologising, “one particular way of knowing becomes 
inflated into all knowing.240 Taylor argues, 
It would be carrying further the demand for self-clarity about our nature as knowing 
subjects, by adopting a better and more critically defensible notion of what it entails. 
Instead of searching for an impossible foundational justification of knowledge or hoping 
to achieve total reflexive clarity about the bases of our beliefs, we would now conceive 
this as awareness about the limits and conditions of our knowing, an awareness that 
would help us to overcome the illusions of disengagement that are constantly being 
generated by civilization founded on mobility and instrumental reason (PA, 14).  
Transposition or ontologising is perceived as the awareness and the attempt to surpass 
the limitations and conditions of the agent’s act of knowing. This awareness would 
help the agent to overcome the deceptions of disengagement that are being generated 
in different cultures and languages. Taylor provides reasons for transposition. First, the 
sort of knowledge prompted by the natural sciences promises the power to reorder 
things.241  Secondly, “since the scientific revolution, the natural sciences have been 
hugely successful in interpreting and changing the world and great prestige attaches to 
this sort of knowledge” (PP2, 130). He postulates that the appeal of epistemology 
derives from more than just promise of power and instrumental control. Ethical and 
religious conceptions of the human person are included in the knowledge of the world. 
Taylor was significantly influenced by the notion of disengaged freedom, and the post-
modern relevance and role of ethics and religion in the individual’s knowledge claim. 
Taylor describes modern epistemology as a ‘structure’ that operates in a world of multi-
faceted individuality amongst knowing agents. He attempts to trace the emergence of 
secularity through this deconstruction of epistemology, placing the knowing agent in 
the world of language, ethics, and religion. 
 
5.3.4 Epistemology as ‘a Closed World Structure’ 
Vattimo observes that there has been shift from in ‘the vertical’ or ‘transcendental’ 
world to ‘the closed’ or ‘horizontal’ world. Taylor also lays out certain world structures 
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that are ‘closed’ to transcendence. However, in the enchanted and embodied world, the 
natural and supernatural are inextricably interwoven. The linkage of the sacred and the 
natural preludes the division of the ‘supernatural’ from the ‘natural’. Taylor examines 
some of ‘the closed world structures’ (CWS) seeing in them those features which make 
it difficult for the modern mind to experience transcendence.242 The notion of CWS is 
used to explain modern and post-modern experiences’ inability to experience the 
transcendental.  
Taylor presents modern epistemology as ‘a structure’. He offers “an underlying picture 
which is not only consciously entertained, but controls the way people think, argue, 
infer, and make sense of things.”243 In its most significant sense, the CWS of modern 
epistemology presents a picture of knowing agents as individuals.  Such agents build 
their understanding of the world by combining, relating, and developing new 
comprehensive theories.244 Knowledge of both ‘self’ and the reality of ‘this world’ as 
neutral fact take precedence over the knowledge of external reality, attributing value 
and relevance to forces transcendental to it. The epistemology working as CWS 
imposes priority relations for what is learned and whom. Taylor contents that, 
there are foundational relations. I know the world through my representations. I must 
grasp the world as fact before I can posit values. I must accede to the transcendent, if at 
all, by inference from the natural. This can operate as a CWS, because it is obvious that 
the inference to the transcendent is at the extreme and most fragile and of a series of 
inferences; it is the most epistemically questionable.245 
The ‘transcendent’ can be complied with, by inference from the natural/the secular/this 
worldly. This inference from the secular/natural is epistemologically questionable. As 
already discussed, taking cues from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Taylor observes 
that there are four stages in overcoming of epistemology. These are; 1) one’s 
comprehension of the world does not consist simply in one’s holding inner 
representations of outer reality. 2) There is an ongoing activity of coping in the world 
as a bodily, social, and cultural being. This coping provides the background against 
which one’s representations make sense. This coping activity does not primarily mean 
                                                          
242 Taylor, “What is Secularity” in Transcending Boundaries in Philosophy and Theology, eds., Kevin 
Vanhoozer and Martin Warner, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007, pp. 57-76. Also refer 
Charles Taylor, “Closed World Structures” in Religion after Metaphysics, ed., Mark A. Wrathall, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.47-68. 
243 This includes foundationalism, representationalism, engaged and embodied agent, and 
disembodied and disengaged agent, etc. 
244 Taylor, “Closed World Structures”, pp. 47-68. 
245 Taylor, “Closed World Structures”, pp. 47-68. 
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that each of us is an individual but rather a social being who takes part in social action. 
3) In this coping, the things that are dealt with are not first and foremost objects, but 
rather things that are the focal points of our dealings, which have relevance, meaning, 
and significance for one from their first appearance in the world. Here one learns to 
consider things objectively outside of the relevance of coping. 4) This coping includes 
features that have a higher status which structures our whole way of life.246  
The general thrust of these arguments is to reorder the priority i.e., within 
epistemology. What were considered ancillary inferences are thus accorded primacy. 
In Taylor’s opinion, even if the fourth stage is excluded, “and consider something like 
the divine as part of the inescapable context of human action, the whole sense that it 
comes to as a remote and most fragile inference or addition in a long chain is totally 
undercut by this overturning of epistemology.”247 The driving forces behind this 
‘overturning’ are certain values, virtues, excellences of the independent, disengaged 
subject, reflexively controlling his own thought processes. This overcoming of 
epistemology is governed by an ethics of independence, self-control, and self-
responsibility, of disengagement, and a refusal to conform to authority, and an aversion 
to the comforts of the enchanted world. The agent surrenders to the deliverances of the 
senses rather than to something beyond himself/herself.248 Considering ‘the divine as 
part of the inescapable context of human action’ is the result of the overcoming of 
traditional epistemology. The divine has an unavoidable existential dwelling in the 
individual self having relevance, meaning and significance. However, seen from 
epistemological deconstruction, the whole picture of the transcendent was carved into 
a powerful theory which posited the primacy of the individual self, the neutral, and the 
intra-mental as the locus of certainty over the divine.  
Epistemology seen as a CWS affirms this new way of observing objects within a new 
historical formation, where human identity as a knowing agent in the disenchanted world 
is framed as that of a disengaged agent, i.e., that of the disengaged objectifying subject. 
This involves a re-invention, a recreation of human identity, along with great changes in 
society and social practices.249 
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Taylor provides a hermeneutical deconstruction of traditional epistemology. He tries to 
free epistemology from the net of instrumental reason and unlocks its autonomy to free 
the values of ethics and religion. This deconstruction, I suggest, presents the 
knower/agent as a self-transforming, self-conscious representational being, who is both 
paradoxically inclined to be disengaged and able to re-contextualise himself/herself. I 
call this disengaged ‘self’ the ‘secular self’. The disengaged ‘self’ can separate 
himself/herself from those earlier understandings which it had previously thought 
absolute or beyond question. Taylor explains; “[O]ur humanity also consists…in our 
ability to decentre ourselves from this original engaged mode; to learn to see things in a 
disengaged fashion, in universal terms.”250 Further, the cosmos and the sacred are no 
longer considered the centre of the self’s life as an agent/knower in the world. Since 
embodiment is fundamental to human subjectivity, the disengaged/secular self relies on 
its embodied mode for its realisation. The insufficiency and inescapability of the secular 
is overcome by transposing or ontologising the disengaged. The self-defining nature of 
the modern secular self through self-localisation becomes an object to itself by becoming 
detached from the cosmic-moral-absolute that surrounds it. The secular self understands 
and defines itself in the absence of any attachment to wider and ultimate reality. 
However, the process of transposition leads to an awareness of the limits and conditions 
of the secular self’s knowing, an awareness that helps overcome the illusions of 
disengagement. The ‘disengaged self’ as ‘secular’ which undergoes 
transposition/ontologising becomes the source of the distinctive ‘secular figure’ in 
Taylor. Thus, Taylor’s attempt at Verwindung (overcoming) traditional epistemology 
functions as a tool that traces the source of his notion of secularity. This is clearer when 
the divine is considered as part of the inescapable context of human action. The whole 
sense that it becomes a remote and most fragile inference or addition in a long chain is 
totally challenged by this overturning of epistemology which weakens the transcendent, 
giving way to the natural and the worldly. Acquiring knowledge in a disengaged and 
secular manner, through de-centring oneself from the claims of the foundational 
knowledge, opens the prospect for further de-centering and secularisation. Accordingly, 
the self’s capacity to self-interpret and the notion of the disengaged self is used to further 
advance the study of ‘the secular self’ in the next chapter.   
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RE-APPRAISING THE SOURCES OF SECULARITY 
 
6.1 Re-appraisal of the Sources of Secularity 
So far, two elements of Taylor’s philosophical anthropology have been discussed: (1) 
the self-interpretable and dialogical nature of the self, and (2) the notion that human 
beings are essentially embodied agents, with the capacity for disengaged knowledge. 
In addition, Taylor proposes a third sense of the self with intrinsic moral dimensions 
which serves to distinguish humans from non-human animals. Nicholas Smith treats 
the notion of ‘the self’ as the hinge of Taylor’s philosophy of ethics and language.251  
 
6.1.1 Sources of ‘the Secular Self’ 
‘Self’ acquires its selfhood in relation to ‘ethics’. One is a ‘self’ only in relation to 
other selves, and by possessing the quality of ordinariness. Altruism and ordinariness 
chart changes in understanding what it is to be a ‘self’. Taylor comments: 
I believe that what we are as human agents is profoundly interpretation-dependent, that 
human beings in different cultures can be radically diverse, in keeping with their 
fundamentally different self-understandings. But I think that a constant is to be found in 
the shape of the questions that all cultures must address.252  
The human agent has different self-understandings. S/he is an interpretation-dependent 
hermeneutical being, with a diverse nature and self-understanding of a variety of 
cultures. However, there are questions all selves should address which indicate a 
common nature. This means that there are static and changing features of the self, 
which are different but complimentary. Ruth Abbey calls these the historicist and 
ontological dimensions of the self: “the ontological dimensions of the self [are] those 
that do not change. Some of the ontological features of the self…are the centrality of 
self-interpretation, the fact that humans are animals with language, and the dialogical 
nature of the selfhood.”253 The historical dimensions of the individual identity or self 
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98 
 
are disengaged freedom, (SS, ix), a sense of inwardness (SS, 158), individuality, and 
uniqueness (SS, ix), expressions of authenticity (SS, 12), the affirmation of ordinary 
life, and the ethic of benevolence (SS, 12-13). These are linked “with a deeper 
imputation of dignity and respect to all persons, simply by virtue of them being 
human.”254 These changing conceptions of the modern self, emerge over the centuries. 
The historicist dimensions of the self, constitute the genealogical features of the 
modern self (SS, ix). Secondly, such assumptions help the modern self to have a self-
knowledge of its own existence. Thirdly, the historical deconstruction of the self has 
an emancipatory intent255 (SS, 112). Finally, modernity helps each self to become 
aware of its own culture and to respect the unique culture of others. 
The historical dimensions of the self, its individuality and uniqueness, expressions of 
authenticity, ordinary life and the ethic of benevolence, are acutely felt in modern 
culture.  Therefore, for Taylor, the historical deconstruction of the self is invaluable to 
understand its modern form. For Abbey, “one reason for this is his general agreement 
with Hegel that the present cannot be understood without a knowledge of history; the 
past is sedimented in the present.”256 As already discussed in Chapter Two, Taylor 
traced the development of the modern self from its post-Enlightenment form (SS, 495) 
and historical dimensions of the self against a Christian background. However, the 
modern marginalisation of religious faith contrast with these notions of freedom, 
benevolence and affirmation of the ordinary life, with divinity, transcendent goods and 
the after-life. This led to the marginal negation of all that is cosmic and sacred. Taylor 
explains this change:  
Something important and irreversible did happen in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century with the rise of unbelief in Anglo-Saxon countries. It was then that they moved 
from a horizon in which God in some form was virtually unchallengeable to our present 
predicament in which theism is one options among others (SS, 401). 
The irreversibility of this change in religious perception and is associated transitional 
disenchantment of the self, its affirmation of freedom, benevolence and ordinariness, 
gradually lead to the growth of the modern ‘secular self’. The ‘secular self’ is unique 
as understood by Taylor. He does not categorically deny the presence of theism and 
belief, but presents them as existential options. Taylor’s notion of the self as a moral 
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and ethical agent undergoing an irreversible change in modernity, becomes a source 
of his conception of secularity. Furthermore, Taylor believes that the modern or the 
‘secular self’ evolves a new vision of the good rather than suffering the loss of some 
older world-view and morality. In what respect does ‘the moral and ethical self’ 
transforms itself into a ‘secular self’? 
 
6.1.2 Enchanted/Porous Self Vs Disenchanted/Buffered Self 
Taylor argues that ‘the secular self’ as self-interpretive, disengaged, moral and ethical, 
progressively evolves. This progressive evolution is experienced both personally and 
historically. However, one must be cautious about the difference between individual 
and general history. Personal history has deep-rooted anthropocentric and historical 
implications. In Philosophical Arguments, Taylor describes ‘the self’ as self-
interpretive and dialogical, whereas, in Philosophical Papers, ‘the self’ is portrayed as 
disembodied and disengaged. In his later Sources of the Self, the self’ assumes a moral 
and ethical character. However, in A Secular Age, the ‘self’ is described as ‘secular’.  
This suggests an understanding of ‘the self’ which is constantly evolving. It is also set 
in society from 1500 to the present time. 
The historical unfolding and evolution of ‘the self’ is not merely a tale of obliteration 
or ‘subtraction’257 but ‘a shift in understanding’ from a condition in which it was 
‘virtually impossible not to believe in God’ to one in which belief in God becomes an 
option amongst others. Taylor proposes three reasons for this. They involve loss of 
faith in the following: (1) that the natural world which had its place in the cosmos, 
testified to divine purposes and action,258 (2) that God himself is implicated in the very 
                                                          
257 By “subtraction stories”, Taylor means “all the stories of modernity in general, and secularity in 
particular, which explains them by human beings having lost, or sloughed off, or liberated themselves 
from certain earlier, confining horizons, or illusions, or limitations of knowledge. What emerges from 
this process – modernity or secularity – is to be understood in terms of underlying features of human 
nature which were there all along, but had been impeded by what is now set aside. Against this kind 
of story, I will steadily be arguing that Western modernity, including its secularity, is the fruit of new 
inventions, newly constructed self-understanding and related practices, and can’t be explained in 
terms of perennial features of human life.” (SA, 22)  
258 Taylor gives an example of this: “the order and design of the universe speaks to its creation, also 
the great events in the natural order such as storms, droughts, floods, plagues, as well as years of 
exceptional fertility and flourishing, were seen as acts of God, as the now dead metaphor of our legal 
language still bears witness.” (SA, 25)  
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existence of society,259 and (3) that people live in an enchanted world260 (SA, 25). 
Taylor proposes that ‘enchantment’ and its negation set the crucial conditions whereby 
pre-modern world evolves into the modern world. 
Taylor states that “one of the important differences between us and our ancestors of 
five hundred years ago is that they lived in an ‘enchanted’ world, and we do not; at the 
very least, we live in a much less ‘enchanted’ world.”261 The enchanted world can be 
described as one in which ‘these forces’ could cross a porous boundary and shape our 
lives both psychically and physically. ‘These forces’ are the imagined world of spirits, 
demons, and moral forces in which our ancestors lived (SA, 26). There are two main 
features of the enchanted world: spirits and magic.262 These imposed themselves 
strongly on human beings. However, this is not a story of loss but of remaking or 
reinventing. There is no epistemic or ontic loss involved here but a shaking loose of 
false beliefs and fear of imagined objects. “The process of disenchantment is the 
disappearance of this (world of magic)” (SA, 29). The process of disenchantment 
involves a change in sensibility by means of which one is open to different 
possibilities.  
Disenchantment in Taylor is the translation of Weber’s ‘Entzauberung’; “means a 
process of removing the magic or demystification. (DC, 288). Taylor suggests a more 
illuminating meaning; “the process of disenchantment, carried out first for religious 
reasons, consisted of delegitimating all the practices for dealing with spirits and forces, 
and magic” (DC, 288).  For Weber, ‘disenchantment’ indicates the removal of magic 
as a technique of salvation. In line with Nietzsche, however, ‘disenchantment’ is 
understood as the atrophying of ‘the beyond’ (die Jenseitigkeit): heaven is empty, God 
is dead. In the context of science, ‘disenchantment’ is linked first of all to the process 
                                                          
259 Taylor claims that God was encountered everywhere in the universe. “And beyond that, the life of 
the various associations which made up society, parishes, boroughs, guilds, and so on, were 
interwoven with ritual and worship…A kingdom could only be conceived as grounded in something 
higher than mere human action in secular time.” (SA, 25) 
260 By “enchanted world”, Taylor means “the world of spirits, demons, and moral forces which our 
ancestors lived in.” (SA, 25) 
261 http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/09/02/buffered-and-porous-selves/, accessed on 12/05/2015.  
262 Charles Taylor, Dilemmas and Connections: Selected Essays, The Belknap Press of Harvard 
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of objectivisation, both in our approach to reality (away from subjective and/or 
religious attachments) and in the concept of the world itself.263 When spirit and magic 
are delegitimised, the only locus of thoughts, feelings, and spiritual élan is ‘mind’. The 
only ‘minds’ in the cosmos are those of humans. These minds are bounded. For Taylor, 
“the thoughts, feelings, etc., are situated within the mind. The space ‘within’ is 
constituted by the possibility of introspective self-awareness” (SA, 30). This means 
that ‘mind’ has the capacity of ‘introspective self-awareness’, an ‘inwardness’ 
constituted by ‘radical reflexivity’.264 Taylor refers to this ‘introspective self-
awareness of ‘mind’ as ‘meaning’ (DC, 288, and SA, 30-33). 
I mean…, the perceptions we have as well as the beliefs or propositions which we hold 
or entertain about the world and ourselves. But I also mean our responses, the 
significance, importance, meaning, we find in things. I want to use for these the generic 
term meaning, even though there is in principle a danger of confusion with linguistic 
meaning (DC, 288).  
The activity of ‘mind’ is called ‘meaning’. Taylor does not want to confuse ‘meaning’ 
with linguistic meaning.265He uses ‘it’ in the sense of “meaning in life or of a 
relationship as having great ‘meaning’ for us” (DC, 288, and SA, 31). This description 
of ‘mind’s activity as ‘meaning’ helps to explain the difference between ‘the 
enchanted’ and ‘the disenchanted’ world. This shift in the significance of ‘meaning’ is 
critical to Taylor’s hermeneutics of secularism and religion. What is distinctive, is 
sense of ‘meaning’ given to secularity. It is seen as the product of an historical 
unfolding of the church’s relation to the state. Secularity is not the death of religion, 
but the basis of establishing a ‘new meaning’ within which an agent lives with a 
renewed faith embodying that ‘new meaning’. In this, the agent finds the presence of 
‘the absolute’ or ‘transcendent’ in the ordinariness of his own mind.  
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Taylor argues that in the ‘enchanted’ world meaning is outside of the mind, while in 
the ‘disenchanted’ world meaning is ‘in the mind’. In the disenchanted world, things 
have meaning only when ‘they’ awake a certain response in one’s mind. According to 
James K. A Smith, Taylor’s understanding of disenchantment “shifts the location of 
meaning, moving it from the ‘the world’ into ‘the mind’.266 As mentioned, people lived 
in a world of spirits,267 and extra-human agencies. The spirits offered a picture of 
minds, like humans, in which meanings, in the form of benevolent or malevolent intent 
resided (SA, 32). In the enchanted world there is then no clear boundary drawn between 
personal agency and impersonal force. However, Taylor suggests that this boundary 
line is essential. If a boundary line is not drawn between ‘the porous’ and ‘the buffered’ 
world, the pre-modern extra-human and cosmic would exercise its power over 
subjects. Two powers that ‘these’ can exert themselves over the neutral agent are, (1) 
“the power to impose certain meanings on us” (DC, 290-291), and (2) these “placed 
meaning within the cosmos” (DC, 291, SA, 34). Objects with supposedly inbuilt 
powers were known as ‘charged’ objects (SA, 34). Hence, according to Taylor, due to 
a lack of boundary, “the meaning already exists outside of us, prior to contact; it can 
take us over, we can fall into its field of force” and meaning is in things, in terms of 
this power of exogenously inducing or imposing meaning (SA, 34).  
Being buffered is an existential orientation of the agent/self’s mind. The buffered self 
has the possibility of distancing itself from what is outside of it. “What moves the self 
is no longer a sense of being in tune with nature, our own and the cosmos. It is more 
like the sense of our own intrinsic worth; something clear and self-referential” 
(SA,134). “This new order was coherent, uncompromising, all of a piece. 
Disenchantment brought a new uniformity of purpose and principle” (SA, 146). It is 
also capable of disengaging from everything which is outside of the mind. The ultimate 
purpose of the self is then, what arises within itself. The meaning of things is defined 
in the self’s responses to it. However, Taylor does not deny the possibility that “these 
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purposes may be vulnerable to manipulation” by an external agency able to impose 
different meanings to them (SA, 38).  
For the buffered self, being cross-pressured is an opening up. However, the porous self 
is always cross-pressured by the cause and influence of powers external to it. “[F]or 
the porous self, the source of its most powerful and important emotions is outside the 
‘mind’; or better put, the very notion that there is a clear boundary, allowing us to 
define an inner base area, grounded in which we can disengage from the rest, has no 
sense” (SA, 38). The modern bounded self can look upon in boundary as a buffer. This 
‘buffer’ helps the self to look at things beyond that do not need to get to it. “The self 
can see itself as invulnerable, as master of the meanings of things for it” (SA, 38). 
Taking into consideration these features of ‘invulnerability’ and ‘mastership’ of the 
self, Taylor sums up two basic contrasts between ‘the porous’ and ‘the buffered’ 
selves, 
1) [T]he porous self is vulnerable, to spirits, demons, cosmic forces, and certain fears 
which can grip it in certain circumstances. The buffered self has been taken out of the 
world of this kind of fear… 2) [T]he buffered self can form the ambition of disengaging 
from whatever is beyond the boundary. And of giving its own autonomous order to its 
life. The absence of fear can be not just enjoyed, but seen as an opportunity for self-
control or self-direction (SA, 38-39). 
In this changed understanding of the self and the world, the inner realm of an event or 
thing is given priority. An important feature of the ‘buffered self’ is that it makes 
disengagement possible. Because disengaged, it is free of ‘fear’ and ‘invulnerable’. It 
is the freedom of the secular-self to be more self-dependent and self-interpreting and 
escape cross pressuring forces outside ‘itself’.   
Many causes can be adduced for disenchantment: Renaissance humanism, the 
scientific revolution, and the Reformation. To understand their implications, 
reformation in particular is important to this research. It is an historical occurrence that 
paved the way for disenchantment and the secularisation of Western Christianity. 
 
6.1.3 The Reformation as a Tool for Disenchantment 
In medieval times, there was a profound dissatisfaction with the hierarchical 
disjuncture between lay life and cloistered vocations. The ‘taken for granted lay life’ 
was not expected to meet the demands of perfection. According to Taylor, there was a 
“growing demand to close this gap” of the perfect ‘carrying’ the lay (SA, 62). Religions 
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organised around the ‘higher’ and the ‘perfect’ fell victim to this dissatisfaction. The 
emergence of several ‘reformist’ groups attempted to bridge this gap.268  
Taylor uses ‘Reform’, with a capital ‘R’ to differentiate from other ‘reform’ 
movements. For Taylor, ‘Reform’ means a process or a movement that undertakes a 
radical de-legitimisation of what was previously legitimate.  It is a concern or a drive 
to transform the whole of society to meet ‘higher’ standards. However, here question 
arises. Are all intellectual and spiritual moments subject to their own forms of 
deconstruction and reform? Does the pursuit of truth invariably uncover the errors 
within such pursuits? Is reform really a re-forming, a purifying of an older reform?  
According to James K. A. Smith, Taylor uses ‘Reform’ as “a meta-cause, or perhaps 
better, an umbrella name.”269 Jonathan Sheehan calls ‘Reformation’ ‘the laboratory of 
the secular’. “It allows us to focus attention on the process by which enchantment 
meets its demise.”270 This rubric name a range of movements already underway in the 
late medieval period, and so shouldn’t be reduced to the Protestant Reformation. 
Michael Warner, Jonathan Vanantwerpen, and Craig Calhoun observe that “secularity 
in its modern Western sense is significantly a product of the long history of reform 
movements within Western Christianity.”271 This observation stands as an irony at the 
centre of Taylor’s account of secularity. This desire for ‘Reform’ finds expression in 
a constellation of internal movements within Christendom, Roman Catholic Church, 
Orthodox Churches, and Renaissance humanism.”272 Taylor uses ‘Reform’ as a 
signature word signifying a range of movements and initiatives from the late Middle 
Ages to early modernity. These movements establish the conditions for the secular 
age. 
These movement were dialectical in character and attempted to maintain both the 
hierarchical equilibrium and initiate religious renewal. The movement implied: (1) 
                                                          
268 Taylor observes that the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages undertook various measures of renewal 
and reform through a dedicated hierarchy, the clergy and the laity through practice and devotion, by 
preaching, encouragement and example (SA, 62).   
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“The turn to a more inward personal devotion, (2) a greater uneasiness at sacramental 
and church controlled magic, and (3) the inspiring idea of salvation by faith” (SA, 75-
76). These drove various reforms. In the ‘secular’ realm, printing and the emergence 
of private modes of reading also played a part. The common man felt an existential 
‘within’ that improved his life, free from spirits and magic. He formed associations in 
church and society, and developed new practices of prayer and contemplation’ (SA, 
76).  
One of the hard issues approached by reformers was that of the sacred. In biblical 
tradition, God’s ‘sacred’ power is vested and concentrated in certain peoples, times, 
and places.273 Vattimo and Taylor believe that ‘the sacred’ is not desecrated by the 
process of secularisation (kenosis and Reformation) but rather that ‘sacredness’ is re-
located in a secular context. Through such ‘re-location’ the ‘sacred becomes available 
not only to the elite but to the ordinary and laity. Taylor argues that a peaceful solution 
to ‘the sacred’ issue was possible. “Reformation was driven by the spirit of Reform in 
an…uncompromising mode. One of its principal talking points was the refusal to 
accept the special vocations and counsels of perfection. There were not to be any more 
ordinary Christians and super-Christians. The renunciative vocations were abolished. 
All Christians alike were to be totally dedicated” (SA, 77).  
The Reformation was uncompromising. It sought to produce a uniformity of believers. 
This had two outcomes: (1) it functioned as an engine of disenchantment and displaced 
the enchanted cosmos, and (2) it attempted to re-order the whole of society. Abolishing 
the enchanted world created a humanist alternative to faith which Taylor calls 
‘Exclusive Humanism’. However, according to Nietzsche’s and Feuerbach’s thinking, 
when ‘disenchantment’ happens, ‘the ordinary’ itself can become an object of wonder. 
The consequent loss of enchantment re-gains the wonder of the ordinary. The 
Reformation abolishes an enchanted world; this led as to disenchantment. Although, 
‘the Reform movements’ were the logical tool and the historical pre-condition of the 
emergence of the world as it is today; it is also an historical continuity involving 
                                                          
273 Taylor observes that one of the difficult issues that the reformers faced was that of the sacred in 
the church. “In the term ‘sacred’, I’m pointing to the belief that God’s power is somehow concentrated 
in certain people times, places or actions. Divine power is in these, in a way it is not in other people, 
times, etc., which are “profane”. The sacred played a central role in the practices of the mediaeval 
church. Churches were holy places, made more so by the presence of relics; feasts were holy times, 
and the sacraments of the church were holy actions, which supposed a clergy with special powers….” 
(SA, 76)  
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transformation through negation. However, negation here does not mean destruction 
but the condition for the emergence of a new orientation. 
 
6.1.4 Exclusive Humanism 
The ‘Re-formed’ moral order underpinned the ontological basis for the rise of an 
‘ordinary’ conception of the self. For Taylor, ‘exclusive Humanism’ is the self’s state 
of ordinariness that ‘lopped off’ the sacred. It is ‘exclusive’ because it is “different 
from most ancient ethics of human nature” (SA, 245). It is entirely human-related 
because “it’s notion of human flourishing makes no reference to something higher 
which the human should revere or love or acknowledge” (SA, 245). Hondo Dave, a 
Taylor scholar, describes ‘exclusive humanism’ as “a way of being in the world that 
locates the deepest sources of meaning with reference only to human life, rather than 
with some reference to reality outside of or beyond human life.”274 Since exclusive 
humanism does not refer to anything ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’, it is profoundly anti-
metaphysical.275  James K. A. Smith observes that exclusive humanism provides a new 
and replacement imaginary that enables us to ‘imagine’ a meaningful life within a self-
sufficient universe.276 Ruth Abbey explains exclusive humanism “as a viable 
alternative to Christianity (at the end of the eighteenth century), one that could give an 
account of human flourishing, of selfhood, society and politics without reference to 
God, the divine or transcendent concerns.”277 However, Taylor does not see this as an 
oppositional phenomenon which overrides religion and belief. It is only ‘a viable 
alternative’ between varying religious and non-religious possibilities. Taylor describes 
exclusive humanism as follows: 
[It]consists in the combination of two elements– one practical; the other theoretical. The 
practical element avows the primacy of human life, largely understood in material terms as 
the valuing of physical life and its necessary corollaries – food, shelter, alleviation of 
sickness and pain, education, employment, opportunity for a personal life and so forth. The 
second-order element supplies the additional claim that there is nothing beyond the primacy 
of human life as outlined in the terms above.278  
                                                          
274 Hondo Dave, “Charles Taylor, Exclusive Humanism, and the Dharma”, in 
https://nozeninthewest.wordpress.com/2013/06/16/charles-taylor-exclusive-humanism-and-the-
dharma/, posted on June 16, 2013, accessed on 12/08/2015.  
275 This can be read in line with Vattimo’s argument for anti-metaphysics and overcoming metaphysics. 
276 James K. A. Smith, How (Not) To Be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor, p. 47. 
277 Ruth Abbey, Charles Taylor: Philosophy Now, p. 209. 
278 Charles Taylor, A Catholic Modernity: Charles Taylor’s Marianist Award Lecture with 
Responses, ed., James L. Heft, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 19. 
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Exclusive humanism becomes the characteristic face of the disenchanted, modern 
moral order. It is an epistemic/ontic and existential way of ‘being in the world’. The 
self localises its meaning in this existential ‘being-ness’ only with reference to itself, 
not with reference to any powers outside of oneself. Exclusive humanism differs 
markedly from these ancient theories on two grounds:  
1) The modern image of human flourishing incorporates an activist, interventionist 
stance, both towards nature and towards human society…2) The new humanism has 
taken over universalism from its Christian roots… in that it accepts in principle that the 
good of everyone must be served in the re-ordering of things (SA, 246).  
Unlike other ancient humanist theories, exclusive humanism strives to re-order both 
nature and the human to serve human purposes in the light of instrumental reason.  
In the enchanted world, however the notion that God has purposes for humans was 
key. The ‘secular reformers’ faced a recurring question: is it not possible that the same 
inspiring power of God comes from the contemplation of the order of nature itself? 
Taylor notes that this ‘transferring’ or ‘shifting’ of God’s power to both the human and 
nature ‘recurred in exclusive humanisms’ (SA, 234). This ‘recurent’ of the ‘secular 
reformers’ is an interior dialectical transformation which gave exclusive humanism the 
status of a ‘viable spiritual outlook’. 
There are two conditions whereby exclusive humanism becomes a viable spiritual 
reality: one negative and one positive. Taylor suggests, “the negative one, that the 
enchanted world fades; and, the positive one, that a viable conception of our highest 
spiritual and moral aspirations arise such that we could conceive of doing without 
God” (SA, 234). The disenchanted world and the new viable spiritual outlook supposes 
that every human being is “motivated to act for the good of our fellow human beings” 
(SA, 246). Taylor calls this humanistic aspiration “community-transcendent 
beneficence” (SA, 246). It reveals a crucial feature of exclusive humanism. God’s 
transcendent power becomes vested in humans and human beneficence replaces the 
transcendent power of God. This transition bestows on man a capacity for benevolence 
and altruism. This enables individuals to flourish and find meaning not beyond but 
within and around themselves.  
How exclusive humanism serve as an ontic tool to understand the present age. Taylor 
acknowledges “a whole gamut of unbelieving positions” (SA, 259), claiming a three- 
fold continuity with past humanistic thinking. (1) Exclusive humanism offers an 
alternative set of moral sources concerning freedom and mutual benefit. (2) It 
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(exclusive humanism) could not have arisen in any other way. 3) “The wide range of 
unbelieving positions marked by their origin point in the ethic of the beneficent order” 
(SA, 259). Therefore, exclusive humanism as an alternative set of moral values 
promotes the ethics of freedom and mutual benefit. Humans as rational and social 
beings ‘imagine’ their lives in association with and contributing towards a mutual 
benefit.   
 
6.1.5 Modern Social Imaginaries 
From the beginning of the seventeenth century, the way people ‘imagined’ society was 
indissociable from a notion of ‘moral order’. Such a vision and ‘the exclusive 
humanism’ associated with it was the consequence of religious warfare and reform 
movements. These contributed to the development of ‘the secular self’. ‘New moral 
order’ was based on John Locke and Hugo Grotius’s theories of ‘Natural Law’.279 
Their ‘natural law’ theory was designed as a ‘political entity’ aimed at ‘security’ rather 
than endorsing the ‘pre-existing moral background’. Taylor observes that the last four 
centuries the idea of ‘the moral order’ implicit in ‘political obligation’ “have 
undergone a double expansion both in extension (more people live by it and it has 
become dominant) and in intensity (the demands it makes are heavier and more 
ramified)” (SA, 160 and SI, 5). The ‘extension’ and ‘intensity’ of this moral/political 
order evolve the notions of ‘society and polity, (with the effect of) remaking them’. 
Hence, ‘extension’ and ‘intensity’ become integral to ‘social imaginary’” (SA, 161 and 
SI, 6). A social imaginary demands a full realisation and imagining of the ‘here and 
                                                          
279 Taylor uses both these thinkers to explain his theory of the historical social imaginary and its 
evolution to the present day social imaginary. According to Grotius human beings are supposed to 
collaborate in peace to their mutual benefit as rational and social agents (he holds a contract theory). 
He tried to formulate a political society based on the moral and social life of its citizens. Political duties 
were seen as an extension of one’s moral and social duties. Even political authority derived its binding 
power from “the moral binding obligations in virtue of the pre-existing principle that promises ought 
to be kept” (SA, 159). In Locke, a change in emphasis is seen in with respect to priority. The mutual 
benefits of human beings are actualized in terms of economy and mutual service rather than based on 
politics bound by moral order. Mutual service is seen in terms of profitable exchange. Taylor argues in 
conjunction with Locke that; “‘Economic” (that is, ordered, peaceful, productive) activity has become 
the model for human behaviour, and the key for harmonious co-existence” (SA, 167). Taylor was 
influenced by these thinkers. Transitions in his understanding occurred as an aftermath of these 
contracts- economic mutual benefit theories. 
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now’. First of all, for Taylor, there is an “the order to be realised”280 that stands in 
relation to reality, as one not yet realized, but demanding to be integrally carried out” 
(SA, 161-162 and SI, 7). ‘To be realised’ does not mean a prescription but a 
hermeneutical clue to full realisation. Something ‘standing in relation to reality’ 
provides ‘an imperative description’. Hence, “an idea of moral or political order can 
either be ultimate… or for the here and now, and if the latter, can be hermeneutic or 
prescriptive” (SA, 162 and SI, 7). Ian Fraser suggests that “the hermeneutical implies 
that the order is actually realised, is part of the normal state of affairs, and offers us a 
way to understand reality. The prescriptive, on the other hand, demands that the moral 
order be carried out and realised eventually.”281 Taylor observes that the modern moral 
order historically pertains to the ‘here and now’ and has the potential for further 
realization.  
Taylor develops the modern moral order ‘beyond’ both “the idea of the Law of a 
people”282 and “the notion of hierarchy in society.”283 In these, the order tends ‘to 
impose itself by the course of things’ which is a common feature in the pre-modern 
idea of moral order. However, Taylor argues that “a moral order is more than just a set 
of imposed norms. It also contains what we might call an ‘ontic component’, an 
identifying feature of the world that make the norms realizable” (SA, 164 and SI, 10). 
Introducing the concept of the ‘social imaginary’, Taylor attempts to classify 
‘identifying features’ of the modern world in the life of each individual.  The ‘ontic 
                                                          
280 Taylor observes that “the medieval conceptions of political order were often of this kind. In the 
understandings of the “King’s Two Bodies”, his individual biological existence realizes and instantiates 
an undying royal “body”.” (SA, 160) 
281 Ian Fraser, Dialectics of the Self: Transcending Charles Taylor, Exeter: Imprint Academia, 2007, p. 
114. Taylor summing up these distinctions observes’ “we can say that an idea of moral or political 
order can be ultimate, like the community of saints…” “It migrates a long path, running from the more 
hermeneutic to the more prescriptive. As used in its original niche by thinkers like Grotius and 
Pufendorf, it offered an interpretation of what must underlie established governments; grounded in a 
supposed founding contract, these enjoyed unquestioned legitimacy.” (SI, 7)  
282 Taylor explains “the Law of the People”. It has “governed the people since time out of mind and 
which, in a sense, defines it as a people. This idea seems to have been wide spread among the Indo-
European tribes who at various stages erupted into Europe. It was very powerful in seventeenth 
century England under the guise of the Ancient Constitution and became one of the key justifying ideas 
of the rebellion against the King” (SA, 163 and SI, 9). Taylor here refers to J. G. A Pocock’s book The 
Ancient Constitution and the Federal Press (2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).  
283 Taylor refers to that “hierarchy in society that expresses and corresponds to a hierarchy in the 
cosmos. These were often theorized in language drawn from the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of 
Form, but the underlying notion also emerges strongly in theories of correspondence: for example, 




component’ in Taylor’s sense of the word pertains to ‘humans’ rather than to God and 
the cosmos.284  
 Taylor calls this actuality of the ‘new moral order’ a ‘social imaginary’. Social 
imaginaries, according to Taylor, contribute to the development of ‘the secular self’. 
They are rooted in society and its practices, but go beyond them. For Taylor, ‘social 
imaginary’ means, “the way people imagine their social existence, how they fit 
together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the 
expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that 
underlie these expectations”285 (SA, 171). Social imaginary is an intra-linguistic or 
imaginative mode facilitating social existence and mutual beneficence. It enables some 
collective moral goal individuals can strive for. The social imaginary seeks to explain 
how imagination, and not simply reason constructs central social institutions and 
practices.  
Taylor illustrates the ‘social imaginary’ as a process that ‘infiltrates and transforms’ 
the modern moral order. It is a ‘process’ by which “what is originally just an 
idealisation grows into a complex imaginary through being taken up and associated 
with social practices and often transformed by the contact” (SA, 175).286 When a theory 
‘penetrates and transforms’ the social imaginary, it is improvised, and inducted into 
new practices in people’s lives.287 A ‘new outlook’ is articulated that gives rise to fresh 
practices. The ‘new outlook’ frames an innovative understanding accessible to all. (SA, 
175-176). The process of transforming theory into practice is not one-sided. During 
the transformation the theory is “glossed” by being given a particular shape by the 
                                                          
284 Taylor explains this with the help of other philosophers like Grotius, Locke and others. Taylor 
critiques the idea that the modern moral order descendings from Grotius and Locke is self-realizing in 
the sense invoked by Hesiod or Plato, or the cosmic reactions to Duncan’s murder. “It is therefore 
tempting to think that our modern notions of moral order lack altogether an ontic component. But 
this would be a mistake…There is an important difference, but it lies in the fact that this component is 
now a feature about the human, rather than one touching God or the cosmos, and not in the supposed 
absence altogether of an ontic dimension.” (SA, 164 and SI, 10.11)  
285 Charles Taylor, “Afterword” in Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age, Michael Warner, Jonathan 
VanAntwerpen, and Craig Calhoun, eds., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010, pp. 300-324.  
286 Taylor uses the examples of America and France in this transition. “The transition was much 
smoother and less catastrophic in one case, because the idealization of popular sovereignty connected 
up relatively unproblematically with an existing practice of popular election of assemblies; whereas in 
the other case, the inability to ‘translate’ the same principle into a stable and agreed set of practices 
was an immense source of conflict and uncertainty for more than a century. But in both these great 
events, there was some awareness of the historical primacy of theory, which is central to the modern 
idea of ‘revolution’, whereby we set out to remake our political life according to agreed principles. 
This ‘constructivism’ has become a central feature of modern political culture.” (SA, 175)   
287 Charles Taylor, “Afterword”, Pp. 300-324.  
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practices that nurture it.288 It is an ever-evolving process whereby new practices and 
meanings emerge to moderate the conditions that produced them.289 Taylor calls this 
‘a long march’, an evolutionary process of re-imagining oneself through new ideas, 
and practices lead to the formation of ‘secular self’.   
There are three significant ‘social imaginaries’ which form the structure of the modern 
moral order: (1) ‘the economy as objective reality’, (2) ‘the public sphere’, and (3) ‘the 
sovereign people and the democratic rule’ (SA, 176 and SI, 69). 
 
The Economy as an Objectified Reality 
‘The economy’ as a social imaginary aids ‘the disenchanted self’ to conduct and 
imagine in the society independent of any transcendental bindings. It is connected with 
“the self-understanding of polite civilisation as grounded in a commercial society.”290 
“Human life is designed to aim at mutual beneficence” (SA, 176) by “an invisible hand 
as described by Adam Smith.”291 The economy functions as ‘an invisible hand’ that 
benefits the general happiness of society. ‘An invisible hand’ helps individuals to 
search for the general welfare. In this, purposes weave together, and though different, 
“they involve in exchange of advantages.”292 The ‘exchange of advantage’ for Taylor 
                                                          
288 Taylor takes cues from Kant’s notion of an abstract category becoming “schematized” when it is 
applied to reality in space and time, the theory is schematized in the dense sphere of common practice. 
(Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, “Von dem Schematismus der reinen Versatändnisbegriffe”, 
Berlin Academy Edition, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, Volume III, 1968, pp. 133-139.  
289 Taylor gives the examples of the American and the French revolutions. In both these cases, “the 
idealisation of popular sovereignty connected up relatively unproblematically with an existing practice 
of popular election of assemblies, and there was some awareness of the historical primacy of theory, 
which is central to the modern idea of a “revolution”, whereby we set out to remake our political life 
according to the agreed principles.” (SA, 175) 
290 Taylor notes that “the roots of this understanding go further back, in the Grotian-Lockean idea of 
order itself…This new notion of order brought about a change in the understanding of the cosmos as 
the work of God’s Providence. We have here in fact one of the earliest examples of the new model of 
order moving beyond its original niche and reshaping the image of God’s Providential rule” (SA, 176).  
291  By Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hands”, Taylor means “the actions and attitudes which we are 
“programmed” for, which have systematically beneficent results for the general happiness, even 
though these are not part of what is intended in the action or affirmed in the attitude. Adam Smith in 
his Wealth of Nations has provided us with the most famous of these mechanisms, whereby our search 
for our own individual prosperity redounds to the general welfare” (SA, 177) and Ian Fraser, p. 126. 
292 Taylor observes that the order created by “invisible hand” “is of good engineering design, in which 
efficient causation plays the crucial role. In this it differs from earlier notions of order, where the 
harmony comes from the consonance between the Ideas or Forms manifested in the different levels 
of being or ranks in society. The crucial thing in the new conception is that our purposes mesh, 
however divergent they may be in the conscious awareness of each of us. They involve us in an 
exchange of advantages.” (SA, 177)  
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is “humans engaging in an exchange of services.” The basic mode of the ‘exchange of 
service’ is ‘economy’.293 The evolution of economy as a social imaginary is pre-
eminently structured towards the implementation of economic security. However, 
when the economic exchange is understood as a profitable and beneficent, “one could 
begin to see political society itself through a quasi-economic metaphor” (SA, 177).294 
Taylor observes that ‘economy’ could become more than a metaphor; a “dominant end 
of society.”295 
The major shifts effected by ‘economy’ “consists in seeing our society as an 
‘economy’, an interlocking set of activities of production, exchange and consumption, 
which form a system with its own laws and dynamic” (SA, 181 and SI, 76). The 
economy started to influence human existence, and the way humans linked and 
interacted without the imposition of hierarchy or authority. The importance and 
purpose of this social organisation was economic collaboration and exchange. To be 
more precise, humans were engaged in an exchange of service for the sake of mutual 
benefit, in which economy plays the major role. When economic dimensions started 
to play the major role in the modern social order, social security and economic 
prosperity were the advantageous experiences of the common folk. The economy was 
a metaphor of profitable exchange. The economy as the first dimension of moral and 
civil order was later replaced by ‘the public sphere’.  
 
The Public Sphere 
Taylor explains ‘the public sphere’ as “a common space in which members of society 
are deemed to meet through a variety of media: print, electronic, and face-to-face 
encounters; to discuss matters of common interest; and thus, to be able to form a 
                                                          
293 Taylor sees this “new economy” as a new understanding of Providence already evident in Locke’s 
formulation of Natural Law theory in the Second Treatise. “We can already see here how much 
importance the economic dimension is taking on the new notion of the order.” (SA, 177)   
294 For “quasi-economic metaphor”, Taylor gives the example of Louis XIV; “Thus no less a personage 
than Louis XIV, in the advice he offers to his dauphin, subscribes to something like an exchange view. 
All these different conditions that compose the world are united to each other only by an exchange of 
reciprocal obligations. The deference and respect that we receive from our subjects are not a free gift 
from them but payments for the justice and protection they expect to receive from us”” (SA, 177-178). 
(Taylor’s quotes” From Memories, p. 63, cited in Nanerl Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 249-251). 
295 Taylor observes that contemporary with Louis’ memoir of advice, Montchretien offers a theory of 
the state which sees it partially as the orchestrating power which can make an economy flourish. (“It 
is he, incidentally, who seems to have coined the term “political economy”) (SA, 178)  
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common mind about these” (SA, 185 and SI, 83). It is a ‘common space’ because it is 
an intercommunicating ‘space’ of various media. He suggests that this public sphere a 
central feature of modernity, constituted in the collective imagination. Taylor’s 
argument concerning ‘the public sphere’ is influenced by Jϋrgen Habermas.296 People 
who have never met, are linked within a common space of discussion through the 
action of the media.297 Taylor refers to ‘this space’ as ‘the public sphere’ (SA, 186 and 
SI, 84). Moreover, he observes that all the scattered discussion should be seen by their 
participants as ‘linked in one great exchange’.  It “reflects that a public sphere can only 
exist if it is imagined as such” (SA, 186 and SI, 85). Developing his argument, Taylor 
variously refers to ‘common space’,298 ‘topical common space’,299 ‘meta-topical 
common space’,300 and ‘meta-topicality’. The public sphere transcends both topical 
spaces and is interwoven into a frame-work comprising all the above-mentioned 
spaces, thereby providing one large space of ‘non-assembly’ which he calls ‘meta-
topical’ (SA, 187 and SI, 86). This meta-topical space is not without common 
understandings and cannot exist without them. The novelty of ‘meta-topical common 
space’ is not that it offers a new vision301 but rather that it is a step towards a 
metamorphosis of the social imaginary inspired by the modern idea of order. There are 
                                                          
296 Taylor is influenced by Jϋrgen Habermas.296 The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. This 
work studies the genesis of public opinion in eighteenth-century Western Europe and the 
development of the new concept of public opinion.296 (SA, 186 and SI, 84) 
297 By “media”, Taylor means all the means of communications that were available in the eighteenth 
century, such “as print media, books, pamphlets, newspapers circulated among the educated public, 
vehiculing theses, analyses, arguments, counter-arguments, referring to refuting each other. These 
were widely read, and often discussed in face-to-face gatherings, in drawing rooms, coffee houses, 
salons, and/or in more (authoritatively) “public” places like Parliament.” (SA, 186)  
298 “Common space” can be described as a “place” “where people come together in a common act of 
focus for whatever purpose, be it ritual, the enjoyment of a play, conversation, the celebration of a 
major event, or whatever. Their focus is common, as against merely convergent, because it is part of 
what is commonly understood is that they are attending to the common object, or purpose, together, 
as against each person just happening, on his or her own, to be concerned with the same thing. In this 
sense, the “opinion of mankind” offers a merely convergent unity, while public opinion is supposedly 
generated out of a series of common actions.” (SA, 187)  
299 A common space is set up when people are assembled for some purposes, “be it on an intimate 
level of conversation, or on a larger, more ‘public’ scale for a deliberative assembly, or a ritual, or a 
celebration, or the enjoyment of a football match or an opera, and the like.” These common spaces 
arising from such assemblies are called by Taylor “topical common space.” (SA, 187)  
300 For Taylor, the “public sphere” is different from “common space” and “topical common space”. “It 
transcends such topical spaces. We might say that it knits together a plurality of such spaces into one 
larger space of non-assembly. The same public discussion is deemed to pass through our debate today, 
and someone else’s earnest conversation tomorrow, and the newspaper interview on \Thursday, and 
so on. I want to call this larger kind of non-local common space “meta-topical”. The public sphere 
which emerges in the eighteenth century is a meta-topical common space.” (SA, 187)  
301 Taylor observes that the Church and state were already existing “meta-topical-spaces”  
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two implied features in this step: “its independent identity from the political”302 and 
“its force as a benchmark of legitimacy”303 (SA, 187-188 and SI, 87). Taylor clarifies 
his position by explaining “what is new about it on two levels: what the public sphere 
does; and what it is” (SA, 188 and SI, 87). Therefore, I argue that the neutrality of 
‘public sphere’ helps to re-imagine individual’s orientation towards religion and state 
which leads to the formation of secular self. 
First, the public sphere “is the locus of a discussion potentially engaging everyone”304 
(SA, 188, and SI, 87). The public sphere becomes an ‘extra-political’ and intra-
religious power leading to secularity and neutrality. Henceforth, the public sphere 
enables “the society to come to a common mind, without the mediation of the political 
sphere, in a discourse of reason outside power, which nevertheless is normative for 
power” (SA, 190-191 and SI, 91). Second, the public sphere is oriented towards what 
‘it’ has to be. Taylor gives two reasons for this. First, it must be an ‘extra-political’ 
entity, as an association and the common space of discussion, independently existing 
owing nothing to political structures. It is composed of members of a political society 
which forms itself outside of the state.305 Taylor observes that Europe is accustomed 
to living within a dual society, one organised by two mutually irreducible principles. 
The second aspect of the emergence of the public sphere is called its radical 
‘secularity’.  
Taylor’s approach to ‘secularity’ emphasises a shift in the understanding of what 
Western society is based on. The term ‘secular’ is used to signify the nature of the 
‘public sphere’ because “it marks in its very etymology what is at stake in this context, 
i.e., the way human society inhabits time” (SA, 192 and SI, 93). ‘Secular’ in this context 
has radical connotations contrasting it with both divine and transcendental foundations 
                                                          
302 Taylor explains the independence of the “public sphere” from “political space” with the help of 
Locke and Grotius. “In the Lockean-Grotian idealization, political society is seen as an instrument for 
something pre-political: there is a place to stand, mentally, outside the polity, as it were, from which 
to judge its performance. This is what is reflected in the new ways of imagining social life independent 
of the political, viz., the economy and the public sphere.” (SA, 188)  
303 According to Taylor freedom is central to the rights society exists to defend. “Contract theories of 
legitimate government had existed before. But what was new with the theories of this century is that 
they put the requirement of consent at a more fundamental level.” (SA, 188)  
304 Taylor opines that the case of the eighteenth century was different. The “public sphere” involved 
only the educated, enlightened minority.  
305 Taylor gives the example of Stoic and Christian societies. He explains: “For it is obvious that an 
extra-political, international society is by itself not new. It is preceded by the Stoic cosmopolis, and 
more immediately, by the Christian Church. Europeans were used to living in a dual society, one 
organised by two mutually irreducible principles.” (SA, 192) 
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of society. He discusses an idea of a society being constituted by something which 
transcends contemporary common action. 
Secularity contrasts not only with divinely-established churches, or Great Chains. It is also 
different from an understanding of our society as constituted by a law which has been ours 
since time out of mind. Because this too, places our action within a framework, one which 
binds us together and makes us as a society, and which transcends our common action 
(SA, 192 and SI, 93-94). 
Taylor continues: 
The public sphere is an association which is constituted by nothing outside of the common 
action we carry out in it: coming to a common mind, where possible, through the exchange 
of ideas. Its existence as an association is just our acting together in this way. This 
common action is not made possible by a framework which needs to be established in 
some action-transcendent dimension: either by an act of God, or in a Great Chain, or by a 
law which comes down to us since time out of mind. This is what makes it radically 
secular. And this, I want to claim, gets us to the heart of what is new and unprecedented 
in it (SA, 192 and SI, 94). 
He observes that in a purely secular, common agency emanates out of common action. 
Secularity is ‘modern’ because in contrast to the ‘enchanted’ world, people do not 
directly relate to divine or transcendent agency. Taylor links his notion of radical 
secularity to ‘time’ as opposed to ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ time306 (SA, 195 and SI, 98). 
He elucidates:   
Now the move to what I am calling ‘secularity’ is obviously related to this radically 
purged time-consciousness. It comes when associations are placed firmly and wholly 
in homogeneous, profane time, whether or not the higher time is negated altogether, 
or other associations are still admitted existing in it. Such I want to argue is the case 
with public sphere, and therein lies its new and unprecedented nature (SA, 196, and 
SI, 99).  
Taylor claims that the ‘public sphere’ is an extra-political, meta-topical, and secular 
space in which people exchange their ideas and unite in common mind. It constitutes 
a meta-topical agency independent of both political agency and profane time. 
 
 
                                                          
306 Taylor explains his use of “secularity” in relation to “profane” and “sacred” time. He wants the term 
secularity not to be tied to religion alone. “The exclusion is much broader. For the original sense of 
‘secular’ was ‘of the age’, that is, pertaining to profane time. It was close to the sense of ‘temporal’ in 
the opposition temporal/spiritual, as we saw earlier. Now in earlier ages, the understanding was that 
this profane time existed in relation to (surrounded by, penetrated by: it is hard to find the right word 
here) higher times. Pre-modern understandings of time seem to have been always multidimensional. 
Time was transcended and held in place by eternity; whether that of Greek philosophy, or that of the 
Biblical God. In either case, eternity was not just endless profane time, but an ascent into the 
unchanging, or a kind of gathering of time into unity; hence the expression ‘hoi aiones ton ainon’ or 
‘secula saeculorm’. (SA, 194-195)  
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The Sovereign People 
‘The sovereign people’ starts off as an idea, and then penetrates and transmutes itself 
into social imaginary.  It aids in the formation of ‘the secular self’ by different paths. 
First, it is “a theory inspiring a new kind of activity with new practices, [that] forms 
the imaginary of whatever groups adopt these practices” (e.g., the Puritan church’s 
idea of ‘Covenant’ influencing American politics), and the second is “the change in 
the social imaginary [that] comes with a re-interpretation of a practice which already 
existed in the old dispensation” (SA, 196-197and SI, 101).307 Taylor suggests that this 
change happens through a “transformed social imaginary, in which the idea of 
foundation is taken out of mythical early time. In other words, it is brought about by 
collective action in contemporary secular time” (SA, 197 and SI, 101). To this end, He 
appeals to an ancient constitution that emphasises parliament’s rightful place beside 
the king. It created a sense of self-rule which became part of a broader society.308 The 
transition to ‘self-rule’ and ‘new social imaginary’ make people aware that they “share 
a social imaginary which can fill this requirement of including ways of realizing the 
new theory” (SA, 200 and SI, 110). The Canadian thinker breaks down ‘this 
requirement’ into two facets: “(1) the actors have to know what to do, have to have 
practices in their repertory which put the new order into effect; (2) the ensemble of 
actors have to agree on what these practices are” (SA, 200 and SI, 115). Taylor uses 
Kantian ‘schematisation’ as an analogy to argue that theories need to be ‘schematised’ 
for concrete interpretation.309 He also uses Rousseau’s theory of the ‘general will’ for 
the formulation of the modern idea of order. “Taylor interprets Rousseau as trying to 
                                                          
307 Taylor explains the idea of Covenant as “a new ecclesial structure that flowed from a theological 
innovation; and this becomes part of the part of the story of political change, because the civil 
structures themselves were influenced in certain American colonies by the ways churches were 
governed, as with Connecticut Congregationalism, where only the ‘converted’ enjoyed full 
citizenship”.  Taylor also observes that “older forms of legitimacy are colonized, as it were, with the 
new understandings of order, and then transformed; in certain cases, without a clear break.” (SA, 196-
197) 
308 Taylor explains this with the example of England. The demands for broader popular participation 
took the form in England of proposals to extend the franchise. “The people wanted in to the 
established representative structure, as most notably in the Chartist agitation of the 1830’s and 
1840’s” (SA, 200).  
309 “Taylor argues that in the case of the Russian Revolution in 1917, or example, this schematization 
was not present because the peasantry could not grasp all the Russian people as a sovereign agent 
replacing despotic power, so their social imaginary was only local. In the case of the French Revolution, 
by contrast, Taylor argues that there were different ways to realise popular sovereignty with the 
unrepresentative Estates General on the one side, and a variety of theories that were influenced by 
Rousseau on the other.” (Ian Frazer, Dialectics of the Self, p. 139)  
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overcome the motivational dualism between our own self-interest against the interest 
of others…”310 
 
Under this new idea of order, each can pursue their life in such a way that individual 
pursuits harmonise with one another. This embodies the politics of virtue, the fusion 
of the individual within the general will. The ideal of the ‘sovereign people’ had a 
gradual growth through the centuries and the impact of this ideal is crucial to the 
development of the modern social imaginary. “The new social imaginary comes 
essentially through a retrospective re-interpretation. The revolutionary process was 
mobilised largely based on the old, backward-looking legitimacy idea. This will later 
be the exercise of a power inherent in a sovereign people. The proof of its existence 
and legitimacy lies in the new polity. But popular sovereignty would have been 
incapable of doing this job if it had entered the scene too soon” (SI, 112 and SA, 198). 
The new political, social, environmental scenario created by ‘social imaginaries’ 
enabled individual selves to imagine their lives as ‘secular selves’. Now let us 
examine, how does Taylor develop his own unique sense of secularity having a specific 
teleological and existential purposefulness. 
 
 
6.2 Development of Secularityiii 
6.2.1 The Nova Effect  
Having narrated how ‘exclusive humanism’ offers an alternative to faith, and how 
people ‘imagined’ themselves within a modern moral order, Taylor presents an 
account of the development of secularityiii. There is a triple-stage development: (1) 
involving exclusive humanism as an alternative to Christian faith,311 (2) the nova 
effect’, and (3) the ‘age of authenticity’. These three stages lead to the present age, and 
the third specifically “alters the shape of secularityiii” (SA, 299). 
How does this change take place? The critiques of institutionalised religion, deism, 
and humanism, and their cross polemics advance many new positions relating to belief, 
                                                          
310 Ian Fraser, Dialectics of the Self, p. 139. 
311 Here, I graph the emergence of Exclusive Humanism down the centuries as: (Enchanted world 
[porous self] (enthusiasm, superstition and fanaticism) → Disenchanted world [buffered self and 
buffered world] → Deism → Providential deism →Humanism → Exclusive humanism [atheism]). I 
used this graphic imagery in my dissertation for the fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
M Litt.  
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and un-belief. They “set in train the dynamic of nova effect, spawning an ever-
widening variety of moral/spiritual options…” (SA, 299). As a result, the ‘buffered 
self’ undergoes further change. This anthropocentric shift allows ‘the self’ to gain a 
sense of power and capacity to order its both world and itself (SA, 300-301). 
This shift is interwoven with “literacy and education, personal self-discipline, 
development of the productive arts, a sense of decorum, personal self-discipline, 
government and the respect of law” (SA, 301). With these positive changes, there are 
also negative ones: “invulnerability lived as a limit…makes us blind or insensitive to 
whoever lies beyond this ordered human world…” (SA, 302). This sense of ‘missing 
something’ is part of “a wider sense of malaise”312 in the disenchanted world. It is 
phenomenological in that “the opposition between orthodoxy and unbelief” cross-
pressures many looking for a third way. This ‘cross-pressuring’ is part of the dynamic, 
and this predicament produces the disenchanted world that generates the nova effect. 
Taylor reads ‘cross-pressure’ from within buffered identity. It is the understanding that 
‘the disenchanted’ world lacks ‘meaning’ (SA, 303).313 “This ontic doubt about 
‘meaning’ itself is integral to the modern malaise” (SA, 303). This is one source of the 
nova effect and it compels us to seek new solutions and meanings which will 
themselves lead to continual, multiple changes over generations. 
                                                          
312 Taylor explains ‘the malaise of modernity’ as, “features of our contemporary culture and society 
that people experience as a loss or a decline, even as our civilization ‘develops’” (Charles Taylor, Ethics 
of Authenticity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003, p. 1). Taylor brings forth three main 
malaises of modernity: (1) the loss of meaning, and the fading of moral horizons, (2) the eclipse of 
ends, in face of rampant instrumental reason, and (3) a loss of freedom. (Charles Taylor, Ethics of 
Authenticity, p. 10.) 
313 Taylor observes that our age suffers from loss of meaning. “This malaise is specific to a buffered 
identity, whose very invulnerability opens it to the danger that not just evil spirits, cosmic forces or 




Figure 1 – Nova Effect from Cross-pressure in a Secular Age iii 314 
The nova effect arises not only out of cross-pressures in the buffered identity but also 
through “the whole package of buffered identity, with its disengaged subjectivity (SA, 
304-305).315 The nova effect “is the explosion of believing and unbelieving options 
that arise out of the felt disappointment with the impersonal order. It is the multiplicity 
of options that arise out of our discontent.”316 This produces not only a viable 
alternative to Christianity but many other reactions to belief, or unbelief. This 
primarily happened among the elite and continued throughout the nineteenth century 
with differently spaced interruptions within various societies.  
A given reaction can often give rise to more than one response within the ambivalent 
of buffered identity. What does this mean? It means that even a call for a return to 
belief may give rise to new forms of unbelief, and vice versa. This is an ontic-
phenomena within the immanent, impersonal, rational order we live in. Taylor 
identifies three forms which these ‘malaise of immanence’ might take: “1) the sense 
of the fragility of meaning, the search for an over-reaching significance; 2) the felt 
flatness of our attempt to solemnise the crucial moments of passage in our lives, and 
                                                          
314 This figure is adapted from the figure drawn and presented by James K. A. Smith, P. 63. 
315 According to Taylor all supporting disciplines of buffered identity sustain an order of freedom and 
mutual benefit, “(it) has given rise to a gamut of negative reactions, sometimes levelled at the package 
itself, sometimes against one or other part of it, sometimes against particular solutions which arise 
from it.” (SA, 305) 
316 https://whosoeverdesires.wordpress.com/2011/04/07/taylor-%E2%80%93-a-secular-age-part-3-









(3) the utter flatness, emptiness of the ordinary” (SA, 309). These are called the 
“malaise of immanence” because they “come to our horizon with the eclipse of 
transcendence” (SA, 309). This allows us to state “what some find objectionable or 
lacking in the buffered, disengaged, disciplined identity in the modern moral order” 
(SA, 310).317 Taylor explains that the “felt dissatisfaction at the immanent order 
motivates not only new forms of religion, but also different readings of immanence 
(SA, 310). Taylor calls this ‘the nova’.  
By malaise of immanence, Taylor means that there is a shift in emphasis that goes 
beyond the nova effect. It is in this period, that the alternatives for the creation of 
secularityiii became wider. One of the ‘gamuts of change’ consists in the shift from 
“cosmos to universe” (SA, 323). Like the social imaginary, the ‘cosmic imaginary’ 
“makes sense of the ways in which the surrounding world figures in our lives…and 
the way in which nature figures in our moral and aesthetic imagination” (SA, 323).318 
It means that there has been “a fundamental change or ‘shift’ in how people ‘imagine’ 
their environment, and cosmic context.”319 This non-Biblical cosmic imaginary “has 
moved people in a range of directions, from the hardest materialism to Christian 
orthodoxy; passing by a whole range of intermediate positions” (SA, 351).  
Taylor is also interested in another trajectory embedded in the cosmic imaginary, i.e., 
“the experience of being opened to something deeper and fuller by contact with nature” 
(SA, 350). It means “some of the ‘nova’ reactions to cross-pressure generate a new 
sense of the charmed, charged nature of our being-in-the-world.”320 The outcome, in 
this modern cosmic imaginary is that “it has opened a space in which people can 
wander between and around all these positions without having to land clearly and 
definitely in any one” (SA, 351). How was this ‘free-space’ created? Taylor observes 
that it was made “possible in large by the shift in the place and understanding of art 
                                                          
317 The axes of criticism and objection regarding the ‘malaise of immanence’ according to Taylor can 
be generally grouped under three categories. They are “axes of resonance, the Romantic axes, and 
those opposed to Romantic axes which tend to see this modern outlook as too facile and optimistic.” 
(SA, 311-321)   
318 “Cosmic imaginary” Taylor explains; “figures in our religious images and practices, including explicit 
cosmological doctrines; in the stories we tell about other lands and other ages; in our ways of making 
the seasons and the passage of time; in the place of ‘nature’ in our moral and/or aesthetic sensibility; 
and in our attempts to develop a ‘scientific’ cosmology,…” (SA, 323) 
319 James K. A. Smith, How (Not) To Be Secular, p. 79. 
320 James K. A. Smith, p. 73. 
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that came in the Romantic period” (SA, 352).321 Taylor here emphasises the significant 
role that ‘art’ plays in creating ‘an open space’ that characterises the secular age.322  
The ‘open space’ functions as a ‘neutral space’ between the development of a deeper 
form of materialism and unbelief. It increases cross-pressure experienced of the 
buffered self between belief and unbelief (SA, 360). How does ‘art’ or this ‘open space’ 
create the ‘open space of the nova effect’? The arts and the aesthetic become a way of 
working out “the feeling that there is something inadequate in our way of life, that we 
live by an order which represses what is really important” (SA, 358). James K. A. 
Smith observes that this results in an immanent space trying to bridge the lost longing 
for transcendence. In short ‘art’ creates a ‘place to go for modern unbelief’ without 
having to settle for the utterly flattened world of mechanism or utilitarianism, but also 
without having to return to religion proper. So, we get the new sacred space of 
modernity: the concert hall as temple, the museum as chapel; tourism as the new 
pilgrimage (SA, 360).323 Hence, ‘art’ as ‘Art’ creates room to expand unbelief and this 
was the way unbelief deepened.  
Unbelief increased steadily with complex internal differences in the nineteenth century 
further expanding and intensifying ‘the nova’. The cross-pressuring belief and unbelief 
has led to new forms of ideals and counter-ideals within the moral order of society 
(SA, 419). In the last sixty years, ‘the self’ has entered a new world in which the old 
links have disappeared. Various un-couplings and de-linkings of belief and unbelief 
have taken place causing a de-coupling of religion and spirituality (SA, 419). The 
                                                          
321 This understanding of ‘art’ emerges, when ‘art’ as ‘mimesis’ is changed into one that places its 
emphasises on ‘creation’. It concerns ‘the languages of art’ of painters and poets etc., (SA, 352). Taylor 
explains it with the example of Shakespeare. “As Shakespeare could draw on the correspondences to 
make us feel the full horror of the act of regicide, …He has a servant report the “unnatural” events 
that have been evoked in sympathy with this terrible deed: the night in which Duncan is murdered is 
an unruly one, with ‘lamentings heard in the air; strange screams of death’, and it remains dark even 
though the day should have started. On the previous Tuesday a falcon had been killed by a moussing 
owl, and Duncan’s horses turned wild in the night, ‘Contending ‘against obedience, as they 
would/Make war with mankind.’ In a similar way painting could draw on the publicly understood 
objects of divine and secular history, events and personages which had heightened meaning, as it 
were, built into them, like the Madonna and Child or the oath of the Horati.” (SA, 352) 
322 “One of the features of post-romantic art, he suggests, is a fundamental shift from art as mimesis 
to art as poesis- from art imitating nature to art making its world.” (James K. A. Smith, How (Not) To 
Be Secular, p. 74.) 




outcome of this change is secularityiii. Taylor claims that nova effect with new and 
widening options of belief and non-belief continues to expand its effects today. 
 
6.2.2 From an Age of Mobilisation to an Age of Authenticity 
Taylor observes that nova effect primarily occurs within social elites and the 
intelligentsia. In proceeding centuries, the predicament of the then upper strata has 
become that of the whole of society. Taylor in this shift introduces his ‘secularisation 
theory’ proper. Canadian philosopher elucidates:  
This has been mainly concerned with explaining various facets of secularityi (the retreat 
of religion in public life) and secularityii (decline in belief and practice), but obviously, 
there is going to be a lot of overlap between secularityiii (the change in the conditions of 
belief). In particular, the relation of this latter with secularityii is bound to be close. This 
is not because the two changes are identical, or even bound to go together. But the change 
I am interested in here, (3) involves among the other things the arising of a humanist 
alternative. This is a precondition for (2) the rise of actual unbelief, which in turn often 
contributes to (2) the decline of practice (SA, 423). 
Here Taylor offers simplified history of the last centuries to portraying the move from 
an age of elite unbelief to that of contemporary mass secularisation. He uses a Weber-
style social and spiritual matrix to explain the shift. 
The first of these spiritual and social ideal type is the ancien régime (AR). As explained 
people in AR understand order as that of “a pre-modern kind” (SA, 438).324 The second 
ideal type is ‘the Age of Mobilisation’ (AM), which designates a process whereby 
people were persuaded, dragooned, or bullied into new forms of society, church and 
association (SA, 445).325 In AR, there is a wider social and hierarchical context which 
functions as the framework of all legitimacy. Yet in the AM, there is no background, 
only a mobilisation or inducement into existence (SA, 445-446).   
Historically and phenomenologically, ‘the self’ between the sixteenth and the 
nineteenth centuries moved from AR to AM. In contrast to AR, where self is in an 
enchanted world, ‘the self’ in the AM is induced to the disenchanted world. As a result, 
all Western societies have “trodden the path out of the AR into the AM, and to the 
                                                          
324 Taylor observes that “this notion of order holds both for the larger society: we are subordinated to 
King, Lord, Bishops, nobility, each in their rank; and (or in England, squire and parson) hold sway, and 
each person has their place. Indeed, we only belong to the larger society through our membership in 
this local microcosm” (SA, 438).  
325 “Mobilization was already taking place during the English Reformation, or the French Counter-
Reformation of the seventeenth century – indeed, the Crusades might be seen as an even earlier 
example.” (SA, 445)  
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present predicament of secularityiii” (SA, 448). This path out of AR was both extremely 
demanding and conflictual, particularly for institutional religions.326,327 Taylor dates 
AM approximately from1800 to 1950-60. During these centuries, there is an explicit 
decline of all religious forms throughout many parts of Europe, as well as a gradual 
development of new religious forms appropriate to the age (SA, 471).328 These new 
religious forms fashioned “four strands together: spirituality, discipline, political 
identity, and an image of civilisational order” (SA, 472). However, these puritanical 
religious forms were “set for a precipitate fall in the next age” (SA, 472), because 
antagonistic to outsiders regarding their faith and political codes. The next stage began 
“to dawn in the mid-twentieth century” (SA, 472).  
‘The Age of Authenticity’ (AA), appeared as an alteration of the conditions of belief 
in the last sixty years. It is an ‘individuating revolution’ which resulting in a 
“expressive individualism.”329 Although ‘expressive individualism’ has its origin in the 
Romantic period, it becomes a mass phenomenon in the 1960’s. James Gerard McEvoy 
describes, “AA as a new understanding of human identity.”330 Authenticity is creating 
an identity for oneself. It is an existential struggle in Heideggerian sense, where ‘the 
self’ struggles to pick the right identity or to create it.  
                                                          
326 Taylor says that it was particularly difficult in the case of Catholic societies, where the old model of 
presence lasted much longer (SA, 448). It caused a re-establishment of religions into two within AM. 
“The first involved a presence of God at the level of the whole of society, as the author of a Design 
which this society is undertaking to carry out. The design of God, as it were, defines the political 
identity of this society. The second consists in ‘free’ churches, set up as instruments of mutual help 
whereby individuals are brought into contact with the Word of God and mutually strengthen each 
other in ordering their lives along Godly lines” (SA, 453). 
327 Both these types of religious forms coexist well together. “Not only are they both organised on 
similar principles: mobilizing to carry out the will of God; but they can also be seen as mutually 
strengthening. This was the case in the early U.S.A. The Republic secures the freedom of the churches; 
and the churches sustain the Godly ethos which the Republic requires.” (SA, 453)  
328 Taylor gives the example of the Irish Church which went through a reform process after the famine. 
People were recruited and mobilised on an impressive scale, surpassing their ancient régime 
counterparts. He also speaks of a “Second Confessional Age” because churches managed to organise 
so much of their members’ lives, and hence became the focus of often intense loyalty, a sentiment 
akin to nationalism (SA, 471-472). 
329 The phrase, “individuating revolution”, according to Taylor, “may sound strange, because our 
modern age was already based on a certain individualism. But this has shifted on to a new axis, without 
deserting the others. As well as moral/spiritual and instrumental individualisms, we now have a 
widespread “expressive” individualism.” (SA, 473)  
330 James Gerard McEvoy, “Living in an Age of Authenticity: Charles Taylor on Identity Today” in 
Australasian Catholic Record, 86(2), pp. 161-172. Copyright 2009 Australasian Catholic Record, 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au, 
http://dspace.flinders.edu.au/xmlui/bitstream/handle/2328/26137/McEvoy%20Living.pdf?sequence
=1, accessed on 12/10/2015.  
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Taylor differs from other philosophers in explaining authenticity. He says; “I am using 
authenticity as the background idea that everyone has of their own particular way of 
being human that you can either be true or untrue to that.”331 Accordingly, during this 
period, everyone understood that something had changed, and experienced a sense of 
loss and a break-up.332 There are different reasons that can account for this erosion of 
belief in the 1960’s. They include “affluence, and the continued extension of consumer 
life styles; social and geographic mobility; outsourcing and downsizing by 
corporations; new family patterns, particularly the growth of the two-income 
household with resulting overwork and burnout; suburban spread whereby people often 
live, work, and shop in three separate areas; the rise of television, digital media, and 
others” (SA, 473). Notwithstanding, Taylor’s concern was about the moral uneasiness 
brought about by this new individuation. ‘Moral uneasiness’ means that there occurred 
a gradual ‘outbreak’ of egoism, or a turn to hedonism. Egoism and mere pleasure-
seeking challenged the traditional ethical values of community service and self- 
discipline and functioned as the motors of change.333 There were four significant 
factors that controlled the individual self prior to ‘the age of authenticity’: (1) an 
imposition from ‘outside’, (2) an imposition from society, (3) an imposition from 
previous generations, and, (4) an imposition from religion and politics. However, in 
AA, each one has his/her own way of realising humanity and each one must find his/her 
own life against these surrounding and externals factors.   
                                                          
331 Charles Taylor and Ron Kuipers, “Religious Belonging in an “Age of Authenticity”: A Conversation 
with Charles Taylor (Part Two of Three)” in The Other Journal.com: An Intersection of Theology and 
Culture, June 23, 2008, http://theotherjournal.com/2008/06/23/religious-belonging-in-an-age-of-
authenticity-a-conversation-with-charles-taylor-part-two-of-three/, accessed on 22/10/2015. 
332 Taylor gives the example of Americans who believed that communities are eroding, families, 
neighbourhoods, even the polity; they sense that people are less willing to participate, to do their bit; 
and they are less trusting of others (SA, 473). Taylor in Sources of the Self, portrays the history of 
modern self, and identity, tracing the sources of the self from Plato to its contemporary sources and 
their accompanying moral visions. In Ethics of Authenticity, he elaborates his theme of ‘authenticity’ 
and sorts out the good from the harmful in the modern cultivation of an authentic self. In A Secular 
Age, He seeks to understand the place of religion and ‘the sacred’ in this age of authenticity.  
333 Taylor observes that (these) ‘motors of change’ may have played a larger role in the motivation of 
an individual’s life. The most significant feature of this shift is “a large-scale shift in general 
understanding of ‘the good’ that requires some new understanding of ‘the good’” (SA, 474). In 
individual cases, this functions as rationalisation or as an animating ideal, and the moral and social 
ideal itself becomes a crucial facilitating factor. An example of this manifestation of individualism has 
been the ‘consumer revolution and its by-product of the new consumer culture of ‘the youth market’ 
(SA, 474). “One important facet of the new consumer culture was the creation of a special youth 
market, with a flood of new goods, from clothes to records, aimed at an age bracket which ranged 
over adolescents and youth adults…. Youth even becomes a political reference point, or a basis of 
mobilization…The present youth culture is defined, both by the way advertising is pitched at it, and to 
a great degree autonomously, as expressivist….” (SA, 474-475).  
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AA affects the whole of an individual’s life embracing its political, cultural, moral, and 
religious dimensions. How does AA influence the social imaginaries? Together with 
three ‘social imaginaries’, Taylor adds “the space of fashion” (SA, 480) ‘the youth 
culture’. “The space of fashion is one in which we sustain a language consisting of 
signs and meanings, which is constantly changing, but which at any moment is the 
background needed to give our gestures the sense they have” (SA, 481). Since, ‘fashion’ 
is a language, there is an historical continuity to it. It is a visual language which will 
have new directions, and permutations. Accordingly, secularism and commitment to 
religion too is an ontological language. These are socially shared structures which 
become part of the unfolding continuity of history. The general mode that can be drawn 
from ‘the space of fashion’ is that “of horizontal, simultaneous mutual presence, which 
is not that of a common action, but rather of mutual display” (SA, 481).  
Summing up his observations of ‘the authentic age’, the place of ‘the self’ and ‘the 
sacred’ in contemporary times, Taylor observes that it is an ontological necessity that 
one directs one’s efforts towards human flourishing. The ideal of authenticity is based 
on the inextricable relation between humans and religious thought. This must include 
the rigour of the secular imperative of Kant but also transcendental norms.334 Religion 
or spirituality, however, do not belong to ‘this age’ or faith. Taylor observes that the 
Christian faith can be lived in a better way, and more fully by links with ‘other ages’ 
(Eastern: Hinduism, and Buddhism?) rather than being on their own.335 He argues that 
it is casting off crutches to move towards a more open, honest, and authentic faith, and 
not signing on to the dogma of any particular faith. However, Taylor does not deny that 
there are not only gains but also losses associated with living in an AA. It is something 
like being in an immanent frame, forever “tossed between.”336 Now let us see how ‘the 
immanent frame’ in nova effect functions. 
 
                                                          
334 Agnieszka Kaczmarek, “Between the Narrative of Secularization and the Narrative of Authenticity” 
in Charles Taylor’s Vision of Modernity: Reconstructions and Interpretations, eds., Christopher 
Garbowski, Jan Hudzik and Jan Klos, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009, pp. 
104-117. 
335 Charles Taylor and Ron Kuipers, “Religious Belonging in an Age of Authenticity”. 
336  “On the one hand, a trivialization of authenticity is readily available that can make people quite 
unserious about certain very important issues; and on the other hand, authenticity can introduce the 
opportunity for discovering better and more profound ways of living and engaging with these issues.” 
(Charles Taylor and Ron Kuipers, “Religious Belonging in an Age of Authenticity”). 
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6.2.3 The Immanent Frame 
Through his analysis of the AR, AM, and AA, Taylor tries to address the fundamental 
issue of his secularisation project: how we got to where we are? He says, 
“secularisation stories involve some picture of the spiritual shape of the present age” 
(SA, 539). He moves from an historical and genealogical explanation to a critical 
analysis of the secularisation story. Taylor reaches the ‘constructive’ part of his project 
and “makes an attempt to get secularityii to inhabit the seculariii age.”337 
The buffered, disciplined self, seeking intimacy comes to see itself as an individual in 
an age of authenticity. In relation to the instrumentality of individualism, the modern 
moral order places its emphasis exclusively on secular time. This means that “our sense 
of being comprehensively in secular time is heavily reinforced by the very thick 
environment of measured time which we have woven around ourselves in our 
civilisation” (SA, 541-542). Accordingly, the buffered self of the disciplined individual 
moves in a constructed social space, where instrumental rationality is a key value, and 
time is pervasively secular. This thick environment with its total composition is called 
“the immanent frame” (SA, 542).  
‘The immanent frame’ being a metaphorical concept alluding to a ‘frame’ that both 
boxes in (closes) and boxes out (opens), encloses and focuses, is meant to capture the 
world we now inhabit in our secular age. “This frame constitutes a ‘natural order’, in 
contrast to a ‘supernatural’ one (SA, 542).338 The immanent frame is composed of a 
‘constellation’ of impersonal orders, including cosmic, social, and moral. These orders 
are not saturated if moved by any divine agent. The radical differentiation of the 
‘immanent’ from the ‘transcendent’339 is established in the whole strata of society 
through a set of connected changes. These changes in practical-self-understanding 
entail “how we fit into our world (as buffered, disciplined, instrumental agents) and 
society (as responsible individuals, constituting societies designed for mutual benefit)” 
(SA, 542).340 This ‘new science’ of the immanent frame opens a theoretical path to the 
                                                          
337 James K. A. Smith, How (Not) To Be Secular, p. 92. 
338 James K. A Smith, p. 92.  
339 This distinction between the two was an achievement of Latin Christendom in the middle Ages and 
early modern period. It “was originally made in order to mark clearly the autonomy of the 
supernatural. The rebellion of the ‘nominalists’ against Aquinas’ ‘realism’ was meant to establish the 
sovereign power of God. Whose judgments made right and wrong, and could not be chained by the 
bent of nature.” (SA, 542).  
340 However, the immanent frame owns its historical and existential rootedness to the rise of the major 
theoretical transformations brought about through the growth of post-Galilean natural science. Post-
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immanent order. Therefore, ‘the self’ comes to understand that his/her life is lived 
within “a self-sufficient immanent order or a constellation of orders, i.e., cosmic, social 
and moral” (SA, 543). Taylor names the immanent frame as the ontic-epistemic 
situation of all in the West. Some live it as ‘open’ to beyond and others live it as 
‘closed’ (SA, 544). Therefore, “it is an order of natural laws, human laws, and ethical 
principles, which we all share, while differing in the ultimate meaning, transcendent 
or not.”341 
How does the immanent frame remain ‘closed’ or ‘open’? Taylor uses ‘the Neo-
Durkheimian’ understanding of civil religion in the U.S.A to explain it. Many in 
America felt that “there was something ‘beyond’ to aim for, some better and moral 
way of life, indissolubly connected to God” (SA, 544). However, the lower are not just 
quantitatively inferior; “there is no way of compensating for the lack of the higher 
through any accumulation of the lower. On the contrary” (SA, 544).  Taylor argues that 
“whenever the sense of the higher constitutes such distinction, it is somehow 
ineradicably linked to God, or something ontically higher. Belief in this higher seems 
obviously right, founded, even undeniable” (SA, 544). The collective good is 
consubstantial with God or has some relation to transcendence. This is a positive set 
of ways by which the immanent frame may be lived as open to transcendence.  
Conversely, ‘the openness’ of ‘the self’ towards transcendence, is also pushed by 
certain elements to a ‘closure’ of immanent frame. What are the elements instrumental 
for this ‘closure’? In response to ‘the goods’ which are consubstantial with the 
transcendent, there are also notions of ‘the good’ which are seen as immanent (SA, 
546).342 It seems Christianity as a strong and influential religion demands allegiance 
to certain theological beliefs or ecclesiastical structures that face resistance from 
mainstream society. Religion in this menacing form is what can be called ‘fanaticism’. 
Taylor finds ‘fanaticism’ as one of the sources of ‘the closure of the immanent 
                                                          
Galilean natural science reminds one of “the familiar picture of the natural, “physical” universe as 
governed by exceptionalness laws, which may reflect the wisdom and benevolence of the creator, but 
do not require in order to be understood – or (at least on first level) explained – any reference to a 
good aimed at, whether in the form of a Platonic Idea, or of Ideas in the mind of God.” (SA, 542)  
341 Charles Taylor, “Afterward” in Working with A Secular Age: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Charles 
Taylor’s Master Narrative, eds., Florian Zemmin, Colin Jager, Guido Vanheeswijck, Berlin: CPI Books 
GmbH, Leck, 2016, pp. 369-384. 
342 Taylors gives the examples of Gibbon, Voltaire, and Hume. He observes the reaction from (the 
eighteenth century) which identifies in a strongly transcendent version of Christianity a danger for the 
goods of the modern moral order (SA, 546).  
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frame’.343 It results in the rejection of Christianity, a future turning towards atheism, 
and other forms of anti-Christian forms of ‘isms’.  
Taylor also notes a naturalistic rejection of the transcendent that pushes towards 
‘closure’. It happens through the success of modern natural science, technology, and 
the development of civilisations that unlock the mysteries of the self. Taylor refers to 
‘the openness’ and ‘the closure’ of ‘the immanent frame’ as two polar positions. Taylor 
observes how a great many people are cross-pressured between these two orientations. 
These people genuinely wish to respect the scientific shape of the immanent order and 
have a fear of religious faith, yet who still cannot help believing that there is something 
more than the merely immanent (SA, 548).344 The emerging outcome of the open and 
closed positions or how one inhibits the immanent frame, hinges on one’s attitude 
towards transcendence. One can “either (see) the transcendent as a threat, a dangerous 
temptation, a distraction, or an obstacle to our greatest good, or we can read it as 
answering our deepest craving, need, fulfilment of the good…” (SA, 458). Whether a 
threat or a promise, one is free to make crucial turning in life in one direction or the 
other. This is standing in ‘an open space’ “where you can feel the wind pulling you, 
now to belief, now to unbelief” (SA, 549).345  
However, Taylor notes that one does not stand ‘there’ in ‘the open space’ of belief or 
non-belief. He explains; “not only is the immanent frame itself not usually or even 
mainly a set of beliefs which we entertain about our predicament, it is the sensed 
context in which we develop our beliefs; but in the same way, one or other of these 
takes on the immanent frame, as open or closed, has usually sunk to the level of such 
an unchallenged framework, something we have trouble often thinking ourselves 
outside of, even as an imaginative exercise” (SA, 549). One does not, in this frame, 
have a stable ‘position’ on transcendence and one does not embrace the frame as a set 
of belief systems. It is a ‘sensed context’ in which one can ‘take’ either ‘open’ or 
‘closed’ relation with transcendence. It works also as an existential and imaginative 
exercise in our social imaginary and it becomes part of the background that governs 
our being-in-the-world. 
                                                          
343 Taylor here illustrates the example of anti-clericalism. He gives the example of the story of anti-
clericalism in nineteenth-century France (SA, 546).   
344 Taylor gives the striking example of Victor Hugo and Jean Jaurés for this ‘spiritualism’ (SA, 548).  
345 Taylor has described and elaborated this idea in his lectures on William James. See -The Varieties 
of Religion Today, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002, P. 59.  
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“Taylor’s basic orientations within the immanent frame regarding ‘the sensed context’ 
and ‘the take’, are not necessarily logical conclusions. His aim is to portray an 
existential picture of the self in secularityiii. How one inhabits the immanent frame is 
less the fruit of deduction and more a ‘vibe’.”346 He relates ‘the sensed context’ to the 
Wittgenstein’s “a picture held us captive” (SA, 549).347 It is explained as “a 
background to our thinking, within whose terms it is carried on, but which is often 
largely unformulated, and to which we can frequently, just for this reason, imagine no 
alternative” (SA, 549). Subsequently, how does one occupy the immanent frame? To 
answer this, Taylor makes a distinction between ‘Jamesian open space’348 and the 
immanent frame as a ‘spin’ (SA, 549). In Jamesian open space,  
we recognise the contestability of our take on things, and even feel the pull and tug and 
cross-pressure of the alternative; or we will fail to recognise that ours is a ‘take’ and 
instead settle for ‘spin’ – an overconfident ‘picture’ within which we cannot imagine it 
being otherwise, and thus smugly dismiss those who disagree. If we settle for ‘spin’, we 
will think it is just ‘obvious’ that the frame is open or closed. (Thus) what I am calling 
‘spin’ is a way of avoiding entering this (Jamesian) space, a way of convincing oneself 
that one’s reading is obvious, compelling, allowing of no cavil or demurral (SA, 551).349 
Taylor feels that ‘immanent frame’ is existentially unavoidable, and underpins the 
power of the mainstream secularisation theory. Taylor stands for both ‘the open’ and 
‘closed’ reading of the immanent frame without advocating one or the other. ‘Open’ 
and ‘closed’ stances are possible only by a ‘leap of faith’ (SA, 550). According to 
Taylor, what pushes either way is “our overall take on humans and its cosmic and 
spiritual surroundings” (SA, 550). This ‘take’ is not arbitrary. ‘The take’ can change 
through further events and experiences. “[O]ur overall sense of things anticipates or 
leaps ahead of the reasons.  It is something in the nature of a hunch; perhaps we might 
better speak here of ‘anticipatory confidence’. This is what it means to talk of a ‘leap 
of faith’” (SA, 550).350 One’s thinking is clouded or cramped by a powerful ‘picture’ 
which prevents seeing the important aspects of reality because one suffers from an 
                                                          
346 James K. A Smith, How (Not) To Be Secular, p. 94.  
347 Taylor quotes Ludwig Wittgenstein. “Ein Bild hielt uns gefangen”, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Philosophische Untersuchungen, 115.  
348 “Standing in the Jamesian open space”, Taylor writes, “requires that you have gone further than this 
second state [of being set free from captivity], and can actually feel some of the force of each position” (SA, 549).  
349 James K. A Smith, How (Not) To Be Secular, pp. 94-95. 
350 Taylor gives an entirely different meaning to the term ‘faith’. “Here it refers to a crucial feature of 
our over-all sense of things, namely the personal relation of trust and confidence in God, rather than 




intellectual dishonesty. To withstand this criticism, ‘the individual self’ occupies a 
place of neutrality in which each alternative looks equally appealing.  
 
 
6.2.4 The Conversion and Fullness 
Taylor further explains the force of the secularist spin in terms of what he calls the 
‘closed world structures’ which appear as ‘a closed immanent order’. CWS makes ‘the 
take’ of the immanent frame obvious, unchallengeable, and axiomatic (SA, 589). In 
CWS, faith “remains a possibility, or the self-valorising understanding of the founders 
of atheism” (SA, 591). However, the change that we have undergone in our modern 
condition, involves both an alteration of the structures in which we live, and how these 
are imagined. It cannot be understood in terms of the decline and marginalization of 
religion alone. All have a share in the immanent frame. “What we share is what I have 
been calling the immanent frame; the different structures we live in: scientific, social, 
technological, and so on constitute such a frame in that they are part of a ‘natural’ or 
‘this-worldly’ order which can be understood in its own terms, without reference to 
the ‘supernatural’ or ‘transcendent’” (SA, 594).  Due to this radical and continuing 
relegation of religion and the ‘transcendent’, traditional religious life within Western 
society became more and more fragmented and unstable. 
Taylor notes that the fragmentation and virtual unsustainability of religion is not a 
fundamental feature of Western society. The unique nature of the modern moral order 
can be characterised by “a natural fragilization of different religious positions, as well 
as of the outlooks both of beliefs and unbelief” (SA, 595). The whole culture 
experiences an ontic and existential cross-pressuring. It is experienced “between 
narratives of closed immanence on one side, and the sense of their inadequacy on the 
other, strengthened by encounter with existing milieux of religious practice, or by 
some intimations of the transcendent” (SA, 595). ‘Cross-pressure’ does not mean 
“most or everyone in this culture feels torn, but rather that virtually all positions held 
are drawn to define at last, partly in relation to these extremes” (SA, 677).  
Taylor further addresses the condition of belief in the contemporary world by 
examining unbelieving critiques of religions. He discusses it by pointing out certain 
historical figures “who broke out of the immanent; people who experienced some kind 
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of ‘conversion’ (SA, 728). He names Bede Griffiths351 and Vaclav Havel352 as 
examples of people who went through self-authenticating, ‘epiphanic experience’. 
Most people who have such an experience of ‘conversion’ may not have a self-
authenticating epiphanic experience, but “they take on a new view about it from others: 
saints, prophets, charismatic leaders, who have radiated some sense of more direct 
contact” (SA, 729). There is a shared religious language which helps to articulate this 
‘fullness’.353 Shared religious language is instrumental in boosting both confidence 
and the religious experience of ordinary people.354 This language gives force to the 
conviction that others have lived ‘it’ in a more complete, direct and powerful manner. 
Taylor widens his range of examples to what ‘direct contact’ and ‘accepted religious 
language’ may involve. Analogous to the example of Griffiths and Havel, were the 
powerful mystical experiences of Francis of Assisi who was seized by a sense of the 
overpowering force of God’s love. A transformation beyond the human scope and an 
‘openness’ to something outside the epiphanic experience is seen in the case of Francis. 
His was much more than a vision of God ‘out there’, but a heightened power of Love 
itself, which God opened to him, and is a participation in God’s love (SA, 729). The 
life of Francis draws one to a ‘middle condition’ where one can have a dim sense of 
being drawn to and confirmed in this conviction.  
One, in our age thinks of this contact in terms of ‘experience’; and to think of experience 
as something subjective, distinct from the object experienced; and as something to do 
                                                          
351 Bede Griffiths was born Alan Richard Griffiths into a British middle-class family at Walton-on-
Thames, England in 1906. He read English and Philosophy at Oxford and he became a life-long friend 
of the writer and scholar C. S. Lewis. Refer to http://www.overgrownpath.com/2008/07/this-man-is-
dangerous.html, accessed on 12/12/2015.  
352 Václav Havel,  (born October 5, 1936, Prague, Czechoslovakia [now in Czech Republic]—
died December 18, 2011, Hrádeček, Czech Republic), Czech playwright, poet, and political dissident, 
who, after the fall of communism, was president of Czechoslovakia (1989–92) and of the Czech 
Republic (1993–2003). Refer to http://www.britannica.com/biography/Vaclav-Havel, accessed on 
12/12/2015.  
353 For Taylor, ‘fullness’ is a subjective experience. “By this he means an experience of life and the 
world as imbued with meaning, beauty and connection – whatever the source of the experience. 
Crucially, it is a subjective experience in which the fullness or satisfying intensity is understood to be 
objective – the way the world is, or at least can sometimes be – not merely a result of subjective 
attitude…it is a reflection of our individualistic, psychological orientation and also our rationalistic, 
epistemological criteria for knowledge that we try to grasp fullness entirely in terms of subjective 
states; we say we have moments of transcendent experience, thus, rather than moments when we 
experience the transcendent character of reality”. (Michael Warner, Jonathan Vantwerpen, “Editor’s 
Introduction” in Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age. London: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 
11.) 
354 Taylor gives certain examples of those who shared the shared language which helps the religious 
experience of these common folk. “These may be named figures, identified paradigms, like Francis of 
Assisi, or Saint Teresa; or Jonathan Edwards, or John Wesley; or they may figure as the unnamed 
company of (to oneself) unknown saints or holy people.” (SA, 729)  
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with our feelings, distinct from changes in our being: dispositions, orientations, the bent 
of our lives, etc. That is, ‘experience’ may have a causal effect on these latter, but it is 
defined separately from them. This notion of experience, as distinct both from the object 
and the continuing nature of the subject (experiencer), is quintessentially modern, and 
springs from the modern philosophy of mind and knowledge… (SA, 729-730).355  
The notion of ‘experience’ as distorting is seen in the case of Griffiths and Havel. Their 
experience is defined “on the one hand as openness to the deeper reality they were 
opened to and life changing” (SA, 730) of that reality. Despite this, Taylor notes that 
there were ‘experiences and expressions’ of joy, of liberation which were heart-
transforming and life-changing in the cases of Francis and Théreśe of Lisieux.356 Thus, 
‘fullness’ involves a contemplative grasp of fullness (Griffiths and Havel) and the 
vision of the negative absence of fullness: desolation, and emptiness. These 
experiences consist in life changing moments, being ‘surprised by love’ (Francis and 
Théreśe of Lisieux).  
Many ‘great conversions’ or ‘great founding movements’ involve a transformation of 
the immanent frame in which people live. It is a way of changing the elements of ‘the 
frame’ and moving beyond it (SA, 731).357 This is analogous to a ‘paradigm change’358 
which displaces the entire existing manner of thought, action, and piety. Contemporary 
conversions tend to resemble this paradigm change. The totally ‘disrupted’ insights of 
‘the converts’ “break beyond the limits of the regnant versions of immanent order, 
either in terms of accepted theories, or of moral and political practice” (SA, 732). It 
requires that one (the convert) invents ‘a new language’359 or literary style. New 
                                                          
355 The influence of Descartes and William James are examples here.  
356 Théreśe was born in France in 1873, the pampered daughter of a mother who had wanted to be a 
saint and a father who had wanted to be monk. She knew as a Carmelite nun she would never be able 
to perform great deeds. Refer to http://www.catholic.org/saints/saint.php?saint_id=105, accessed on 
12/12/2015.  
357 Taylor gives the example of Jesus and Buddha here. “We can think of the change that Jesus wrought 
in the pre-existing notion of the Messiah in his society, of the way the Buddha transformed the 
understanding of what it was to go beyond the chain of rebirth; within Christianity, we can cite the 
way in which Francis transformed the understanding of what it meant to respond to God’s love, the 
new mystical tradition founded by Saint Teresa, and so on.” (SA, 731)  
358 Taylor has a very unique meaning for his usage of ‘paradigm change’ in this context. He explains; 
“[A]ttempting to make a paradigm change beyond this (as against a shift between paradigms within 
natural science) is in some sense bucking the limits of generally accepted language. The terms in which 
the paradigm shift can be made are suspect, and difficult to credit; they either belong to outlooks 
which can be discredited as ‘pre-modern’ (e.g., God, evil, agape); or else one has to have recourse to 
a new ‘subtler language’, whose terms on their own do not have generally accepted referents, but 
which can point us beyond ordinary, ‘immanent’ realities. Indeed, what may have to be challenged 
here is the very distinction nature/super-nature itself.” (SA, 732)   
359 Taylor refers to ‘new language’ as, an individual having recourse to a ‘new subtler language’, whose 
terms on their own do not have generally accepted referents, but which can point us beyond ordinary 
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language assists one “to break from the immanent order to a larger, more 
encompassing one, which includes it while disrupting it” (SA, 732). The disruption of 
the immanent order by a higher order and an ideal relation (an equilibrium) that is 
reckoned to be maintained between the two is always a temptation for the converts.360 
Taylor proposes ‘three strands’ that maintain the equilibrium between ‘immanent’ and 
‘higher’ order.  (1) “[T]he deepest sources of European culture were in Christianity, 
and this culture must lose force and depth in the extent that moderns departed from it” 
(SA, 733).361 (2) This strand identifies the basic error of modernity as subjectivism, 
that is, “in philosophies which stressed the powers of the free individual subject, 
constructing his scientific and cultural world” (SA, 733)362, and (3) the idea that 
Christianity is essential for order itself (SA, 734).363 
Taylor explains the supposed reciprocal link that brings the demands of the secular 
and the transcendent closer to each other (SA, 735). His observation is that ‘this 
narrowing of the gap’ is a ‘loss’ relative to a transformation. Taylor takes Ivan Illich364 
as an example of the ‘loss’ that an ‘ideal’ transformation suffers. Commenting on 
Illich, Taylor observes, “something is lost when we take the way of living together that 
the Gospel points to, and make of it a code of rules enforced by organisations erected 
for this purpose” (SA, 737). What is lost is the ‘core’ of Christianity. For Illich, there 
                                                          
‘immanent’ realities. The new language challenges the very distinction nature and super nature itself 
(SA, 732). 
360 In this regard, Taylor gives the examples of the followers of Action Franҫaise, Christopher Dawson, 
in Hilaire Belloc, to some degree in G. K. Chesterton, although without the nostalgic dimension, and in 
T. S. Eliot. (SA, 733)  
361 Taylor refers to the ideas of Dawson and Eliot to explain the first strand. “I am talking about the 
common tradition of Christianity which has made Europe what it is, and about the common cultural 
elements which this common Christianity has brought with it…It is in Christianity that our arts have 
developed; it is in Christianity that the laws of Europe have – until recently- been rooted. It is against 
a background of Christianity that all our thought has significance.”  (T. S. Eliot, Notes Towards the 
Definition of Culture (London: Faber & Faber, 1962), p. 122; quoted in Joseph Pearce, Literary Converts 
(London: Harper Collins, 1999), P. 264.) Taylor uses this explanation in his footnote 5, Chapter 20, A 
Secular Age. (SA, 846)  
362 To substantiate this observation Taylor refers to Eliot who took up this theme. However, Taylor 
further observes that the best-known articulation of this critique came from the pen of Jacques Martin. 
363 Taylor observes that the modern world, through its subjectivism and its denial of its moral roots, is 
falling into ever deeper disorder. “Christian religion, or in some cases, Catholicism as the only bulwark 
against a menacing disintegration and disorder; this theme was woven together with that of the deep 
roots of European culture, and that of the dangers of self-indulgent subjectivism.” (SA, 734) 
364 Illich was born in Vienna into a family with Jewish, Dalmatian and Catholic roots. Refer to 




is something monstrous and alienating about the modern moral order. This, he 
explains, comes from the corruption of the ‘core’, the highest, the agape-network.365 
This agape analogue of Taylor can be compared to Vattimo’s notion of caritas, the 
result of kenosis.366 The critique of Illich supports Taylor’s and Vattimo’s notion of 
how the modern secular world emerges out of the increasingly non-governed reform 
of the Church.  
Further analysing the phenomena of conversion, Taylor discerns two tendencies. 
Conversions are “often accompanied by an acute sense that (1) the present immanent 
orders of psychological or moral understanding are deeply flawed, and (2) an intuition 
of a larger order which can alone make sense of our lives” (SA, 744). The ‘flaw’ of the 
present order is overcome by establishing another (a real Christendom) and this ‘gap’ 
(flaw) can also be seen “as endemic in the human historical condition itself” (SA, 744). 
The ‘endemic gap’ and the tension between the demands of Christian faith and the 
norms of civilization are not of major concern for converts. Several people who 
experience conversion move from one view to the other, others learn both ways (SA, 
745).367  
Different approaches to conversion and re-conversion are defined as ‘the itineraries of 
faith’. Taylor portrays Charles Pѐguy368 and Gerard Manely Hopkins369 as examples 
of those found their own itineraries of faith. “The gamut of new itineraries is much 
                                                          
365 Illich uses the Parable of the Good Samaritan to explain the agape-network.  Refer to SA, 738-739. 
366 Refer to the footnote above for the explanation. (“They are fitted together in a dissymmetric 
proportionality which comes from God, which is that of agape, and which became possible because 
God became flesh This enfleshment of God extends outward, through such new links as the Samaritan 
makes with the Jew, into a network, which we call the Church.” (SA, 738-739) 
367 Taylor explains it with examples taken from recent history. “This issue has not been clear in the 
lives and thought of converts…Some have moved from one view to the other, as with Thomas Merton 
and Jacques Martin.” (SA, 745)  
368 Pѐguy is a paradigmatic example of a modern who has found his own path. “We can see this first 
of all in that he comes out of or through a very modern concern, one might say a modern protest at a 
crucially modern development.” He strongly rejects the “excarnation” approach and is deeply 
influenced by Bergson who offered perhaps the major philosophical challenge to this (excarnation) 
view at that moment in France (SA, 745-746). Some of the themes of Pѐguy “became central to the 
reforms of Vatican II, the rehabilitation of freedom, of the church as people of God, the openness to 
other faiths, amongst others.” (SA, 752)  
369 “Hopkins offers, indeed, a striking example of a surprising new itinerary. Like, Pѐguy, he starts from 
the modern, more exactly post-Romantic predicament. He felt keenly the threat of a narrowing and 
reduction of human life in a culture centred on disciplined instrumental reason. We lose contact with 
the natural world surrounding us, and at the same time, with a higher dimension in our own lives. He 
was at one in this regard with an important stream of the thought and sensibility of his age; with Ruskin 
in his sense that the contemporary age has lost a perception of beauty in the world around us; and 
that this is intimately connected with a system of economic exploitation. But also with Pater in the 
search to recover an aesthetic dimension in contemporary life.” (SA, 755)  
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wider” (SA, 765). Taylor gives the examples of Charles de Foucauld, John Marie, Jean 
Vanier, Mother Teresa, and Théreśe de Lisieux who found new paths of prayer and 
action (SA, 765). “What is significant about these people is the contribution they made 
to restoring a previously established, then challenged, church order…” (SA, 765). 
These ‘conversion experiences’ are paradoxically seen by Taylor as ‘living in a 
‘secular ageiii’. The ‘transcendent’ is re-engaged in a renewed fashion within the 
secular.  
To sum up his observations on the prospects for a spiritual-future, Taylor proposes two 
alternatives. These function as the hinge of secularityiii. These are the conditions of 
belief in ‘secular age’ and ‘sacred re-thought’ (SA, 768, DC, 214). Commenting on 
Taylor, James K. A. Smith observes; “(Taylor) finally succumbs to the temptation to 
make some predictions in light of all his analysis.”370 This leads Taylor to offer 
alternatives which do not do away with transcendence but re-discover, and recognise 
secularityiii. His effort makes room for these alternative accounts. He summarises:  
I have told a long story, because I believe that one can only get a handle on this if 
one comes at it historically. It is not that one or other view simply follows from the 
story, but rather that, in the way I tried to explain…, one’s story only makes sense 
in the light of a certain understanding of the place of the spiritual in our lives. 
Reasoning runs in both directions. Once sense of human spiritual life will suggest 
certain ways of telling our story; but then on the other side, the plausibility or 
implausibility of the story will give support or cast doubt on one’s view of the 
spiritual. My claim throughout has been that the view implicit in mainstream theory, 
its “basement” …has been rendered less plausible in the light of the actual order of 
events and processes in Western society that we usually call ‘secularisation’ (SA, 
768).  
Taylor’s alternative is unapologetic and offer a better account of our spiritual 
experience. It can only be reached through historical narration. The two views derive 
from the mainstream secularisation theory. This theory sees religion shrinking further 
and further though not totally.371 “The basic supposition is that transcendent religious 
views are erroneous, or have no plausible grounds. Once we have outgrown the legacy 
of the past, they could only re-enter our world through the wilder, more gratuitous 
inventions of minorities” (SA, 768). The second view is also based on this supposition, 
and this is contrary to the mainstream views. Taylor explains:  
In our religious lives, we are responding to a transcendent reality. We all have some 
sense of this, which emerges in our identifying and recognizing some mode of what 
                                                          
370 James K. A. Smith, How (Not) To Be Secular, p. 137. 
371 Taylor explains; “[O]f course, no one expects it to disappear totally, giving way to science, as the 
old generation of rationalist atheists did. Most atheists accept today that there will always be a certain 
degree of ‘irrationality’, or at least inattention to science, and wildest ideas will always have 
defenders.” (SA, 768)  
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I have called fullness, and seeking to attain it…So the structural characteristic of the 
religious (re)conversions…that one feels oneself to be breaking out of a narrower 
frame into a broader field, which makes sense of things in a different way, 
corresponds to reality. It can easily be that an earlier sense of fullness is now given 
a new and deeper meaning, as we saw with Bede Griffiths, who first read his school 
field epiphany in the light of a Wordsworthian Romanticism, and then came to see 
it in Christian terms (SA, 768-769).  
 
Both views announce that ‘the shutting out’ of the immanent frame is quite 
understandable. However, ‘the breaking out’ (conversion) into the broader field should 
make one aware of how little and partial one’s grasp of ‘God’ is. Many ‘believers’372 
tend to have the certainty that they have got God right. This certainty itself can be an 
idolatry. “Too much reality is not only destabilizing, it can be dangerous” (SA, 769), 
especially if we respond to the perils of transcendence by pre-mature closure.373 One 
can also fall prey to idolatry because of self-assurance related to strong ideals.  
 
However, Taylor envisions a future that cannot be defined in any detail. He explains, 
“things will almost certainly work out differently in different societies. But the general 
structure would be this: whatever the equilibrium points which dominates in any 
milieu, it will always be fragile. 1) Some will want to move further ‘inward’, towards 
a more immanentist position, … and 2) some will find the equilibrium confining, even 
stifling, and will want to move outward” (SA, 770). From this ‘inward’ and ‘outward’ 
movement, Taylor makes two promising predictions: 1) “In societies where the general 
equilibrium point is firmly within immanence, where many people even have trouble 
understanding how a sane person could believe in God, the dominant secularisation 
narrative, which tends to blame our religious past for many of the woes of our world, 
will become less plausible over time” (SA, 770). 2) “At the same time, this heavy 
concentration of the atmosphere of immanence will intensify a sense of living in a 
‘wasteland’ for subsequent generations, and many young people will begin again to 
explore beyond the boundaries” (SA, 770). Though these two possibilities run together, 
religious belief may be something which most humans (in the West and East) have 
trouble doing without. 
 
Setting aside the general paradigm of the West, Taylor feels that much of our deep past 
cannot be set aside. It is not just because of our ‘weakness’, but because there is 
                                                          
372 By “believers”, Taylor does not mean an ordinary believer or a spiritual person but a ‘fanatic’.   
373 This happens by drawing “an unambiguous boundary between the pure and the impure through 
the polarization of conflict, even war.” Both believers and atheists are culprits of this crime.  
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something genuinely important and valuable in it (SA, 771). According to him, in 
Christianity repression and marginalisation of the spiritual and excarnation is less and 
less carried within meaningful bodily forms, but lies more and more ‘in the head’. It 
means that Christianity based on the doctrine of the incarnate God, denies something 
essential to itself as long as it remains wedded to forms which excarnate. Agreeing 
































Taylor’s ‘story’ of secularisation is neither a Christian apologetic nor a confession of 
his faith. Instead, through a deconstructive and hermeneutical re-reading of the 
medieval and modern history of Christianity, he draws upon the contemporary 
consciousness of the spiritual and the secular. The reference to God in a secular age, I 
argue, is a ‘spin’ on the ‘return of the religion’ and ‘the re-enchantment of the world’ 
leading to a possible ‘re-incarnation’. It involves a more integrated approach to 
religion and the secular. Taylor’s intention in narrating both secularityi and secularityii 
is to endorse his secularityiii. He thereby broadens the sense of religion; “I want to 
focus not only on beliefs and actions ‘predicated on the existence of supernatural 
entities’, but also on the perspective of transformation of human beings which takes 
them beyond…whatever is normally understood as human flourishing…” (SA, 430). 
He envisages “a more specific, substantive, content-based orientation towards religion. 
This is key to his lament at the over-reach of Reform, his conviction about modernity’s 
self-misunderstanding, and his claim that it is the ethical attraction of ‘debunking’, and 
not the theoretical plausibility or historical adequacy of the modern alternatives, that 
fuels the immanent frame and mainstream secularisation theory.”374 His approach 
opens multiple paths to God, remaining open towards various forms of religious 
transcendence. 
It is the change in ‘the background’ that brought diverse and unprecedented choices 
for human life concerning both of belief and un-belief. If so, it can be argued that ‘the 
great changes’ in the medieval religious world have changed the historically and 
theologically accepted concept of the sacred. He argues, however, that the sacred in 
itself is historically invariant. “To historicise the sacred would be to relativize God as 
manifestation of the sacred in history…and would subordinate Him to time.”375 If so, 
does Taylor deny an immanent conception of the divine? Is it possible to experience 
the sacred in the absence of the transcendent God? Or, is there an immanent experience 
of the sacred: an intuition of wholeness?376  Does not ‘the sacred’ have the ability to 
                                                          
374 David Storey, “Charles Taylor’s Secular Age: Breaking the Spell of the Immanent Frame”, pp. 179-
218. 
375 Peter E. Gorden, “The Place of the Sacred in the Absence of God: Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age” in 
Journal of History of Ideas, Vol. 69, No. 4, October 2008, PP 647- 673.  
376 Here I refer to the example of Spinoza’s divine who is wholly immanent to nature (Deus sive natura).  
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go beyond the constraints of ‘the background’? Answers to these questions are possible 
when each ‘self’ in contemporaneity accepts how the religious evolves.  
Believer or non-believer, one has to understand ‘the religious evolutionary process “as 
a continuous redrawing of boundaries between the sacred and the profane, 
transcendence and immanence, and religious and secular.”377 Redrawing dichotomous 
boundaries entails a refashioning of ‘the self’ who is called to live (or to deny) ‘some 
norm’ (transcendental norm) beyond human flourishing. Can a mediator or mediating 
role ‘bridge’ the dichotomy between ‘the transcendental norm’ and ‘human 
flourishing’? I believe that ‘the church’ can play this role because it partakes in both 
realities.378 It seems to be the crucial argument of Taylor’s secularityiii. This can be 
seen as a process of internal secularisation which is an attempt to ‘spiritualise’ the 
temporal and to bring the religious life out of the monasteries into the saeculum, and 
thus, literally, to secularise the religious. As in Vattimo, the historical process of 
secularisation is a means to recover the spiritual dimension of religion that institutional 
religion has covered up. It is a process of interiorising of religion, and thus involves 
deritualisation, desacralisation, and demagicalisation.379 Accordingly, the principal 
dialectical aim of the post-secularisation is an attempt to bridge the dichotomous gap 
between the religious and the secular.  
One of the positive outcomes of Taylor’s secularisation is a morphogenesis: a 
qualitative change in Western religion itself and the way it locates the sacred within 
personal and social life. From the narrative perspective, his account is both polemical 
and hermeneutically generous. It tries to understand most positions, and to see virtue 
in all of them. Despite considering all the possible options, he never gives up his deep 
personal and practical Christian/Catholic concerns. His critique of faith is challenged 
in historical epoch and unfolds the meaning of faith. The principle of this historical 
unfolding of faith is not reducible to any final conclusion but to a continuity of rational 
deliberations. Thus, his historical and contingent dialectic offers a spiritual teleology.  
However, the ambivalence of Taylor’s understanding is improved by Vattimo on five 
areas. They are: (1) the ontological foundation of Taylor’s ‘self’ undergoing the 
                                                          
377 Jose Casanova, “A Secular Age: Dawn or Twilight?”, pp. 265-281. 
378Hermeneutic engagement in philosophical deliberation always involves particular and general. 
Mediation always involves the movement of the particular in relation to its whole. The Church is one 
of the components of the pluralistic society. However, in my thesis, the Church is presented as a 
hermeneutical community which always resides in the tension of immanence and transcendence.  
379 Jose Casanova, pp. 265-281.  
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process of ‘conversion’, (2) secularisation as progress, (3) evolution of the ‘self’ and 
the kenotic God, (4) the disenchanted self and caritas, and (5) the divine in the 
natural.380   
I recognise that in the debate of Taylor there are problematic issues. However, I will 
deal with those issues that directly pertain to the argument of this thesis. The primary 
criticism I would raise against Taylor is that he has not engaged with other critics 
regarding secularism. His focus on Latin Christendom is very restricted and dilutes the 
question of faith into modern ‘expressive individualism’. In so doing, Taylor 
unnecessarily limits his discussion to a consideration of Western culture alone. 
Although Taylor has a clear geographical boundary for his case study, there is no clear 
conceptual boundary drawn for it especially with regard to his study of the evolution 
of the secular self. Because his account is partly philosophical and yet partly 
genealogical, historical, sociological and theological, Taylor fails to draw a neat and 
convincing conceptual boundary for his narrative. Because Taylor’s ‘exclusive 
humanism’ discards any ontically based understanding of transcendence, it fails to 
weaken the ‘immanent frame’ as he intends.  Taylor’s concepts of ‘the nova effect’, 
and ‘super nova’ allow individuals to opt for ‘conversion’ and ‘fulness’; and thus, 
search for transcendence.  
Taylor’s discussion of religious belief of the Middle Ages is inadequate. It accounts 
for trends of non-belief and scepticism also characteristic of that period. He claims that 
one of the most important ‘shifts’ that occurred is that of the enchanted world being 
transformed into the disenchanted world. However, Taylor cannot accurately state that 
the enchanted cosmos is gone entirely for Westerners. I argue that the ‘modern or post-
modern self’ may indeed live in an ‘enchanted world’. It can be suggested that 
‘enchantment’ continues to appear in new forms such as consumerism, fashion, and 
sport etc. I suggest that Taylor’s concepts of ‘cross-pressure’ and ‘immanent frame’ 
are ontically applicable only for the academic elite and intellectuals than for an average 




                                                          





HERMENEUTICAL FUTURE OF RELIGION 
 
“I see today a new religious revival. In this history, the religious revival seems to me 
the most alive, and perhaps best able to respond to the endemic crisis stemming from 
our cultural heritage. It is not about a return to causes. Causes, after all, have been 
deconstructed as much as ‘origins’ and ‘truth’; they no longer speak to us.”381 Julia 
Kristeva 
“Religious faith will be of the same significance to the 21st century as political  




Julia Kristeva and Tony Blair’s statements on the re-engagement of religion concur 
with significant questions of this research. Are we living in an age of religious revival? 
Does a new transcendental emerge from the secular? Will the triumph of faith over 
secularism be a determining feature of the 21st century? Has secularisation helped to 
re-invent the lost ground of the sacred and religion? Are we witnessing a counter-
revolutionary movement against secular nationalism? Has religion returned because it 
is hard to live without meaning?382 If there is a revival of religion, has this recent 
visibility been exhibited more in fundamentalist movements and ethno-religious 
conflicts?  Has migration-driven religious diversity stripped secularisation of its 
foremost status as a virtually uncontested paradigm? Can these developments be called 
‘de-secularisation’, or a ‘post-secular’ condition?383  So far, I tried to answer these 
questions with the help of the key arguments of Vattimo and Taylor. Drawing cues 
                                                          
381 Julia Kristeva, “New Humanism and the Need to Believe”, in Reimagining the Sacred: Richard 
Kearney Debates God, eds., Richard Kearney and Jens Zimmermann, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2015, pp. 93-127. 
382 Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/sundayextra/the-return-
of- religion-and-a-search-for-meaning-in-modern-times/7020516, accessed on 12/08/2016. 
383 Matthias Koenig, “Beyond the Paradigm of Secularisation?”, in Working with a Secular Age: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Charles Taylor’s Master Narrative, eds., Florian Zemmin, Colin Jager, 
and Guido Vanheeswijck, Studies in Religion, Nonreligion, and Secularity, Vol. 3, Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2016, pp. 23-48. 
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from them, this research will further explore the inexhaustible continuity, the 
hermeneutical possibility, and rich implications of the language turn in philosophical 
and hermeneutical field to answer these questions.  
Vattimo and Taylor’s thought legitimately respond to the rise of extremism, 
fundamentalism, and global animosity.384 Each in turn, (as discussed in previous 
chapters) stand as representative voices of distinct, though profoundly interrelated, 
modes of thinking about the relation of religion to society and the viability of 
theological thinking. Through their influential concepts of secularisation, Vattimo and 
Taylor offer tools for the analysis of “an emergent religious and cultural sensibility 
that (is) now forced to pick up the broken pieces and to imagine, if not craft, an 
alternative future” (ADG, 8). This emergent religious and cultural sensibility, implies 
both a post-modern and a post-secular hermeneutical return to religion. Post-secular, 
and post-modern in this context suggest moving to a condition or perspective after or 
subsequent to the secular, and to the modern.385 In other words, the secular now 
emerges as the condition of the new transcendent. 
To expand my key argument (the hermeneutical return of religion), I undertake a 
comparative and dialogical exchange between Vattimo and Taylor. This dialectical 
critique communicates further aspects of how we in the West have moved from 
religious skepticism rooted in modernity to re-embrace religion in a post-modern 
secular world (ADG, 13). The philosophical areas where Vattimo and Taylor improve 
and advance upon each other will be considered. The post-secular attempt to re-engage 
religion and the sacred will be elucidated by four arguments offering answers to our 
principal research questions. The arguments point to; 1) the hermeneutical effort to re-
engage religion as a non-religious religion, 2) the post-secular recovery of religion that 
requires the ‘self’ as its own inevitable being-for-the-other, 3) the hermeneutics of 
‘weak thought’ and Verwindung abandoning dogmatic conditions so as to allow 
charity to take precedence over truth.  4) Secularisation prompts the hermeneutic return 
of religion as both ‘an exodus’ and ‘transition’.   
 
 
                                                          
384 Thomas Guarino, Vattimo and Theology, p. 65.  





HERMENEUTICAL FUTURE OF RELIGION 
 
7.1 A Dialogical Exchange between Vattimo and Taylor 
Both Vattimo and Taylor’s portrayal of ‘post-secularism’ opens the opportunity for 
dialogue about faith and secularism. The post-modern account of secularisation sets 
the scene for what Nietzsche would have regarded as unthinkable: the return of 
religion. 
 
A ‘dialogical relationship’386 is embedded within the key values of Christianity, 
notably within the modern tradition that resulted from the Reformation, and these still 
continue through ‘secular philosophical reflection’.387 “This dialectical history is 
already contained ‘in the beginning’ of Christianity itself specifically in the 
identification of the divine with the logos as stated in the opening to the Gospel 
according to John.388 It follows from this “inherently ironic structure that the narrative 
components - faith and reason, God's death and the return of religion -play themselves 
out like partners in an ongoing historical conversation.”389 Accordingly, a study of the 
dialogical relationship between Vattimo and Taylor’s secularisation suggests a new 
understanding of the ‘post-secular’ and the ‘return of religion’ it enables. To this end, 
the areas where they agree and complement each other will be explored even as 
                                                          
386 "Post-secular" situation requires an investigation into the way in which the process of secularisation 
unfolds in a dialectical relationship with and not just against thinking about faith and 
religion. Dialogues helps to understand how, over the last four centuries, thinkers who used rational 
arguments to justify faith often undermined it, and how thinkers who saw rationality at its strongest 
came to recognize the need for faith to address its insufficiencies. 
387 John D. Smith, “Dialogue between Faith and Reason: The Death and Return of God in Modern 
German Thought”, in The Montréal Review,  Cornell University Press, 2011, 
http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Dialogues-between-faith-and-reason.php, accessed on 
20/02/2016.  
388 Gospel according to John states; “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, 
and the Word was God.” (John 1:1 in The Holy Bible, Revised Standard Edition).  
389 John D. Smith, “Dialogue between Faith and Reason: The Death and Return of God in Modern 
German Thought”.  
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dialectical contrasts between them are drawn. Secondly, there are certain arguments of 
Vattimo which Taylor advances but with a new nuance. 
 
7.1.1 Complementarities and Contrasts 
Vattimo and Taylor’s secularism share an interest in and concern with the continuing 
relevance of religion and transcendence. Though they belong to different schools of 
thought390 and use diverse methods in developing their theories, they take seriously 
the role of Christianity in shaping post-modernity. There are number of areas where 
they complement and contrast each other which I intend to explore. I use the outcome 
of these comparisons and contrasts to develop my argument about a ‘post-secular 
return of religion’.  
 
I. The Recursiveness of Lives 
Life’s recursive structures as conceived by Vattimo comprise of three different but 
related concerns: politics, philosophy, and religion. They resemble Taylor’s account 
of political fragmentation moulded by political, intellectual and spiritual engagement. 
The failure of Vattimo’s engagement with politics and religion brought about a 
disillusionment which eventually prompted his return to a radically reconceived 
religion. It is not a return to a renewed faith in any conventional sense. The ‘religious 
philosopher’ in him was shaped by his critical and deconstructive approach to 
metaphysics. He promotes an approach directed at ‘displacing’ existing sacred 
structures with broader secularised versions. As already discussed, by reaffirming his 
personal faith in Catholicism, Taylor unavoidably ‘weakens’ his otherwise strong and 
important claim to participate in the transformation of Christian moral philosophy into 
a bona fide public philosophy with universal ambitions.  
 
II. Limitations of the Secularisation Narrative 
Taylor and Vattimo limit the scope of their account of secularisation to Western 
Europe and North America. Since they focus on Judeo-Christian religion, their 
                                                          
390 Vattimo undoubtedly belongs to the continental school and Taylor is an analytical communitarian. 
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narrative may be critiqued as incomplete. Taylor admits that his narrative is not ‘clean 
and simple’. He explains: 
this however is not a clean and simple approach either, because a) the religious life of 
other cultures has impacted on the developments in the West, and also one of the facets 
of contemporary religious life in the West is the borrowing of forms of devotion, 
meditation and worship from other parts of the world; and b) there has also been 
borrowing in the other direction, that is by non-Western societies from the West (hence 
the fact that certain arrangements of the Indian constitution are captured under the cover 
name “secularism”).391 
I suggest that if they had broadened their boundaries to include the East, their work 
would have a far more comprehensive claim. 
 
III. Does Secularism have a Telos? 
Vattimo and Taylor’s approach to secularisation raises diverse philosophical, 
religious, and socio-political questions. Does the process of secularisation end? If so, 
what is next? Since secularisation is an historical process, there is no limit to 
secularisation according to Taylor. For Vattimo, as already discussed, the limit to 
secularisation is caritas. Is there an end to caritas?  If there is an ‘ultimate reality’, 
will there be a secularisation of reality itself? Is secularism territorial? For Taylor, it is 
transnational, and its limit is the combined transformation of both state and religion. 
Where precisely does the secular-religious balance lie in the West which is supposed 
to represent the telos of developmental models of modernisation? One of the crucial 
outcomes of ‘secularisation’ in the West is the ‘spread’ of new forms of religion, 
devotion, discipline, congregational life. These ‘new forms’ create a ‘place’ for 
religion within the fabric of society. Religion becomes more self-consciously 
pluralistic, developing new visions with an increased capacity for individual 
affirmation and conversion. This negates dogmatism and in this negation comes a more 
conscious form of religious consciousness which maintains itself in a permanent 
interplay of affirmation and negation.  
 
 
                                                          
391 Charles Taylor, “A Secular Age:  Problems around the Secular”, in The Immanent Frame, 
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2007/11/02/problems-around-the-secular/, accessed on 12/01/2016.  
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IV. A Praxis-Oriented Ontology  
Taylor and Vattimo go beyond Hegelian idealism to a philosophy of actuality. 
Vattimo’s ‘weak ontology’ and Taylor’s ‘secular narrative’ are ‘ontologies of 
actuality’. They extend their philosophical borders to politics, ethics, language and 
culture. Every ‘event’ in history has connections with closely related questions of 
politics and religion. It involves a constantly readjusted response to the historical, 
political, and existential situation of a specific epoch. Accordingly, Vattimo and Taylor 
‘overcome’ the malaise of modernity, and propose a praxis oriented hermeneutics of 
post-modernity. Their philosophies pertain to the concrete concerns of religious and 
social life. By introducing variants of a post-secular transformative hermeneutical 
philosophy, Vattimo and Taylor aim to overcome the remaining traces of both 
materialism and transcendent notions of God. Their hermeneutical deconstruction 
culminates in the re-engagement of a post-secular religious outlook. This conscious 
re-engagement with religion is the outcome of Western secularisation proper. It means 
that religion has returned not to a specific practice or observance but to a conscious 
reflexive praxis based on an historical conviction. It takes religion beyond absolutism 
and secularism per se. Religion accompanies the individual rather than acts as an 
authoritarian master. It involves the displacement of older forms of faith and results in 
pluralism.  
 
V. An Ontic-Inevitability and Historical Self-interpretability 
For Vattimo, secularisation is a participatory process in the fate of being and religious 
ontology. For Taylor, it is a phenomenon by which the individual self undergoes an 
historical evolution culminating in the realm of the ‘secular self’. For Vattimo, the 
individual ‘self’ participates in the process of secularism as an ontic inevitability of 
being-in-the-world. Taylor, however, observes ‘decay’ within religion but does not 
personalise it with his faith. For him, the self-interpretability and the dialogical nature 
of ‘the self’ presupposes the narrative nature of human identity and the moral outlook. 
Man allows existence to be expressed and constituted by ‘meanings’ of self-
interpretability. ‘Meaning constitution’ and ‘self-interpretability’ are principal 
elements in his approach to epistemology, the philosophy of language, and ethics. 
These in turn become the sources of his secular narrative. Narratives of secularisation 
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can be constructed in dialogue with the other. By ‘other’, I mean, art, literature, 
aesthetics, languages; and in the present context – our surrounding ecology.     
 
VI. The Indeterminacy of Secularisation  
Vattimo and Taylor’s secularism acknowledges the historicity and the indeterminacy 
of the concept. “Secularism incessantly blurs together religion and politics, and that its 
power relies crucially upon the precariousness of the categories it establishes which 
are expressions of deeper indeterminacies at the very foundation of secularism.”392 
Secularism as a feature of modern state is fraught with indeterminacy. The richness of 
secularism enables it to open to other indeterminate principles and open itself to further 
historical determination. Secularism is often open to criticism because of its 
indeterminacy. “For the peculiar intractability of secularism lies not in the normativity 
of its categories, but in the particular indeterminacies and anxieties it provokes.”393 I 
suggest that such indeterminacy offers a “transcendental dimension to secularism” 
(transcendental because its indeterminacy allows Taylor and Vattimo to adapt a 
narrative that is unique goes beyond the conventional meaning of the concept) and 
which at the same time contributes to the formulation of post-secular religion.  
 
VII. The hermeneutic of Overcoming: Verwindung 
Vattimo and Taylor’s secularism is unambiguously explained as the overcoming 
(Verwindung) of metaphysics and epistemology. It is made possible by deconstructing 
the traditional understanding of foundationalism and metaphysics. Taylor and Vattimo 
propose a unique, liberal, tolerant, and democratic hermeneutic. Vattimo draws cues 
from Nietzschean and Heideggerian nihilism. Vattimo and Taylor aim at not a critical 
overcoming, but at a convalescence.  As explained, through ‘chemical analysis’ 
(Nietzsche) ‘truth’ itself is dissolved, which amounts to ‘the death or slaying of God’. 
For Taylor, in overcoming, the individual self disengages itself from the abstract 
notions of the sacred, and assumes for itself a truer and secularised form of the sacred. 
He attempts a retrospective analysis of traditional epistemology by ‘ontologising the 
                                                          
392Hussein Ali Agrama, “Secularism, Sovereignty, Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a Secular or a Religious 
State?” in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 52, Issue 3, July 2010, Pp. 495 - 523.  
393  Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, Robert A Yelle, and Fallers Sullivan Winnifred, After Secular Law, eds., 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011. 
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disengaged’. I argue that this presents the knower/agent/self as a self-transforming, 
self-conscious being, who is paradoxically both inclined to be disengaged and able to 
re-contextualise himself/herself. I have presented this disengaged ‘self’ as the ‘secular 
self’.  
 
VIII. Intertwinability of the West and the Judeo-Christian Religion 
The crux of Vattimo and Taylor’s secularism is the hermeneutic deconstruction of 
God, truth and faith, that is, the history of the Judeo-Christian religion. For Vattimo, 
the visions of modernity, capitalist economy, and Western civilisation, are all 
indirectly structured by their relation to Christianity. The centrality of secularisation 
has post-metaphysical and nihilistic implications: the dissolution of the sacred, the 
transition to an ethics of autonomy, to a lay state, to a more flexible literalism in the 
interpretation of dogmas and precepts, and to a fuller realisation of Christianity, 
conceived as kenosis. Taylor, by the same rationale responds to the profound 
dissatisfaction with the hierarchical equilibrium between lay life and renunciative 
vocations. Taylor tries to overcome this dissatisfaction through his narrative of 
secularism. To this end, he offers an analysis of the self-interpretive, disengaged, moral 
and ethical self, that undergoes an irreversible process of progressive evolution in an 
epistemic and ontic sense, leading to the formation of the secular self. This is the result 
of an historical evolution. 
 
IX. A Deconstructive Hermeneutics 
“Since ‘to think’ has come to mean something different from what it meant before,”394 
Vattimo and Taylor have become initiators of a deconstructive hermeneutics after the 
precedent of Nietzsche and Heidegger. They propose a radical shift to the 
understanding of hermeneutics. Vattimo envisions a ‘hermeneutical circularity’ and 
suggests that hermeneutics is the Koiné of post-modernity. ‘Hermeneutical circularity’ 
postulates that every interpretation is based on another interpretation and cannot be 
totally overcome or escaped. Vattimo conceives this mode of interpretation as a 
process of weakening. As explained in chapter three, ‘God is dead’, and is not an 
objective ‘claim’ but rather an ‘announcement’. Hermeneutics as an interpretation ‘is 
                                                          
394 Gianni Vattimo, The Adventure of Difference: Philosophy after Nietzsche and Heidegger, pp. 1-2. 
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a matter of individual taste’. Taylor’s hermeneutics reduces Being to the ‘world as a 
picture’ with the help of Wittgenstein. Taylor and Vattimo use this allegory to show 
the interpretability or the weakening nature of Being. “Hermeneutical reflection”395 is 
the key term in Taylor that becomes the source of his socio-political-philosophical 
arguments. Human existence is expressive of and constituted by ‘meanings’ shaped by 
self-interpretations. Taylor’s self-interpretable and dialogical self presupposes the 
narrative nature of ‘the self’ which in turn becomes the source of his secularity.  
 
X. The Definitive Tools of Secularisation  
They are (1) death of God, and (2) the Reformation. (1) For Vattimo, it is the nihilistic 
conclusion of ‘the death of God’ and ‘the end of metaphysics’ that presupposes the 
end of modernity and the birth of post-modernity. For Taylor, ‘the Reform’ is the tool 
of secularisation.  Vattimo envisions the process of secularisation as the positive result 
of Jesus’ teaching396, and not a way of moving away from it” (B, 41). (2) For Taylor, 
secularisation is a result of ‘the internal reform’ of Western Modernity: it envisions a 
religious reform that goes beyond the epistemic and metaphysical constraints of the 
‘absolute’ and any ‘magic’ orientation.  
 
XI. Secularisation as ‘Return’ of Religion 
For Vattimo, weak ontology is the dynamic which brings the return of religion. The 
hermeneutic of ‘weak ontology’ leads to religious re-engagement. This leads to a 
hermeneutical emancipation which presents secularisation as the incarnation of the 
gospel message. Taylor does not talk of a return of religion, but envisions a 
transformative, purified and secularised version of religion achieved through a process 
of secularisation.  
 
7.1.2 Taylor Improves on Vattimo 
The philosophical substance of this section concerns Taylor improving and advancing 
five areas of Vattimo’s philosophy. These are: 1) secularisation as an event within 
                                                          
395 Nicholas H. Smith, “Taylor and the Hermeneutic Tradition”, pp. 29-51.  
396 Jesus’ teaching on friendship in John 15:15. This is explained in Chapter Three. 
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Christianity, 2) hermeneutical Verwindung, 3) the ‘strength’ of weak ontology, 4) the 
limitlessness of kenosis and caritas, and 5) the interminable death of God. 
 
I. Secularisation as an ‘Event’ within Christianity  
Vattimo and Taylor characterise Western history as an event within Christianity. For 
Vattimo, it is linked positively to both the Incarnation and to a conception of the history 
of modernity as a weakening and dissolution of Being. The ‘eventual’ nature of truth 
and being have the capacity to be constantly interpreted, re-written, remade, and 
subject to evolution (EM, xx). An event never really begins or ends within the 
temporality and an event remains an event as long as it continues to affect history and 
language. Developing the ‘eventual’ nature of truth and being, Vattimo argues that 
metaphysical absolutism and its claim to truth is unveiled and undermined by the 
kenotic acts of Jesus which resulted having secularising dynamic. Secularisation is the 
positive effect of Jesus’ teaching, not a dissolution of it. Rather, for Vattimo, it is an 
enquiring after and presenting of God as a contemporary reality. It leads to a 
hypothesis that hermeneutics is a philosophy with clear ontological commitments. 
Though Taylor’s narrative is analogous to Vattimo’s, he presents a more historical-
genealogy. Whereas Vattimo’s concept of secularism is more ontologically grounded. 
Subsequently, for Vattimo, secularisation is an ontic event within or in the unfolding 
of the history of Christianity, but for Taylor, secularisation is an historical inevitability. 
If secularisation is the result of both an ontic event as well as an historical inevitability 
within Christianity, it reposes the question of God.  
 
II. The Hermeneutical Verwindung  
As discussed, Vattimo’s re-evaluation of religion through philosophical 
deconstruction and hermeneutics utilises ‘Being’ as an event as the model for and the 
kenotic dynamic of Christian thought which dissolves itself finally into caritas. This 
deconstruction is described as a post-modern defence of Christianity secularised goes 
beyond ‘the death of God’, metaphysics and violence. It realises the nihilistic vocation 
recognising truth as event. It overcomes metaphysical dogmatism and offers a 
convalescing as Verwindung. Taylor’s concept of ‘overcoming epistemology’ I read 
in relation to Vattimo’s Verwindung of metaphysics. Taylor does not use 
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‘Verwindung’ in his writings. However, I use Vattimo’s Verwindung as a concept to 
elucidate Taylor’s theme of ‘overcoming epistemology’ which is so decisive in tracing 
the epiphany of secularism. In both cases, overcoming metaphysics and epistemology 
can be set in opposition to Überwindung or total ‘overcoming’. By using Verwindung 
instead of Überwindung, Vattimo states that his ‘weak thought’ performs a 
Verwindung at the close of metaphysics. Taylor is not intent on claiming a total and 
radical overcoming of epistemology but rather a hermeneutical deconstruction of 
absolute truth claims. This frees epistemology from instrumental reasoning and 
presents the knowledge-agent as a self-transforming conscious being.  
In addition, Vattimo sees Verwindung as a key form of post-metaphysical thought. It 
is not only a matter for thought, rather, it concerns ‘thoughtful being’ as such. The 
destiny of ‘Being’ is actualised with the help of Verwindung, and Vattimo argues that 
the hermeneutical being of ‘Being’ (that underwent the process of Verwindung) is not 
to be ignored but experienced in every human situation. As seen in chapter three, 
Vattimo translates Verwindung into a familiar term: secularisation. Secularisation 
describes the course of history not as an uncurving progression or as decadence, but as 
a course of events by which emancipation is reached only by means of a radical 
transformation of its very contents (EM, 179). If Verwindung/secularisation concerns 
‘Being’ and is a course of transformative events, Taylor’s concept of the ‘modern 
social order’ and ‘social imaginary’ draw cues from ‘Being’s ‘transformative and 
eventing character’. Taylor’s concept of ‘social imaginary’ can be grasped as the 
existential element of Vattimo’s experiencing of Verwindung.  Taylor’s ‘modern social 
order’ has the character of the ‘here and now’ and the potential for further realisation. 
For him the ‘social imaginary’ is a ‘process’ by which the individual self undergoes a 
transformative and penetrating change. Taylor’s ‘individual self’s’ ‘identifying 
features’ are rooted in society and social practices but can imagine and re-imagine 
beyond society. The ‘eventual’ nature of social imaginary leads the individual self into 
new dimensions of social life. Taylor gives the example of ‘fashion’ as a form of social 
imaginary. The self gives way to an ever-evolving process whereby new practices and 
meanings emerge enabling the self to adapt to new horizons of social practices in 





III. The ‘Strength’ of Weak Ontology   
For Vattimo, ‘weak ontology’ functions as an aid or rather a medium through which 
the return of religion is brought about. He frames it as a returning home. His 
exploration of ‘weak thought’ allows him to re-establish continuity with his religious 
origins but differently. It is not a return to the faith of his childhood but a return to a 
renewed understanding of Christianity. It becomes an existential possibility for him 
and, thus, he discovered a significant link between the history of Christian revelation 
and the history of nihilism. Vattimo re-interprets the history of the West in terms of 
the Christian message. By way of contrast, Taylor’s narrative of secularisation is also 
influenced by his intellectual, political and spiritual biography but he does not talk 
about isolating himself from or ‘returning’ to religious faith. His secularism does not 
have a personally disturbing effect on his faith. His secularism is a narrative. He calls 
it ‘a master narrative’. Vattimo’s secularism is existentially oriented and traces its 
origin to the very source of the Christian message. It finds its culmination in kenotic 
caritas. Taylor by contrast gives examples of individuals who underwent personal 
‘conversions’. He portrays a historically inevitable evolution of the West from the 
1500’s. The principal ‘strand’ of this evolution consists of the ‘conditions of belief’ in 
Christianity in the West. He presents the genealogy of secularism as an historically 
inevitable evolution, one which leads to the realisation of a truer form of religion 
opening to the possibility of continuous conversion. 
 
IV. The Limitlessness of Kenosis and Caritas    
As discussed, Vattimo’s kenosis has the structure of a Verwindung leading to 
secularisation397 (B, 39). Distinguished from nihilism, it does not imply a total 
“conversion to Christianity, but rather it is an interpretation” (B, 9). The hermeneutic 
of kenosis adheres to charity (caritas) and does not make any claim to final truth.  In 
this kenotic Christianity, the source and paradigm of secularisation is actualised, and 
is itself open further realisation in caritas. Thus, as already discussed in chapter four, 
secularisation has only one limit and that is caritas or charity (B, 62-65, AC, 48, and 
                                                          
397 Vattimo explains, “God’s abasement to the level of humanity, what the New Testament calls God’s 
kenosis, will be interpreted as the sign that the non-violent and non-absolute God of the post-
metaphysical epoch has as its distinctive trait the very vocation for weakening of which Heideggerian 
philosophy speaks.” (B,39) 
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ADG, 39). This is more than an end, an ideal goal, or limit, but opens limitless vistas 
without limit. If secularisation has no limit, the possibility for return of religion is more 
significant. It means ‘the return’ is conceivable through preference for caritas rather 
than for justice, truth, severity, and the majesty of God. It is sufficiently clear that the 
New Testament orients one to recognise this (love) as the sole, supreme principle (B, 
64). The hermeneutical consequence of truth is that it is increasingly determined by 
agreement with others398 (ADG, 43). This paves the way for the dissolution of the 
objectivity of truth through kenosis. The dissolution of the objectivity of truth has the 
potential of caritas/charity to replace truth. The experience of truth is of an interpretive 
kind in dialogical charity. The experience of truth is possible only within the alterity 
of caritas. 
I use caritas to elucidate the constructive possibilities within the ‘openness’ of ‘the 
immanent frame’ of Charles Taylor. This ‘frame’ constitutes the natural order rather 
than a transcendental order. It is composed of cosmic, social, and moral orders through 
a set of connected changes in ‘the self’s’ practical self-understanding. This fits each 
individual into the world as a buffered, disciplined, and instrumental agent. ‘The self’ 
realises that its life is lived within this cosmic, social, and moral order. This ontic-
epistemic status can be either lived as ‘open’ or ‘closed’. The nihilistic hermeneutic of 
caritas can function as a tool for the ‘open’ take of the immanent frame. The possibility 
to aim ‘beyond’ is ineradicably linked to God who is the incarnate, the caritas. The 
alterity and the dialogical nature of caritas will prompt ‘the self’ to go beyond the 
constraints of the ‘closed’ spin of ‘the immanent frame’. Nicholas Davey comments 
that “…involvement in kenotic process is demanding, for there is no end to negotiating 
with and opening to the other.”399 Though ‘demanding’, the inherent alterity of the 
never-ending negotiation of and the openness to the other, enables caritas to surpass 
‘cross pressuring’. Thus, nihilistic interpretability enables caritas to take precedence 
over the cosmic, social and ethical world.  
 
 
                                                          
398  Vattimo explains, “we do not, and perhaps cannot, agree when we have found the truth, but we 
may say that at least we have found some truth when we have agreed upon something.” (ADG, 43) 
399 Nicholas Davey, “Gianni Vattimo” in The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, eds., Niall Keane 
and Chris Lawn, West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd, 2016, pp. 429-434.  
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V. The Interminability of Nietzschean Death of God 
Vattimo states that “it is precisely because the God of Greek philosophy is dead that it 
is possible to listen to the Bible again” (ADG, 97). Nihilistically, Vattimo and Taylor’s 
hermeneutic secularisation works as an impetus to abandon atheism. Vattimo uses 
hermeneutics as the ‘koinė’ of Western thought and adheres to hermeneutical 
circularity to explain the post-secular approach to religion. He envisions a 
hermeneutical weakening in which the weight and eternity of objective structures are 
weakened. Vattimo grasps that after the death of God hermeneutical engagement leads 
to religious re-conversion and return. Taylor is also not concerned about the method 
of hermeneutics. His central focus is on meaning, expression, and sense in relation to 
man as a self-interpreting animal. Questions of meaning, expression, and sense in 
interpretation are not an epistemological issue but in the present age an ontological 
one.400 They refer to the purpose a self gives to itself and provide a telos that guides 
its actions. The teleological purposefulness of human existence is achieved through a 
dialogical relationship with ‘the other’ which presupposes an ethical and moral 
outlook. This self-interpretability and dialogical relationship strengthens the 
secularism of Taylor. Bearing in mind their hermeneutical uniqueness, I argue that 
Vattimo’s Nietzschean ‘death of God’ would turn the attention of Taylor’s disengaged 
‘self’ more ‘inward’. I mean ‘inward’ because for ‘the buffered self’ which is being 
cross-pressured by transcendence and immanence, ‘the event of Christ’s death’ or 
‘Christianity’ will become a subjective experience through which it can propose 
meaning and purpose for itself. If so, the nihilistic hermeneutic of ‘the death of God’ 
having the character of an announcement (an event) (AC, 13), can potentially transform 
the existence and self-understanding of ‘the self’ who receives that announcement (AC, 
13). Given the self-interpretability, purposefulness, and dialogical nature, ‘self’ is able 
to ‘go beyond’ this cross-pressuring to a personal transformation and ‘conversion’, i.e., 
“a move outward” (SA, 770).  This leads to a transformed faith in Christianity where 
the ‘metaphysical God is dead’ and Kenotic Christ lives in the form of caritas which 
is secularisation’s defining message. Therefore, “secularisation is not opposed to 
religious experience but to realisation of its kenotic principle.”401 I suggest that the 
                                                          
400 “Questions of meaning, expression, and sense in interpretation are not an epistemological issue 
but in the present context an ontological one.” An explanation to this argument by Taylor is 
elaborately dealt with in p. 53.  
401 Nicholas Davey, “Gianni Vattimo”, pp. 429-434. 
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possibility of Taylor’s ‘self’ ‘goes beyond’ ‘cross-pressuring would help Vattimo to 
defend Nietzsche against all sorts of criticism labelling him as ‘the murderer of God.’ 
Nietzsche’s announcement of ‘the death of God’ can be seen as continuation and 
development of the sacrificing death of Christ and ‘the death of God’. These events 
are historically transformative and in the case of religion lead to the secularisation of 
religion which can be classified as a purification of its metaphysical dogma. It is 
notable that this Nietzschean announcement is being repeated in history and cultures 
wherever there is an absolute claim for truth. Taylor observes that the claim too much 
reality is not only destabilising but can be dangerous and promote negative reactions 
(SA, 769). This is evident in fanatical claims for the supremacy of the transcendental 
absolute of a particular religion, e.g., Christian absolutism across Europe and America 
from 1500 to 1900, ISIS, and Islamic fundamentalist groups, particularly in the Middle 
East, as well as an over-emphasis on nationalist chauvinism (Nazism, fascism, and all 
modern forms of dictatorship). This announcement can also be a reminder to humanity 
that ‘absolutism’ of any sort leads to ‘the death of God’.  
The contemporary relevance of these arguments depends entirely on how significantly 
they are critiqued by contemporary philosophical deliberations and their relevance of 
post-secularity.  
 
7.1.3 Vattimo Improves on Taylor 
The philosophical substance of this section concerns Vattimo improving upon and 
developing five areas of Taylor’s philosophy. These are, (1) the ontological foundation 
of Taylor’s ‘self’ undergoing the process of ‘conversion’, (2) secularisation as 
progress, (3) evolution of the self and the kenotic God, (4) the disenchanted self and 
caritas, and (5) the divine in the natural.  
 
I. An Ontological Foundation for ‘Conversion’ 
According to Taylor the distinctive nature of the modern moral order can be 
characterised by a natural fragilisation of different religious positions, in which the 
self is led through both belief and unbelief (SA, 595). Taylor observes that in modern 
moral order, ‘the individual self’ is ‘cross-pressured’ in the ‘immanent frame’. 
According to him, it is possible to ‘break out of the immanent frame’ and experience 
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‘conversion’ and ‘fullness’. This experience of conversion can be either a kind of self-
authenticating epiphanic experience, or of being seized by a sense of the overpowering 
force of God’s love. Taylor describes this as a transformation beyond human scope 
and an ‘openness’ to something outside oneself. It is more than a vision of God ‘out 
there’, but an experience of a heightened power of ‘love’ itself, a participation in God’s 
love (SA, 729). This conception of ‘conversion’ and experience of the ‘heightened 
power of Love’ of the individual ‘self’ is arguably better placed in Vattimo’s concept 
of kenosis/caritas. Taylor presents the ‘conversion’ experience as ‘individualistic’ and 
experienced by only a few individuals. Taylor also proposes a ‘new language’ that 
each ‘convert’ possesses. It is a language which assists one to “break from the 
immanent order to a larger, more encompassing one…” (SA, 732). However, for 
Vattimo, the whole history of Western thought ‘experiences’ this conversion as a direct 
result of Christ’s kenosis. Vattimo proposes the limit of this experience of kenosis as 
caritas/love/Christ. With this, Vattimo provides ontological and phenomenological 
clarity to the historical and genealogical narrative of Taylor.  
Taylor’s secularism hinges on his attempt to explain the role of secularity and still 
including ‘transcendence’. He does this by keeping the options for the ‘self’ either 
‘open’ or ‘closed’ to transcendence. He proposes two alternative futures: 1) the secular, 
and 2) the sacred. These are ‘shutting out’ (secular) and ‘the breaking out’ (the 
sacred/conversion) of the immanent frame. The ‘breaking out’ is possible when ‘the 
radical message of the incarnation’ as the genuine source of Christianity is reaffirmed. 
The ‘reaffirmation of incarnation’ is arguably developed by Vattimo in his account of 
‘salvation’. For Vattimo, the hermeneutics of salvation is coincidental with ‘the 
incarnation of Jesus’. Salvation is basically fulfilled in the incarnation, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus, but awaits a future and further fulfilment (AC, 59). The Paraclete, 
the Spirit of truth assists in this future fulfilment. It is through the Spirit that the Son 
becomes human in the womb of Mary. The Spirit is the relation and the hypostatising 
of the love-understanding between the Father and the Son. Salvation takes shape, gives 
itself, and constitutes itself through history. Thus, whenever there is a ‘breaking out’ 





II. Secularisation as Progress 
In Taylor’s account, the very locus of religious, social and political life undergoes a 
shift due to ‘the nova effect’. The nova effect is explained through a triadic description 
of secularity: secularityi, secularityii, and secularityiii. He offers three progressive 
stages in history. They are ‘ancient rẻgime’ (AR), ‘the Age of Mobilisation’ (AM), 
and ‘the Age of Authenticity’ (AA). Historically and phenomenologically, ‘the self’ 
in these stages undergoes transition towards modernity and secularity. It involves the 
retreat of faith and alternative religious forms. The modern religious life under 
secularisation is a destabilising and recomposing process and progress. Taylor pictures 
secularisation as an ongoing historical and phenomenological process including a 
progressive unfolding of belief-unbelief options.  
Vattimo’s secularisation inaugurates possibilities for a new interpretation of religion 
and ethics and offers a narrative of continuity and progress, providing philosophical 
depth to Taylor’s secularism as a historically unfolding progress. Vattimo considers 
secularisation a process of transition, and a change of emphasis manifested in a 
historical awareness and belief in progress, which in itself is yet another secularisation 
(EM, 8). Furthermore, Vattimo sees secularisation as a continuity of modernity and 
‘value’ that dominates and guides the ‘self’s’ consciousness, primarily as faith in 
progress, which is both secularised faith and a faith in secularisation. Here, faith is 
seen as an historical process devoid of providential and meta-historical elements (EM, 
100).    
 
III. The Evolution of the Self and the Kenotic God 
As discussed, Taylor’s understanding of ‘the self’ as self-interpretive, disengaged, and 
ethical undergoes an irreversible and ongoing evolution both personal and historical. 
If it is an historical evolution, I argue, it should be an ontological and epistemic 
occurrence pertaining to the ‘beingness’ of the whole of creation. I argue that, based 
on this progressive historical evolution of ‘self’s understanding’ of itself and of 
‘reality’, Vattimo can further develop his concept of kenosis. In his recent writings, he 
broadens his understanding of a kenotic God. How is it possible to broaden the kenotic 
understanding of God? This is taken up by Taylor when he engages his notion of ‘self’. 
‘The self’ crosses over from the ‘porous’ to the ‘buffered’ stage, and then through 
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different stages of evolution in history to the formation of ‘the secular self’. In a similar 
fashion, the ‘self’s understanding of kenosis should be broadened, not confined to the 
boundaries of the Judeo-Christian religion. Vattimo asks, “Is God humbling himself 
only one among many pictures of God offered by known cultures? Do we abide with 
it only because we were accidently born in the Judeo-Christian tradition, with the 
understanding that in the end we have to get rid of it (like Wittgenstein’s famous ladder 
in the barn) in order to get to God as he really is?”402  The ‘self’s’ understanding of a 
kenotic God is to be broadened beyond the cultures of the Judeo-Christian religion. 
God is to be worshipped beyond the arbitrary boundaries that do not compel the self 
to reject God. Vattimo also opines that the individual self can find God when ‘the self’ 
lives “an open, hospitable, and tolerant way as much as possible, knowing that in the 
multitude of interpretations the only one that is certainly false is the one that claims to 
be identical with the truth.”403   
 
IV. Disenchanted Self and Caritas 
Disenchantment consists of delegitimating all practices that deal with spirits, forces, 
and magic. For Nietzsche, it is a weakening of the beyond, an emptying heaven, and 
the death of God. Disenchantment as ‘weakening the beyond’ and ‘removing magic’ 
is understood further in terms of Vattimo’s kenosis which for him is another word for 
secularisation. As Christ self-empties himself and weakens metaphysicalism, Taylor’s 
individual ‘self’, disenchanting itself from the external forces, undergoes a kenotic 
experience. If so, can the ‘disenchanted’ or ‘secular’ self be a kenotic self? Whenever 
an individual ‘self’ goes beyond dictated boundaries to empty itself of the external 
forces of absoluteness, it is able to undergo a self-emptying that results in caritas as 
the evolving result. This replicates Christ’s life in one’s own individual life.  
After the process of disenchantment, ‘the buffered mind’ is left. This ‘mind’ contains 
thoughts, and feelings. The space of the mind ‘within’ has the possibility of 
introspective self-awareness (SA, 30) which is constituted by ‘radical reflexivity’. For 
Vattimo, caritas is the result of kenosis. If so, caritas is the ‘thought’ or feeling’ or 
                                                          
402 Gianni Vattimo, “Anatheism, Nihilism, and Weak Thought” (Dialogue with Gianni Vattimo) in 
Reimagining the Sacred, eds., Richard Kearney and Jens Zimmermann, New York: Columbia Press, 
2015, pp. 128-148. 
403 Gianni Vattimo, “Anatheism, Nihilism, and Weak Thought”, pp. 128-148. 
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‘meaning’ of kenosis. Whenever, an individual self disenchants itself, not enchanted 
by anything that makes its claim absolute, then there is the lived experience of caritas. 
Both Vattimo and Taylor’s hermeneutics of kenosis and disenchantment critiqued 
reconstructively result in kenosis and caritas becoming the inner disposition of the 
disenchanted self. Because of this, though cross-pressured in the immanent frame, in 
post-modernity an individual self has the choice either to ‘shut off’ or ‘break out’ of 
to conversion.   
 
V. The Divine as the Worldly Kenosis 
Taylor describes epistemology as CWS that discerns priority relations which tells what 
is learned before what, and what is inferred on the basis of what.404 Accordingly, the 
transcendent can be inferred from the natural/the secular/worldly. This argument 
functions as the foundation on which Vattimo can structure his ‘weak thought’, i.e., 
the transcendent can only be understood by inference from the natural, the weak, and 
the secular. Vattimo’s ‘weak thought’ transcends ‘its’ ‘weakness’ with the help of 
Taylor’s epistemology working as a CWS. It is from the weak, the natural, the 
immanent, that the sacred or transcendent can be properly conceived. Through the 
weakening of metaphysics and the self-emptying of Christ, a fuller experience of God 
becomes possible. Here, the divine becomes an inevitable part of human action and 
experience. This becomes the kernel of Incarnation and kenosis. The divine becoming 
this inevitable part of the human involves certain values, virtues, excellences of the 
independent, being disengaged, and reflexively controlling one’s own thought process. 
To properly perceive ‘the weak God’ one should be governed by an ethics of 
independence, self-control, self-responsibility, a refusal to conform to a set dogmatic 
authority, and an aversion to the comforts of the enchanted sacred cosmic world. In 
kenotic religious experience, divinity becomes part of humanity and its existence and 
the transcendent will have a necessary existential dwelling in the individual self. 
Accordingly, ‘the weak God’ becoming an inevitable part of human resembles the 
worldly kenosis of the divine.  
 
                                                          





POST-SECULAR RETURN OF RELIGION 
 
 
8.1 Post-Secular Return of Religion 
The dialogical contrast between Vattimo and Taylor’s ‘secularism’ aids our 
understanding of ‘the Post-Secular Return of Religion’. Secularism, generally 
recognised as the prerequisite “of public democratic life, the requisite integument of 
international relations, the mere absence or negation of obsolescing religion, and the 
characterization of modernity,”405 is contested by Vattimo and Taylor. “Secularism 
and secularisation, are no longer regarded unquestionably as the vaunted pillars of 
modern democratic society, or modernity itself.”406 Notwithstanding the unstable role 
of secularism, secular humanists continue to insist that despite post-secular claims, 
secularism remains ‘the only’ sure solution for negotiating sectarian conflict and a 
means for sustaining a democratic state. Vattimo’s proactive thinking with regard to 
Nietzsche’s ‘death of God’ does not imply the negation of religious orientation rather 
establishes through consequent secularism a new transformational religious 
experience. Taylor attempts to show the historical evolution of the death of God that 
neither exhausts the religious consciousness nor negates it, but offers a new direction 
to its appearance in post-modernity. Significantly, ‘the hermeneutic of secularism’ by 
Vattimo and Taylor has wider implications for contemporary philosophy.  
The meaning of secularism is elucidated as by ‘the death of God’ (Nietzsche and 
Vattimo) and as induced by the Reform movements as suggested by Taylor, hence the 
importance of deconstruction and the overcoming of traditional metaphysics and 
epistemology. The ‘post secular return of religion’ for Taylor is an ‘historical project’ 
                                                          
405 Michael Rectenwald and Rochelle Almeida, “Introduction” in Global Secularisms in a Post-Secular 
Age, pp.1-26. 
406  Michael Rectenwald and Rochelle Almeida give examples of the unstable role of secularism that 
led to the post-secular age. “They are ‘the continued popularity of church going in the United States, 
the emergence of New Age spirituality in Western Europe, the growth of fundamentalist movements 
and religious political parties in the Muslim world, the evangelical revival sweeping through Latin 
America, and the upsurge of ethno-religious conflict in international affairs, ‘religious resurgence’ or 
the desecularisation of Peter Berger, the reassigning of a new for role for religion in politics and public 
life by Habermas, and the adoption of the term “post-secularism” to describe the relations between 




and for Vattimo, it is ‘a salvific action of God’. Moving on, can ‘God’ return from ‘the 
death of God’ in the ‘post-secular age’ where the role of secularism is unstable? What 
follows ‘after the death of God’ is ‘post-Christian’ rather than ‘anti-Christian. It would 
seem that secularisation becomes the norm of all theological discourse and ‘return of 
religion’. Consequently, the foundation of the post-secular return of religion is the 
‘death of God’. Besides, the “death of God has always been accompanied by various 
modes of resurrection.”407 This is seen primarily in metaphysics where ‘theological 
prejudices’ are imbedded “in their entirety, even when they profess to be atheistic.”408 
When metaphysics poses itself as the supreme authority that pronounces ‘there is no 
God’, it simply re-enacts the role of God. 
Christopher Watkin in Difficult Atheism, observes that atheism is ‘difficult’409 and 
proposes ‘imitative’ and ‘residual’ atheisms that re-enact the role of God within ‘the 
death of God’.410 Imitative atheism is parasitic over the very framework it negates. It 
“replaces ‘God’ with a supposedly atheistic place-holder such as ‘Man’ or ‘Reason’, 
explicitly rejecting but implicitly imitating the theological categories of thinking…”411 
It is residual because “it calls upon us to make do with the resulting debris or ‘residue’ 
of lost foundations (the ‘death of God’), to live with finitude and imperfection, giving 
up on a satisfying transcendence and putting up with an unsatisfying immanence.”412 
John H. Smith claims that “the ‘death of God’ is in a crucial sense inscribed in the 
Christian identification of God with logos.”413 This is brought forth by the definition 
and identification of theology and critical reflection on God.  Smith explains:  
                                                          
407 John D. Smith, Dialogue between Faith and Reason: The Death and Return of God in Modern German 
Thought, London: Cornell University Press, 2011, p. 9. Smith explains this with the examples in 
heavenly geometry, infinitesimal calculus, in morality, a dialecticized spirit, in the necessity of 
ritualized practice, in capitalism, or in variously defined spheres of “otherness.” (John H. Smith, p. 9).     
408 John D Caputo quotes Derrida in his review of Difficult Atheism, John D. Caputo, Syracuse University 
and Villanova University, http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/31269-difficult-atheism-post-theological-thinking-
in-alain-badiou-jean-luc-nancy-and-quentin-meillassoux/, accessed on 22/05/2016.  
409 “Atheism,” Watkin argues, is "difficult," a difficulty Nietzsche proposed to meet when he said "God 
is dead," where "God" meant not just the Deity but the whole system of "values," of "truth" and the 
"good," from Plato to the present, every attempt to establish a centre, a foundation of knowledge and 
morals, including modern physics, which is also an "interpretation.” http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/31269-
difficult-atheism-post-theological-thinking-in-alain-badiou-jean-luc-nancy-and-quentin-meillassoux/, 
accessed on 22/05/2016.  
410Christopher Watkin, Difficult Atheism: Post-Theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy 
and Quentin Meillassoux, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013, p. 1. 
411 Christopher Watkin, p. 2. 
412 Christopher Watkin, p. 133. 
413 John D. Smith, Dialogue between Faith and Reason, p. 2.  
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[T]hat ‘death,’ […] does not come to Him from ‘outside’ Christian tradition but from 
within. It occurs through the different ways in which that logos comes to be identified 
over time, the different discursive spheres that bring their own “logics” to bear on 
understanding (the Christian) God. Because that logos is not one – that is, it takes the 
form, among others, of philology, natural science, ethics, Idealist philosophy, 
anthropology, ideology, existentialism, and ontology – the long process of God’s death 
also contains a constant returning to religion and of religion, as different thinkers again 
and again take on the task, ironically, not of killing but of understanding God with 
logos.414 
The notion of a Christian God is injected into the heart of the Western concept of logos, 
and the exercise of reason associated with philosophy cannot historicaly be practised 
in isolation from theology. Since, the logos is with God, or at least, in communion with 
God, philosophy will return again and again to the question of God. Consequently, the 
issue of religion will also return. The logos in God has focussed over the centuries on 
His death and the God in logos has led time and again to His return.415 In Gadamer, 
logos is inextricably linked to language. Language and logos are constitutive of each 
other. Gadamer highlights the linguistic concept of logos as ‘word’ and especially as 
language. Each word dies when another is uttered. It means that, linguistically, 
language maintains itself in falling and rising of every word. However, God is not 
reduced to a word. God maintains himself not in what is said but in ‘saying’. Whatever 
is stated now leads to something else in language. The dying and returning of God is 
an on-going dialectic of logos. To commit to religion depends on this movement kept 
open to historical epoch. In addition, “the dissolution of the main philosophical 
theories that claimed to have done away with religion: positivist scientism, and 
Hegelian-later Marxist – historicism”416 account for much of the ‘religious turn’ in 
recent Continental thought. Hence, ‘the trace of the sacred’ (God) is engraved in the 
very negation of ‘the sacred’. This framework of arguments makes conceivable the 
return of religion in a post-secular setting. Thus, I argue for the hermeneutical recovery 
of the divine after the death of the metaphysical God. 
The hermeneutical recovery of the divine and the return of religion undermine the 
credibility of atheism. One of the attributes of returned religion in post-secularity is a 
position beyond ‘theism’ and ‘atheism’: ‘anatheism.’417 Both Taylor and Vattimo 
                                                          
414 John D. Smith, Dialogue between Faith and Reason, p. 2. 
415 John D. Smith, pp. 2-3. 
416 Gianni Vattimo, “After Onto-theology: Philosophy between Science and Religion”, in Religion after 
Metaphysics, ed., Mark A. Wrathall, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 29-36. 
417 ‘Anatheism’ refers to a “’return to God after God’: a critical hermeneutic retrieval of sacred 
things that have passed but still bear a radical reminder, an unrealized potentiality or promise 
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concur in their philosophical exchange with Richard Kearney, not to disagree with 
‘anatheism’ but to agree with his call to rediscover the sacred dimensions of ordinary 
life. For greater clarity about the features of ‘returned religion’, I will unveil 
developing trends in contemporary philosophy that define and attempt a hermeneutic 
effort to re-engage religion. Along with Vattimo and Taylor; Rowan Williams, John 
Milbank, and Richard Kearney unreservedly argue for the post-secular call to re-
engage religion.  
For Vattimo, ‘religious experience is an experience of leave taking’ and if ‘it’ is ‘a 
leave taking’ (a departure) ‘it’ is most likely to ‘return’ to where and to when ‘leave 
was taken’.418 Religion comes to be experienced as a return. “In religion, something 
that we had thought irrevocably forgotten is made present again, a dominant trace is 
reawakened, a wound reopened, the repressed returns, and what we took to be an 
Ửberwindung is no more than a Verwindung, a long convalescence that has once again 
come to terms with the indelible trace of its sickness.”419 It is a return to its origin, 
which is forgotten and is made present, an important point rediscovered, a wound 
reopened to heal, a crushed and alienated return that was not totally rejected and set 
aside but only underwent a period of convalescence. Vattimo understands this ‘return’ 
as the essential aspect of religious experience itself. The ‘death of God’ and thus 
‘overcoming metaphysics’ is in fact only a ‘leave taking’ which helps to come to terms 
with the indelible trace of Christianity’s weakness and helps towards renewed 
reflection, leading to the original message of Christianity. Thus, the hermeneutical 
implication of ‘leave taking’ according to Vattimo is that the returned religion must 
also lead to a leave taking and so on ad-infinitum.  
In Taylor’s three distinctive and coexisting interpretive modes, secularism is 
understood as a term according to which a new relationship with religion might occur. 
This is most clearly seen in secularityiii. Secularityiii, Taylor suggests is the historical 
and hermeneutic recovery of religion for human flourishing (exclusive humanism). It 
opens the possibility for a peaceful coexistence of religious and secular citizens 
                                                          
to be more fully realised in the future. In this way, anatheism may be understood as ‘after-
faith’, which is more than a simple ‘after-thought’ or ‘after-effect’. (Richard Kearney, 
Reimagining the Sacred: Richard Kearney Debates God, eds., Richard Kearney and Jens 
Zimmermann. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015, p. 7) 
418 Vattimo and Derrida, Religion, eds., Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998, p. 79. 





(transcendent humanism).420 This can also be called a new Christian humanism, ‘open’ 
to the transcendent, and a possibility to ‘believe again’. Taylor also observes that “[the] 
return to religion is not actuated by a strong group or political identity or by a need to 
defend or recover a civilizational order against threatened dissolution, [but]… a 
profound dissatisfaction of a life encased entirely in the immanent order. The sense is 
that this life is empty, flat, devoid of higher purpose” (DC, 255). It is always a personal 
search encoded in the language of authenticity. One tries to find one’s own path or 
‘oneself’. It does not mean that it must be self-enclosed, “that it cannot end up with a 
strong sense of the transcendent, or of devotion to something beyond” (DC, 256). 
“[This] new framework has a strongly individualistic component, but this will not 
necessarily mean that the content will be individuating. Many people will find 
themselves joining extremely powerful religious communities, because that’s where 
many people’s sense of the spiritual will lead them” (DC, 256). 
Rowan Williams envisions a transformational non-dogmatic faith that can represent 
the social, imaginative world. If that faith is chaotic, it produces a cultural loss of 
courage, which affects the true spirit of faith itself; this can lead to the violence of 
fanaticism.421 The principal aim of non-dogmatic religion is that it discovers the notion 
of human rights. Williams explains: 
[It] does not just enforce my own claims, but about the demands of dignity in all persons; a 
notion of freedom that sees it as freedom for the other, not from them; a vision of democracy 
that is about the constant search for ways of ensuring that even the most marginal and 
deprived has a voice; a search for the convergent morality in public life, not a separation 
between minimal public order and private moral preferences; and a climate of artistic 
creation that evokes something of the richness of the human subject when it is opened up 
to the holy.422 
It would be wrong to identify God with a dimension of an individual belief system, as 
something contained by it. This can be analytically conceptualized by means of ‘God’ 
as something that grows inside every individual. Even when one does not wish, God 
ripens. The “individual life has a task that can be defined only as that of allowing God 
to ‘ripen’ in increasingly visible ways.”423 Williams gives God a place that He chooses 
to be. However, God is not seen as a commodity waiting for an advantage to guarantee 
                                                          
420 For Taylor, exclusive humanism pertains to ‘the immanent frame’ that recognises no source of value 
beyond ‘the immanent frame’. However, transcendent humanism breaks out of the immanent frame 
and looks beyond to quest for spiritual and religious fullness.   
421 Rowan Williams, Faith in the Public Square, London: Continuum Trade, 2012, p. 73. 
422 Rowan Williams, p. 74. 
423 Rowan Williams, p. 316. 
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its place. He explains; “[t]he religious life, on this account would be taking on the task 
of ensuring a habitation for God, a God who does not guarantee for himself a place in 
the created world, a place alongside other agents, and so is visible only when a human 
life gives place, offers hospitality to God, so that this place, this identity, becomes 
testimony.”424 
John Milbank’s ‘radical orthodoxy’425 proposes the possibility of a skeptical 
demolition of modern, secular social theory by demonstrating that all of the most 
important governing assumptions of such a theory are bound up with the modification 
or the rejection of orthodox Christian positions. He tries to free Christian theology 
from the shackles of secular reason by stepping outside the parameters imposed by 
modern thought to re-discover the roots of an alternative conceptual structure that 
better conforms to the Christian narrative. Thus, he articulates a meta-narrative, a 
transcendent factor, ‘even when it comes as the constant element in an immanent 
process’ to ‘pass critically beyond Nietzschean suspicion’ which arguably is the final 
and truly non-metaphysical mode of secular reason.426 There are two reasons for doing 
this: “the faith of humanism has become a substitute for a transcendent faith now only 
half-subscribed to, and secondly there is a perceived need to discover precisely how to 
fulfil Christian precepts about charity and freedom in contemporary society in an 
uncontroversial manner, involving cooperation with the majority of non-Christian 
fellow citizens.”427 Milbank attempts to recover an authentic and reasonable union of 
theology and philosophy, so that human beings can rediscover a vital, mysterious, and 
fructifying theological relationship to both God and the world. This would reverse the 
decline of Christianity in public life by restoring the intellectual legitimacy of Christian 
theology over secularism. It is evident that as for Vattimo, ‘return of religion’ is the 
                                                          
424 Rowan Williams, Faith in the Public Square, pp. 318-319. 
425 “[I]n the face of the secular demise of truth, [radical orthodoxy] seeks to reconfigure theological 
truth. The latter may indeed hover close to nihilism, since it, also, refuses a reduction of the 
indeterminate. Yet what finally distances it from nihilism is its proposal of the rational possibility, and 
the faithfully perceived actuality, of an indeterminacy that is not impersonal chaos but infinite 
interpersonal harmonious order, in which time participates…Radical Orthodoxy wishes to reach 
further in recovering and extending a fully Christianised ontology and practical philosophy consonant 
with authentic Christian doctrine.” (John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward, Radical 
Orthodoxy, eds., London and New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. 1-2.) 
426 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory; Beyond Secular Reason, Second ed., Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1990, p. 1. 
427 John Milbank, p. 2. 
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dialectical outcome of secularism. Whereas, for Milbank, ‘re-discovering’ Christian 
theology is recovering it from ‘the shackles of secular reason’. 
Richard Kearney makes an anatheist attempt to re-imagine the sacred. ‘Ana’ means 
‘up in space or time’, ‘back again’, ‘anew’, and ‘after’.428 It is “a retrieval of past 
experience that moves forward, proffering new life to memory, giving a future to the 
past.”429 This ‘aftering’ “refers to any poetic movement of returning to God after God 
– God again, after the loss of God…the return of the lost one – in the case of religion, 
the lost God – may well be the return of a more real presence.”430 The prefix ana 
portrays the idea of retrieving, revisiting, reiterating, and repeating. Kearney explains 
it as “a critical hermeneutic retrieval of sacred things that have passed but still bear a 
radical reminder, an unrealized potentiality or promise to be more fully realized in the 
future.”431 It is giving a future to the past in which the future was a potentiality or a 
promise. It “is the possibility of opening oneself, once again, to the original and 
enduring, the promise of a sacred stranger, an absolute other who comes as gift, call, 
summons, as invitation to hospitality and justice…Anatheism is a radical opening to 
someone or something that was lost and forgotten…”432  
The post-secular attempt to re-engage with religion and the sacred, first of all, calls for 
a radical revival of religion as non-religious religion. The ‘God’ who returns is stripped 
of metaphysical qualities, claims, objectivity, and dogmatism, but ‘weak’ and ‘fragile’. 
For Vattimo, “it is a reversal of a Platonic programme: the philosopher now summons 
humans back to their historicity rather than to what is eternal.” (FR, 9) God is not 
outside the universe, but within, a potential promise always present in language. 
Secondly, it enables ‘the self’ to realise its own being and that of the other and thus to-
be-for-the-[O]ther. Being-for-the-other is inevitable because the hermeneutic 
rediscovery of religion and the sacred is primarily aimed at human flourishing and the 
peaceful coexistence of the whole of creation. Thirdly, once we let go of our dogmatic 
convictions, charity takes precedence over truth. As a result of the kenotic ethic, 
caritas/charity takes precedence over veritas/truth. Caritas (agape) is a vocation lived 
with all its implications: one worships God exclusively in the form of service to others. 
Caritas ‘overcomes’ all the metaphysical and epistemological constructions such as 
                                                          
428 Richard Kearney, Reimagining the Sacred, p. 6. 
429 Richard Kearney, p. 6.  
430 Richard Kearney, pp. 6-7. 
431 Richard Kearney, p. 7.  
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discipline and dogma. Finally, the ‘re-engaging of religion’ can be best explained as 
an ‘exodus’ and a ‘transition’ from ‘sacred’ to ‘secular’. It is both an ‘exodus’ and 
‘transition’ from the constraints of modernity to post-modernity and post-secularity. 
‘God,’ who is a ‘promise’ and ‘potential’, who ‘was’, ‘is’ and ‘will be’, is reimagined 
as ‘kenosis/caritas’. It is a plea to ‘release’ and ‘to live with’ ‘the other’ as the other. 
It is a demand to let particulars be themselves rather than having to conform to the 
structures of the prevailing ideological, political, or religious system.  
 
8.1.1 Non-religious ‘Religion’ 
The hermeneutical deconstruction of both Vattimo and Taylor plays a vital role in the 
‘return’ of religion and functions as an impetus for abandoning atheism. As discussed, 
secularisation is the result of an ontic event as well as an historical inevitability within 
Christianity, re-proposing the question of God after ‘the death of God’. Through 
hermeneutical ‘weakening’ and the possible ‘openness’ (breaking out) within ‘the 
immanent frame’, the weight and eternity of the objective structures are weakened.  
This hermeneutical rediscovery is an inevitable ‘progressive event’ in history whereby 
the ‘genuine’ nature of religion is reaffirmed. It “is a faithful recovery of kenotic 
Christianity and an orientation toward the very essence of the Christian faith – namely 
that of agape/caritas…which is more determinative than the collapse of Christendom” 
(ADG, 14). It is “a recovery, rediscovery, or retrieval of faith in the midst of a world 
marked by militant faiths and militant attacks on faith.”433 Following on, I would like 
to develop the following thesis. 
I call the recovered, rediscovered religion, “non-religious religion” because ‘it’ is 
realised phenomenologically and ontically in contrast to the conventional religion. The 
phrase ‘non-religious religion’ is initially used by Vattimo to address his concept of 
the post-secular return of religion. As elucidated in Chapter Two, the word ‘religion’ 
draws its etymology from the Latin religare, meaning ‘bind’, ‘obligation,’ ‘bond,’ and 
‘reverence.’ It means a binding respect for the metaphysical sacred, reverence for the 
dogmatic God, fear of the gods, a mode of worship, sanctity and holiness, etc. Vattimo 
and Taylor’s hermeneutical deconstruction of religion, draws out the possibility for a 
                                                          
433 John Caputo, “Anatheism and Radical Hermeneutics” (A Dialogue with John Caputo) in Reimagining 
the Sacred: Richard Kearney Debates God, eds., Richard Kearney and Jens Zimmermann, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2015, pp. 193-218. 
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post-secular form of religion that ‘unbundles’ the traditionally conceived obligations 
of religion. Again, I call this post-secular religion, a ‘non-religious religion’’. Cicero’s 
understanding of religion is pertinent. According to Cicero, religio is derived from the 
verb relegere in its sense of “to re-read or go over a text”, from re ‘again’ and legere 
‘read’.434 Hence, a possible explanation for this might be that ‘nonreligious religion’ 
is the traditional religion ‘re-read’ and ‘reconstructed’, whereby the original and 
purified form is re-discovered.435 For Vattimo, Christianity must be non-religious (i.e., 
post-religious436) because in Christianity there is a fundamental commitment to 
freedom. For him, true Christianity, stands for freedom, and stands against 
authoritarianism. It is freedom from truth (ADG, 37) and all forms of authoritarianism 
founded on metaphysics. Therefore, in contra-distinction to the customary meaning, 
‘the returned religion’ places stress on ‘personal commitment’ and “devalues ritual and 
external practice in favour of inward adherence…It is taking religion seriously which 
means taking my religion personally, more devotionally, inwardly, and more 
committedly” (DC, 216). However, I suggest that this ‘return’ and ‘rediscovery’ is 
only a Verwindung, a return of the repressed from the ‘death of God hermeneutic 
nihilism’ and a return of the possibility of ‘breaking out’ of the immanent frame to a 
new buffered identity.  
Distinguished thinkers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – for example Sөren 
Kierkegaard, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Martin Heidegger, and Nietzsche held the view that 
the loss of belief in a metaphysical God who is the ground of all existence and 
intelligibility, “opens up access to richer and more relevant ways for us to understand 
                                                          
434 http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=religion, accessed on 12/06/2016. 
435 I see the ‘Non-religious religion’ as a ‘restoration’ of the authentic meaning of religion which is an 
historical consequence of its transformation (Verwindung). The non-religious religion, therefore, is 
transformative. It is consistent with Vattimo’s approach to the concept of concept of kenosis and 
Verwindung which are presented as unfolding and never static hermeneutic. Taylor, on the other hand 
speaks of more authentic personal conversion and fulness.  
436 In Vattimo’s terms, ‘nonreligious’ means ‘post-religious,’ or, in Richard Kearney’s terms, ‘ana-
christian after anatheism.    In Vattimo’s own words, “I would say, today, it has become both possible 
and necessary to become anatheist, to become postreligious. Because, as a matter of fact, there is no 
foundational structure of Being we recognise, there is no ultimate or ulterior Being in itself, no 
noumenal substance hidden behind phenomenal appearance. That is why one is more Christian than 
Kantian.” Richard refers to the German pastor Bonhoeffer as an exemplary anatheist with his call for 
a “religionless” Christianity. It aims at an integration of faith in a secular world. “Especially when he 
speaks of a God without religion and metaphysics and asks: ‘How do we speak in a secular way about 
God? In what way are we religionless secular Christians’.” (Richard Kearney’s dialogue with Vattimo, 
“Anatheism, Nihilism, and Weak Thought”, pp. 135-136) 
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creation and for us to encounter the divine and the sacred.”437 At present, including 
Vattimo and Taylor, there are post-secular trends that advocate ‘a non-religious 
religion’. A few thinkers in this post-secular movement are: John Milbank (Radical 
Orthodoxy), Richard Kearney (Anatheism), Rowan Williams (God in Language), Julia 
Kristeva (Post-Christian Humanism) Alfred Whitehead (Process theology), Simon 
Critchley (Faithless Faith), and John Caputo (Radical Hermeneutics). There are also 
developing post-modern and post-secular theological trends, such as ‘theology of 
communal practice’, ‘post-liberal theology’, ‘post-metaphysical theology’, 
‘deconstructive theology’ (Derrida), etc. Even Derrida suggests something ‘beyond’ 
his deconstruction. He undertakes deconstructive analysis “in the name of something, 
something that is affirmatively in-deconstructible.”438 For Derrida, these something 
beyond deconstruction are ‘justice’ and ‘the gift’.439 Caputo observes that “Derrida’s 
affirmation of the impossibility of justice and of the gift, is a gesture not of nihilistic 
despair but of faith: the desire for something other than what is obtained in the present 
world order.”440 These philosophers, and these schools of thought advocate that in 
post-modernity there are authentic and relevant ways for ‘the self’ to encounter ‘the 
divine’ and ‘the sacred’. 
Furthermore, I argue that ‘the self’ in the ‘nonreligious religion’, ‘breaks out’ of ‘the 
immanent frame’ of ‘belief’ and unbelief’ to ‘a certain faith’. The ‘self’ possesses a 
new buffered identity, with its insistence on increased distance from, or dis-
identification with, forms of collective ritual and belonging, as well as scientific and 
atheistic rationalism. Here, Heidegger’s onto-theological conception of the sacred 
showing itself is ‘overcome’. Despite this ‘overcoming’, and changes in the historical 
‘background’, I leave the very object of the transcendent intact. Here I adhere to 
Vattimo’s deconstructive hermeneutic of weak thought and Verwindung (not 
                                                          
437 Mark A. Wrathall, Religion after Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 1. 
438 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “Theology and the condition of postmodernity: a report on knowledge (of God)” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003, pp.3-25, quotes from John D. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, A Conversation with Jacques 
Derrida, New York: Fordham University Press, 1997, p. 128. For Derrida, this something, that cannot 
be deconstructed is justice. He says that deconstruction itself is justice.  
439 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, pp.3-25. Another religious theme to which Derrida gave much attention was 
‘gift.’ For him, ‘gift’ is also impossible as ‘justice’. ‘Justice’ for Derrida is the impossible, in the sense 
that it is incalculable on the basis of factors that are already present. As for ‘gifts’, as soon as we give 
something to someone, we put that person in our debt, thus taking, not giving. The gift disappears in 
a web of calculation, interest, and measure.  
440 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, pp. 3-25, quotes from John D. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell, p. 128. 
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Ửberwindung) of the absolute. Taylor and Vattimo’s secularism function as an aid to 
reinstate, and a ‘purified’, and ‘convalescenced’ form of the transcendent. The ‘death 
of God’ leads to kenosis of God so that ‘disenchantment’ leads to re-enchantment. 
Conversely, in ‘nonreligious religion’ what is ‘genuinely sacred’ can only be 
transcendent and can only be God.441 Consequently, the nonreligious religion goes 
beyond the traditional role of 1) an empowering devotion, 2) a neo-Durkheimian 
phenomenon442 and, 3) a basis for moral/civilizational order (DC, 246). What is 
genuinely sacred can only be transcendent. A search for ‘the sacred’ shall occur in 
every individual. “It is a personal search, and can easily be coded in the language of 
authenticity: I am trying to find my path, or find myself” (DC, 256). As a result, it will 
be an “increasingly individual and unstructured faith, ‘made to measure’, to suit the 
needs and expectations of the individual.”443 This ‘personal search’ to ‘find my path’ 
will aim at “the recovery of a biblical faith that gives emphasis not to the power and 
glory of a transcendental absolute but of God’s suffering and love- from the ‘Being’ 
of God to the story of God’s being with the poor, the hungry, and the outcast” (ADG, 
9-10). However, this does not mean that ‘this personal search’ is self-enclosed. It 
experiences a strong sense of the transcendent, or of devotion to something beyond the 
self. The self is an outcast and returns to itself in a knowing and healing way. Though 
‘non-religious’ religious outline has “a strong individualist component, this will not 
necessarily mean that the content will be individuating” (DC, 256).  
Consistent with the observations of Taylor and Vattimo, I claim that outpacing the 
predictable mode and objectives of traditional religion, ‘nonreligious religion’ 
envisions an increasingly individual, unstructured’ mode that aims at ‘recovering the 
biblical faith’ of kenotic charity. To that end, I note, Julia Kristeva’s “post-Christian 
                                                          
441 Peter E. Gordon, “The Place of the Sacred in the Absence of God: Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age” in 
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 69, No. 4, October 2008, pp. 647-673.  
442 “A neo-Durkheimian social form is one in which religion is partially disembedded from the 
traditional social structure of kinship and village life but comes to serve as an expression of a larger 
social identity, namely the newly emerging nation state in the West. The post-Westphalian regime of 
established churches—one realm, one church—is an example. And it is this regime that is closely 
related to the rise of modern nationalism, which may or may not shed its religious guise, but to which 
the churches in many ways remain oriented.” http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2007/11/23/after-durkheim/, 
accessed on 10/06/2016.  
443 Pierpaolo Antonello, “Introduction” in Christianity, Truth, and Weakening Faith: A Dialogue; Gianni 
Vattimo and Reñe Girard, ed., William McCuaig, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, pp 1-22. 
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Humanism”444 and Nancy L. Eiesland’s “The Disabled God”.445 God’s suffering and 
love, together with His identity with the poor, hungry and outcast is manifested to ‘the 
self’ through the reflection of God’s transcendence in and through “love of Christ’s 
humanity”.446 Even in his glory, Christ appeared to his disciples with an ‘impaired’ 
and damaged body. “Here the wound is not a lack, because it is an integral part of his 
glory, itself given and perceived as a singularity.”447 Richard Kearney’s anatheism also 
pays central attention to Julia Kristeva’s sacred ‘thisness’448 and ‘disability’ that 
reflects Christ’s transcendence. For Kearney, it is paying attention to the “‘least of 
these’ – the forgotten and estranged…[and] hospitality to the stranger.”449 Here a 
paradigm shift happens ‘from the enclosed ‘Being’ of God to the story of God’s 
closeness to the poor, the hungry, and the outcast.’ The eventual nature of truth is 
manifested through this transition from ‘Being’ to ‘being’. Graham Ward observes that 
Derrida and other ‘death of God’ thinkers reject transcendentalism in their 
‘deconstructive theology’. They “accept the Kantian distinction between the 
phenomenological and the noumental, affirming a certain reading of Hegel that, in 
Jesus Christ, God as transcendent Being poured himself into the immanent created 
orders without remainder, and insisting that Wittgenstein was right speaking of things 
in this world, (and) emphasised the need to expunge theological discourse centred on 
                                                          
444 Richard Kearney in his dialogue with Julia Kristeva explains the meaning of “post-Christian 
Humanism.” “Post-Christian Humanism recognises the absolute need of human beings for ideals to 
endow life with meaning (the need to believe), and the tension of these ideals with our desires for 
knowledge, for hard-nosed realism (the need to know). In secular terms, Kristeva recognises the same 
tension Christianity has historically problematized as the relation of faith to reason. For her, religious 
ideals are important not least because they point to important failures of secularism in addressing 
human social needs.” (Richard Kearney, New Humanism and the Need to Believe; Dialogue with Julia 
Kristeva, pp. 93-94)  
445 Julia Kristeva in her dialogue with Richard Kearney mentions Nancy L. Eiesland [1964-2009], who in 
her book The Disabled God describes Jesus as the only “Disabled God.” (Richard Kearney, p. 96) 
446 Richard Kearney in his dialogue with Kristeva observes that “through love of Christ’s humanity, you 
continually receive from him your freedom. Continually, without solution, without end, infinitely free.” 
Kearney asks Kristeva; “Is this an affirmation of the sacred ‘thisness’ of everyday things – what Teresa 
of Avila calls the ‘pots and pans’, what she calls, ‘singularity’ and what he calls’ ‘epiphany’. (Richard 
Kearney, p.95) 
447 Kristeva develops her Scotist [Duns Scotus (1266- 1308)] ethics based on his idea of the 
incommensurable nature of each person, disabled persons included. Scotistic ethics is a more mystical 
ethics (Gilles Deleuze – atheistic ethics), not the social ethics of Thomas Aquinas. 
448 Kristeva develops her notion of ‘thisness’ with the help of Duns Scotus. As against Thomas Aquinas, 
“truth is not in universal ideas, nor in opaque matter, but in ‘this one’ – this man here, this woman 
there; whence his (Scotistic) notion of haecceitas (thisness), of hoc, haec, or again ecce, ‘this’, the 
demonstrative indexing of an unnameable singularity… ‘I am the One who is’. (Richard Kearney, p. 95) 
449Richard Kearney, p. 96.  
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metaphysical claims.”450 Jean-Luc Marion in his ‘post-metaphysical theology’ locates 
an extra-metaphysical “God without Being.”451 Here “Being ‘is’ not, but occurs, and 
it constitutes the a priori temporal (not, versus the Neo-Kantians, transcendental) 
horizon for Dasein.”452 Thus, “True Being never is, but sets itself on and sends itself, 
it trans-mits itself.”453 As Pope Benedict XVI observes; “for us truth is a ‘path’, a 
‘continuous interrogation’, an ‘interior struggle’,…and “no one is the owner of 
truth.”454 For Vattimo, this indeed is the fuller revelation of the Christian message that 
ruptures all the barriers forced upon humanity. The transition of ‘Being’ to ‘being,’ 
strips God and mankind of sacred protections. Due to its incapacity to guarantee 
‘truth’, ‘the Church’ becomes ‘weak’ which is its true destiny. As Pierpaolo Antonello 
observes, “the true destiny of Christianity is to extinguish itself, a weaker, less 
structured or less hierarchical church, more open to alterity, more of a de-Christianized 
Christianity…”455 
Kearney’s anatheistic recovery of the sacred agrees with the post-atheistic reimagining 
of biblical faith, “liberated from the metaphysical trappings of a God of orthodoxy and 
power.”456 Anatheism, in short, means ‘God after God’. Nevertheless, it “is not some 
ineluctable dialectic leading to a final totality. It is not about uppercase Divinity, or 
Alpha God. [Anatheism] is about reimagining – and reliving – the sacred in the least 
of these. It is lowercase from beginning to end.”457 Anatheism is not about ‘Being’, 
but ‘being’; and is about ‘weakness’, about ‘possible openness’. This is also about a 
secularised recovery and reimagining of the sacred, and is not about John Milbank’s 
demolition of modern, secular social theory.458 Milbank, unlike Vattimo and Taylor 
endeavours to reclaim ‘the sacred’ by situating and resituating its concerns and 
activities within traditional Christian theological framework. “What emerges is a 
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contemporary theological project made possible by the self-conscious superficiality of 
today’s secularism…[In] the face of the secular demise of truth, it (radical 
orthodoxy)459 seeks to reconfigure theological truth.”460 Milbank’s ‘radical orthodoxy’ 
fails to penetrate into the centrality of ‘secularism’. For Milbank, secularism is 
antithetical to theology, and he does not recognize the hermeneutic in which secularity 
is not opposed to transcendence. However, Rowan Williams envisages ‘the immanent 
transcendence’ of God through ‘the use of language around faith and our perception 
and understanding of God’. The human uses his/her communicative means (language) 
‘a feature of the temporal world,’ to perceive and understand God. If God is ‘outside’ 
the universe, it is difficult to use ‘a feature of the temporal world’ to represent 
something that does not abide by the conventions of the universe.461 Derrida’s ‘anti-
metaphysical account of language swings in the direction of Williams. Here, “language 
is pointed to itself, not to any realms or personages, revelations or hierarchies above, 
beyond or outside the secular world it constructed.”462 John H. Smith’s attributing the 
logos to the nature of God is relevant here. Reading John 1-2, Smith observes that 
logos meant ‘word’, ‘speech’, ‘discourse’, meanings that are related to the very nature 
of God, and likewise addresses the relationship connecting religion, language, 
philosophy and reason.463 As for Derrida, “now if, today, the ‘question of religion’ 
actually appears in a new and different light, if there is an unprecedented resurgence, 
both global and planetary, of this ageless thing, then what is at stake is language, 
certainly – more precisely the idiom, literality, writing, that forms the element of all 
revelation and all belief.”464 For Habermas, “the divine is always implicated in a 
process of using language, or, in his term, “linguistification.”465 Accordingly, ‘God’ 
becomes an/the ‘immanent transcendent’ who is describable and experienced in 
human language and human temporality. He is conceived and reconceived, constantly 
re-evaluated and re-engaged, critiqued in hermeneutical deconstructions, and liable to 
erring. ‘He’, as part of commonplace language, becomes an unquestionable confidante 
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and counterpart who recurrently engages and reorients Himself in making sense of the 
world and its priorities. 
The most striking implication that emerges is that the ‘immanent transcendent’ implicit 
within ‘transcendental humanism’ replaces ‘the transcendental sacred’. The former 
does not deny the latter but gives space to ‘being’ and at the same time it upholds the 
position of the sacred. However, modernity, tends to deny the former due to the 
absolutism of the sacred which undermines the eventual nature of Being. However, 
‘exclusive humanism’ in post-modernity and in ‘nonreligious religion’ is not 
acceptable to the traditional believer because the former exclusively denies the self’s 
prerogative to go beyond itself to ‘the Other’ only through whom he can realise his 
‘beingness’. 
Significantly, the most important feature of ‘nonreligious religion’ is its ‘spiritual’ 
dimension. James K. A. Smith who based his study on A Secular Age, states that this 
is exemplified in the British novelist Julian Barnes’ memoir, Nothing To Be Frightened 
Of, in which he writes, “I don’t believe in God, but I miss him.”  Smith says, “[This] 
is almost everything we need to understand the modern phenomenon of ‘spiritual not 
religious’.”466 This is an increasingly popular phrase used to emphasise that ‘one’ no 
longer requires, and does not want to be part of an organised religion. For Taylor, ‘the 
breaking out’ of ‘the immanent frame’ leads to a personal ‘fullness’ and ‘conversion’ 
which leads ‘the self’ towards a ‘spiritual awakening’ within itself rather than to being 
part of an organised religion. Vattimo very clearly states that ‘conversion’ is not a 
revision to his childhood religion of Catholicism but rather to personal commitment. 
With the help of Rowan Williams, I distinguish a sense of ‘religious belonging’ from 
a ‘spiritual’ identity which Vattimo and Taylor do not strongly differentiate.  The 
religious life is first of all “a way of conducting bodily life.”467 Conducting bodily life 
“has to do with gesture, place, sound, habit – and not first and foremost what is 
supposed to be going on inside.”468 For Williams, the whole idea of ‘inner life’ (the 
spiritual) “is properly, what we put together from a certain reading of visible lives; it 
is not a self-evident category, a cluster of intangible experiences or mental 
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dispositions, but what comes to light as the sense, the intelligibility, of a certain pattern 
of acts.”469 He argues that it is “a fundamental mistake to consider belief itself, in its 
corporate religious context, as more or less exclusively as a mental event…”470 The 
‘spiritual’ dimension of belief demands of the ‘bodily gestures’ an inner ‘welling-up’, 
a sense of plenitude which transforms the grey landscape of dawn into spaciousness, 
accompanied by ‘listening’ to the ‘self’, which is an attentiveness to nothing 
external.471 “It is not a simple scrutiny of the self; it is really God who hearkens inside 
me. The most essential and the deepest in me hearkening unto the most essential and 
deepest in the other. God to God: loving attention to the other is a clearing of ‘the path 
You in them’.”472 For David Martin, “it is loosening the monopoly” of the 
civilizational religion and nations who provided citizens with a code of conduct of life 
and death.473 Merold Westphal gives an explanation of ‘the inner dimension’ that 
distinguishes ‘the spiritual’ from ‘the religious’. He states, “I believe in, or at least 
hope for and am seeking some deeper meaning to my life than my hedonistic, 
consumeristic society offers me….”474  
Furthermore, for Williams,  
[R]eligion (religious) is understood precisely as the realm of limit and physical 
determination, including community and language, (which) carries with it a different 
mode of freedom from spirituality that is focused on the nature of the inner life as such. 
The ‘spiritual’ as a category can be applied to a range of phenomena or traditions of 
speech and action seems in current usage to work with a model of the self-selecting 
from this range a vocabulary and a set of practices which might serve as an existing 
sense of need, and which may add to self’s repertoire a degree of access to further 
experience.475  
Religious life is limited. It has a physical determination. It has community and a set 
pattern of culture and language, whereas, the spiritual is focused entirely on the inner 
life. The spiritual tends to reject traditional organized religion as the sole or even the 
most valuable means of furthering spiritual growth. ‘Spiritual’ people embrace an 
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individualized mode of ‘belief’ which includes choices within a wide range of practices 
other than those stipulated by organized religion. The ‘spiritual life’ is seen as a 
journey, intimately linked with the pursuit of personal growth and development. 
Williams observes, “[t]he spiritual dimension of all sorts of things, from school 
education to business practice, is recognized more and more seriously and even as a 
resource for health (emphasis added).”476 The ‘religious’ life involves a collective 
responsibility for corporately held teaching and discipline. In organized religion, I 
make over some aspect of myself for others; I may have to compromise my liberty and 
integrity. The practices may mean little to me but I become part of them. I may even 
practise certain codes of conduct that do not convince me. In contrast, ‘the spiritual’ 
opens up my personal conviction and integrity along a new path. It does not frustrate 
my sense of personal distinctiveness. My ordinary activities may be looked at against 
the background of ‘sacredness’. I do not have to hold on to ‘exclusive truthfulness’, 
rather I find ‘truth’ in my relationship with ‘the other’. It is more ‘inclusive’ and 
‘liberating’ both for myself and ‘the other’.477 
Conversely, one of the notable characteristics of post-secular religion is that most 
people find it difficult to commit themselves to a particular religious belief.  The ‘post-
secular religion’ avails the search for a spiritual capital independent of corporate 
religious affirmation. ‘This search’ independent of ‘religion’ can be called post-
religious spirituality. This post-religious sensibility aims at “breaking down the 
barriers between different religious groups, the deconstruction of ghetto walls where 
such existed” (DC, 252). If post-secular religious sensibility can ‘break down the 
barriers’, traditional Christian faith can be redefined or is constantly in the process of 
redefining and recomposing itself in various ways in relation to the growth of non-
Christian religions, “particularly those originating in the Orient, and the proliferation 
of New Age modes of practice, of views that bridge the humanist/spiritual/religious 
boundary, of practices that link spirituality and therapy” (DC, 253). For Daniẻle 
Hervieu-Lẻrger it is a “decoupling of belief and practice of a disembedding belief, 
belonging, and identitary reference” (DC, 253). Grace Davey speaks of a “believing 
without belonging” (DC, 253). Taken together, the thrust of ‘nonreligious religion’ 
follows Secularityiii. It entails a ‘spiritual life’ constructed on secularityiii, “modelled 
after deconstruction that would be auto-deconstructive; self-correcting, removed as far 
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as possible from the power games and rigid inflexibility of institutional life, where a 
minimal institutional architecture pushes towards some optional point, nearly but not 
all of the way towards anarchy, some point of creative ‘chaosmos’.478  
 
8.1.2 Religion of Being for the Other 
In Christian pre-modernity, the principal thought patterns circumscribed the 
metaphysical trinity: man, world, and God. During the seventeenth and eighteenth-
century Reformations and the emergence of what is called modernity, the third element 
undergoes an alteration: man and world take precedence. The consequence of these 
changes results in post-modernity: man, world and ‘the Other’ become the central 
theme of Western thought and philosophy. In studying Taylor, Guido Vanheeswijck, 
observes that we have experienced and inherited three juxtaposed spiritual positions: 
“capacious theism (Man, World, God), exclusive humanism (Man and World), and 
Post-modernism (Man, World, the Other).”479 There is a continuity in this 
configuration, but in each stage the emphasis changes from one to the another. As a 
result of this reconfiguration and its initiated secularisation, ‘God’ in post-modernity, 
re-appears distinctively as ‘the Other’, exploring a continuous searching for an answer 
to the relation between transcendence and immanence. The traces of the return of the 
‘Other’ can be found in Nietzsche’s Dionysos,480 and in Heidegger’s philosophy of 
‘Being’.481 Post-Heideggerian thinkers like Emmanuel Levinas, Gianni Vattimo, Rene 
Girard, and Charles Taylor, try “against the backdrop of Heidegger’s critique of the 
onto-theological structure of our religious language, to find new formulations”482 to 
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speak about ‘the Other’ and transcendence after ‘God’. However, a pertinent 
disagreement remains as to whether the return of ‘the Other’ is ‘wholly’ transcendent 
or immanent. In the post-secular and post-modern return of ‘non-religious religion, 
Vattimo’s Nietzschean death of God and ‘weak thought’ rejects the ‘(Wholly) 
Other’.483 He repudiates the ‘Other’ with a capital ‘O’. Taylor, however, does not deny 
the ‘possibility’ of the ‘Other’, in the full transcendent sense.  
Vattimo’s historical approach to hermeneutics as nihilistic prohibits all interest in the 
possibility of ‘vertical transcendence’. The metaphysical absolutism of ‘Being’ and 
the ‘Other’ is completely displaced. The ‘Other’ as a wholly Other, “is 
incomprehensible, contradicts human reason, and thwarts our plans and ambitions.”484 
Vattimo’s weak interpretation envisions a “‘horizontal transcendence’ of the 
linguistically-constituted epochs into which we are thrown”.485 Vattimo and Taylor’s 
hermeneutical deconstruction of secularism, that is, their Verwindung of metaphysics 
and epistemology, opens the possibility for an irreducible plurality of interpretations 
centering on metaphysical traces. According to Matthew E. Harris, the vocation of the 
philosopher today is to seek out ‘the other’ (with a lower case ‘o’) in order to further 
weaken these metaphysical traces,486 and yet, this is also to recover them in a secular 
form. It means that although Vattimo rejects a wholly ‘Other’ God, he accepts the 
‘Other’ through the hermeneutic of Verwindung. Phenomenologically, it is an 
invitation to greater involvement with the other; an incarnation of the ‘Other’ in each 
one of us. Conversely, he uses the terms ‘Being’ and ‘Other’ in a manner that is now 
altered and healed through his weak/kenotic interpretation as ‘being’ and ‘other’. He 
explains:  
[I]f we consider the meaning of creation and redemption to be kenosis, as I believe we 
must in the light of the gospel, we will probably have to concede that the continuity of 
God and the world established by classical metaphysics is more authentically ‘kenotic’ 
than the transcendence attributed to God in naming him ‘the wholly Other’ (B, 83, and 
AC, 38). 
He takes incarnation seriously. Incarnation brings the message of weakness, 
humiliation and friendship ‘for the other’ (B, 95). In incarnation, God ‘is akin to 
finitude and nature: there is a fundamental continuity between God and world, between 
God and humanity’ (AC, 27). Though Vattimo rejects the ‘Other’, incarnation opens 
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the possibility to encounter the ‘Other’ in the ‘other’.487 It is the individual self’s 
freedom to be ‘closed’ or ‘open’ to conversion and fullness within the ‘immanent 
frame’. It is a drawing out of oneself, of what is already there, a possibility to be open 
to further historical destiny (Heidegger) of the individual self. Since Vattimo considers 
language to be metaphorical, the death of God frees metaphor and language (BI, 54). 
This not only liberates language but also opens the possibility of an encounter with 
God-beyond-God, made possible through incarnation.488 
Vattimo and Taylor’s hermeneutic suggests that the ‘Other’ as a ‘horizontal 
transcendence’ is realized through the Verwindung of all ‘strong’ claims. It is within 
kenotic charity and agape, in the experience of the ‘sacred’, it is the ‘transcendent’ in 
the ‘other’ in ‘dialogue’ and loving ‘friendship’.  Thus, re-discovered post-secular 
religion is a religion of ‘being-for-the-(O)ther’. The ‘Other’ in the ‘re-discovered’ 
religion is not that of Levinas and Derrida: the capital ‘O’ of the other owes its capital 
to Verwindung and incarnation, leading to kenotic charity and agape as realized in the 
‘other’. Hence, what is important is not the technique of ‘hermeneutics’ but rather ‘the 
meaning’, expression and ‘sense’ of its relation to humans as self-interpreting animals. 
‘Meaning’ gives an ontological and teleological purpose to an individual’s life 
achieved through a dialogical relationship with the ‘other’ which presupposes a 
renewed religious, ethical, and moral involvement. Tellingly, the hermeneutical 
deconstruction of secularisation by Vattimo and Taylor gives ‘meaning’ to the ‘Other’ 
in the ‘other’ of post-modernity.  
According to Taylor, to acknowledge the transcendent involves changing one’s 
identity. He explains this with the help of the anatta of Buddhism. Annatta means ‘a 
change from ‘self’ to ‘no self’. It is a radical de-centering of the self in relation to God 
and the other. It is centering one’s will to the ‘other’ through the ‘Other’ (CM, 21). As 
for Levinas, “the self cannot survive by itself alone, cannot find meaning within its 
own being-in-the-world, within the ontology of sameness.”489  Rowan Williams 
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observes that the specific reality of the human self is not totally rejected, “but it is 
dethroned or decentered. To discover who I am, I need to discover the relation in which 
I stand to an active, prior Other, to a transcendent creator: I do not first sort out who I 
am and then seek for resources to sustain that identity.”490 The dethroning and 
decentering of oneself happens through a dialectical relationship with the other. It is 
because, for Taylor, “one of the crucial features of the human condition that has been 
rendered almost invisible by the overwhelmingly monological bent of mainstream 
modern philosophy is his (man’s) dialogical nature.”491 Taylor stresses the unique role 
language plays in recognizing the ‘significant other’.492  
For Vattimo, it means turning inward to oneself. When “you turn inward you must also 
try to listen to others like you” (ADG, 42). Who are ‘others like you?” Matthew E. 
Harris clarifies that “[I]t is likely that Vattimo considers those ‘like you’ only as those 
people interested in listening to the sending of Being as ‘weakening’, that ‘like you’ 
means those people who realize both they and their beliefs are contingent and 
historically situated; in other words, that one should only listen to other people who 
have put friendship before objective truth.”493 Putting friendship before objective truth 
frees one from the addiction to power, present presence, present Being, but listening 
to the forgotten, to the loser, and to the history of the forgotten.494 For Vattimo, not 
listening to the other is a sin. Listening to the other is thinking back, an andenken, 
paying attention to what was lost.495 Listening to the other is an attitude of 
revolutionary nihilism: “Now that God is dead we can love one another!”496 This leads 
to the acceptance and return of the repressed and to the embrace of the ‘other’.497  It 
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orients one towards a “humanity concerned with the desire for the ‘Other’ in every 
‘other’, looking through and with the history of all, – Jews, Christians, Muslims, 
Confucians, Shintoists, and others – without ignoring their hostilities, reducing their 
differences, or submitting to their institutions.”498 Significantly, if re-discovered 
religion in post-secularity is a religion of ‘being-for-the-(O)ther, it is concerned with 
desire for the ‘Other’ in “every” ‘other’. “Every” other here leads to a pluralistic 
conception of the present situation. “Every other” has a broad implication of including 
all other believers, political ideologies, cultural and linguistic diversities. It relativizes 
single and absolute truth claims of any sort. 
From the religious perspective Rowan Williams describes pluralism as “the conviction 
that no particular religious tradition has the full or final truth: each perceives a valid 
but incomplete part of it.”499 Pluralism implies that no faith can or should make claims 
for itself as the only route to perfection or salvation. Pluralism means religious 
inclusivism, tolerance, dialogue, and diversity. It indicates also that no country, 
political party, culture, or language, have absolute claim to superiority or supremacy 
over the other. Pluralism envisions a society composed of different lifestyles, 
philosophies, and options. Williams gives the example of India, declaring itself a 
secular state with independence making a clear option for a certain kind of public and 
political neutrality, “acknowledging that to be a citizen of India could not be something 
that depended on any particular communal identity, and that the state could not 
intervene in religious disagreements except in so far as they become socially 
disruptive.”500 Nicholas Davey notes that “the commitments to the very truths which 
individuate my community from another actually impel me ironically towards 
engagement with the foreign community.”501 For Davey, it is a hermeneutic inter-
dependence because one does not have final command or authority over the meanings 
that shape one’s horizon, and adds that “I have to grant the logical possibility that the 
other can perhaps reveal something of the truths that remain hidden to me.”502 Hence, 
pluralistic hermeneutics can bridge the dichotomies growing around the planet where 
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my truth claims do open a space for the ‘other’, to reveal much more clearly the truth 
that is partially hidden within me because the ‘other’ is not alienated from me.  
For Taylor, pluralism is the most significant characteristic of ‘the secular age’. The 
secular age “is a pluralist world, in which many forms of belief and unbelief jostle, 
and hence fragile each other” (SA, 531).  Being the most important feature of ‘the 
secular age’, pluralism should be the uncontested starting point of contemporary 
liberal, political and religious theory. Political and religious pluralism will survive and 
become a signature of post-modernity, if seen as the outgrowth of the historic tensions 
about sovereignty, absolutism, and the integrity of local Christian communities.503 If 
every society in the West were genuinely Christian, the political philosophy of every 
society would embrace religious variety and cultural hospitality. Williams also 
observes that true religion upholds human rights, that is, it does not enforce religious 
claims and respects, and demands the dignity of all persons. True religion is all about 
freedom to and for the other, and not freedom from the other. It is “a vision of 
democracy that is about the constant search for ways of ensuring that even the most 
marginal and deprived has a voice; a search for the convergent morality in public life, 
not a separation between minimal public order and private moral preferences; and a 
climate of artistic creation that evokes something of the richness of the human subject 
when it is opened up to the holy.”504  
Pluralism, conversely, is about recognizing the ‘other’ in his/her richness and 
depravity. It is a political, religious, cultural, and linguistic liberalism that attributes 
catholicity to the returned non-religious religion. The word katholou can have two 
related meanings implying universality and wholeness. Taylor parses these as 
universality through wholeness (CM, 14). It is not about striving to make other beliefs, 
nations, and cultures to fit our own frameworks. For Taylor (and Vattimo), the event 
of incarnation, ‘the weaving of God’s life into human lives that are different, plural, 
and irreducible to each other’, brings redemption, and this results in reconciliation and 
oneness. “This is the oneness of diverse beings who come to see that they cannot attain 
wholeness alone, that their complementarity is essential, rather than of beings who 
come to accept that they are ultimately identical. Or perhaps we might put it: both 
complementarity and identity will be part of our ultimate oneness” (CM, 14). It is 
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overcoming the ‘historical temptation’ to privilege ‘sameness’, enclosing as many as 
possible in one particular religion. Catholicity has failed, “because it fails wholeness; 
unity bought at the price of suppressing something of the diversity in the humanity that 
God created; unity of the part masquerading as the whole” (CM, 14). Each religion, 
polity, and culture striving for universality through wholeness is truly ‘Catholic’, post-
modern and post-secular. It aims at a ‘unity-across-difference, as against unity-
through-identity’ (CM, 14). Tellingly, the characteristic feature of returned religion is 
that the ‘other’ will play a significant role in unveiling what is hidden within ourselves. 
Accordingly, “I come to appreciate that his or her way of responding differently to a 
subject matter of his or her own very different way of thinking about an existential 
concern is capable of revealing something about their own horizon such that I come to 
think about an aspect of myself and my commitments differently.”505 Davey observes 
that through a dialogic hermeneutic, “a meaning can be better expressed, a value more 
comprehensively embodied.”506 Appreciating his or her own difference, and learning 
to learn from him or her that I understand myself better and change or adapt my 
convictions accordingly, is the ethics of alterity possible only through love/caritas, 
and not in the stringent claims of truth. Caritas, in this sense is the divine call to the 
hermeneutic of friendship which is one of the features of rediscovered and returned 
religion.  Since caritas is the result of secularisation, narratives of secularisation can 
be further individually constructed in dialogue with the ‘other’. By ‘other’, I also mean, 
art, literature, aesthetics, language, society as a whole, and in the context of a given 
culture, religion, environmental equilibrium, and climate change. 
The relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ is sustained only through affirming a 
relationship with the world (the environment). The planet’s history is not exhausted by 
the history of one particular culture and technology, but is sustained and preserved by 
each human being. Here, I suggest a more comprehensive meaning to “being-for-the-
other”; unfolding the prospect of relating to ‘the other’ to nature and the environment.   
The alterity in post-modernity giving priority to the hermeneutic of pluralism embraces 
horizontal transcendence. In this hermeneutic of pluralism, the whole of nature is to 
be looked at as ‘the other’. “We cannot as humans oblige the environment to follow 
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our agenda in all things, and the human force is incapable of changing”507 any of the 
natural laws of the world. As ‘the other’ the human person is distinct, one’s genuine 
religiosity leads to respect, and aims to protect and sustain him/her -  so too with ‘the 
environment’ and the material world. This entails that we do not consider relationships 
centered on us, or our agendas, but “liberating persons and environments from 
possession and the exploitation that comes from it.”508 ‘Liberating’ is to be free of 
‘claims and possessions’ and ‘to stand back’ allowing nature to take its course. This 
does not entail a passivity but rather a taking responsibility to preserve and direct the 
powers of nature. A truer religious “fulfilment is bound up with the work of conserving 
and focusing those powers (in nature), and the exercise of this work…(should) draw 
out potential treasures in the powers of nature and so realise the convergent process of 
humanity and nature discovering in collaboration what they can become.”509 This 
preservation shall be a shared responsibility for deliberately protecting the 
environment from exploitation and “to secure a space for the natural order to exist 
unharmed.”510 One’s responsibility to preserve and sustain the natural order should 
feed into responses to wider economic and social malaises. The responsibility of 
protecting the future of the non-human world, is a bond with the ‘Other’, and 
appropriately honours the special dignity given to the ‘other’. According to Williams, 
“living in a way that honours rather than threatens the planet is a living out…what we 
are as human beings (in the image of God).”511 Living in a way that honours the other 
is a constant reorientation on one’s part towards upholding justice regarding what is 
growth, wealth, and climate change. It is an invitation to have a renewed approach to 
ecology, and climate change, that challenges one to change one’s present pattern of 
life towards a transformation of individual and social goals. Each pattern of growth 
either individual or collective must be oriented towards a pluralistic approach to the 
whole of creation leading to the ‘Other’, (vertical transcendence) through caritas; 
leading to the ‘other’ (horizontal transcendence).  
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8.1.3 Caritas Takes Precedence over Veritas  
The objectivism of classical metaphysics, (and thus the absoluteness of ‘truth’ in 
Western thought) underwent a paradigm shift with the introduction of ‘weak thought’. 
The weakening/secularisation/Verwindung of metaphysics leading to the dissolution 
of all strong truth claims parallels kenosis. According to Erick Meganck, “Vattimo 
takes kenosis as the model of the destiny of ontology”;512 ‘the God-returned’ distances 
himself from the Eternal Origin and His transcendent divinity. Vattimo argues that 
truth becomes a purely ‘worldly’ matter without any external, metaphysical or sacred 
reference.513 The eventual nature of ‘truth’ and ‘being’ provides the dynamic for the 
ongoing process of the weakening of reality through secularisation/kenosis. 
 
For Vattimo, the only possible limit/end of secularisation/kenosis is the hermeneutic 
of caritas/charity (B, 62-65, AC, 41 and 48, ADG, 39). Caritas leads to a profound 
understanding of the biblical message, which has an impact on ‘all spheres of life as 
the post-modern and nihilistic outcome of modernisation seen effectively in cultural, 
political, and social pluralism’. Significantly, caritas is one of the prominent features 
of the post-modern return to or reimagined religion. Vattimo, in Belief, articulates that 
the return and realization of Christianity is possible through preference for love, rather 
than for justice, severity, and the majesty of God (B, 64). Charity could be thought of 
as “a meta-rule that obliges and pushes us to accept the different language games, the 
different rules of the language games” (FR, 59).  
The word ‘caritas’ has its root in the old French charité, meaning charity, mercy, 
compassion, as well as in the Latin caritatem, meaning costliness, esteem, affection. 
In the Vulgate, caritas is often used as the translation of the Greek agape, meaning 
‘love’, especially Christian love for fellow man, and friendship.514 For Ricoeur, love 
is “initially a discourse of praise, where in praising, one rejoices over the view of one 
object set above all other objects of one’s concern - it is rejoicing, seeing, and setting 
above all else…”515 Augustine embraces a break with the classical Roman notion of 
friendship (amicitia) ‘self-denying, neighbour preferring’ friendship for caritas. For 
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Augustine, “caritas is love seeking its proper object and resting in it once possessed; 
it is cleaving to God.”516 Thomas Aquinas says, “charity loves a goodness that our 
senses cannot perceive: God’s goodness, which only our minds can know.”517 Marion 
develops the concept of ‘love’ which is able to “transcend my lived experiences and 
my consciousness in order to reach a pure alterity.”518 Caritas can also be understood 
in relation to Taylor’s use of agape. For Taylor, agape is not just our love for God, but 
God’s love for us. This divine love namely purifies and empowers our own love. 
Timothy Jackson says that agape entails “unconditional commitment to the good of 
others” and “equal regard for the worth of other.”519  
Caritas is the root for such concepts as ‘costliness’, ‘setting above all else’, ‘resting in 
the object once possessed’, ‘God’s goodness’, ‘pure alterity’, ‘agape’, ‘unconditional 
commitment’, etc. I use caritas, charity, and love interchangeably. Vattimo formulates 
his own variant of a nihilistic hermeneutic, which he envisions as positive, and 
affirmative. Through the transformative and creative potential of this hermeneutic 
thinking, he tries to overcome the problems of the onto-theological metaphysics of 
Heidegger and Nietzsche. Significantly, God’s return in caritas has to be understood 
as a postmodern epistemo-theological return. According to Erick Meganck, 
“[R]evelation is now completely accomplished in a nihilistic, endless way: Christianity 
means keeping thought away from petrifying into truth, fact, and reality. It is pure 
Christian caritas in that it does away with the violence of the metaphysical and sacred 
and thereby discourages all human attempts towards violence.”520 Even Christ’s 
message grew with history through the process of the weakening of moral-
metaphysical truth claims, ultimately leading to caritas. The ‘growth’ of Christ’s 
message further diffused the dogmatic teachings of the Church leading to the ‘weak’ 
interpretation of strong claims resulting in alterity and caritas. As already mentioned 
in Chapter Four, “the future of Christianity is thus more purified and based on pure 
love” (ADG, 45).  
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The hermeneutical consequence of ‘truth’ is that it is increasingly determined by 
agreement with others. Vattimo observes, “We do not, and perhaps cannot, agree when 
we have found the truth, but we may say that at least we have found some truth when 
we have agreed upon something” (ADG, 43, CTWF, 51). Truth is respecting the 
opinion of others, their choices and their values. Something becomes the truth when it 
is shared. It is the dissolution of truth claims that allows ‘the truth’ in mutual agreement 
and alterity, to emerge as caritas. If there is something that is true, it is not something 
given to someone once and for all. It must happen in dialogue, which in itself is the 
result of charity. Thomas G. Guarino observes that the actual truth of every religion 
should be the renunciation of “aggressive truth claims and the diffusion of religious 
particularity into secularised universality, thereby fostering a sense of fraternity and 
solidarity among all people.”521 The whole of the Mosaic law was diffused into the 
love of God and neighbour. The similar theme orients the post-modern returned 
religion, “whereby a whole host of doctrinal and moral teaching are being reduced, or 
better still, diffused into caritas.”522 Brian Schroeder, in conjunction with Vattimo 
observes that truth is an event, that is, a transformative occurrence, with an experiential 
character. The experience of truth is connected to the nihilistic hermeneutic and is 
emancipatory leading towards caritas.523 For Franca D’Agostino, truth should be seen 
in a rhetorical rather than logical perspective. There is ‘no truth properly’ but what is 
experienced is an ‘intersubjective agreement on the topics of common use’. “We are 
in fact exploring the nature and extension of that agreement”524 in mutual friendship. 
According to Gaetano Chiurazzi, “every experience of truth requires an interpretation, 
and therefore that truth is interpretation. In its undergoing feature, the experience of 
truth is the experience of an interpretation of meaning. It proposes that 1) there is truth, 
2) one has experience of truth, 3) such experience is of an interpretive kind, and 4) 
hermeneutics is a theory not of truth but of the experience of truth.”525 
The de-sacralising and weakening of Christianity fundamentally points towards the 
idea that “God is not the content of a true proposition but is actually someone increased 
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in Jesus Christ, and Jesus Christ is an exemplar of charity…God is a person who walks 
among us and left us an example of charity.” (CTWF, 48-49). The diffused and 
recovered nonreligious religion orients followers towards a dogma that does not rely 
on ‘truth claims’, but rather reasons of charity. Richard Kearney observes, “the truth 
that will make one free should be true because it frees one. If truth does not make you 
free, it is because there is no caritas in it…”526 Therefore, not only the reimagined 
form of post-modern religion, but also conventional traditional religions should strive 
towards a formulation of ‘truth’ that leads to mutual agreement, and friendship. The 
truth that is communalized generates the evolution of a community where religious 
enquirers have to compromise their individual positions to reach a collective 
understanding of truth. The community of ‘religious truth enquirers’ is possible when 
individuals give up their metaphysical truth claims, and adhere to communitarian truth 
claims.  Guarino quotes Walter Kasper527 who echoes Vattimo’s thought and is 
influenced by the post-modern turn of religious pluralism and fraternity. “The most 
significant results of ecumenism in the last decades – and also the most gratifying – 
are not the various documents, but rediscovered fraternity: the fact that we have 
rediscovered one another…”528 Henceforth, the reintroduction of religious discourse 
in post-modernity is based not on ‘aggressive claims’ but on fraternity, and caritas; to 
which the major religions of the West show a positive orientation.   
The traces of the hermeneutic of diffusion and the weakening of absolute truth claims 
can be perceived in most of the major religions of the world. In weakening itself, a 
particular religion should be able to ‘shun’ its traditional religious particularities. 
Vattimo rightly observes it from his Christian background; “I, too, define myself as 
Christian because I believe that Christianity is more ‘true’ than all other religions 
precisely on account of the fact that there is a sense in which it is not a religion…I 
personally am convinced that I do believe inasmuch as I strive to respect charity…” 
(CTWF, 52-53). Joseph Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI) in his encyclicals emphasises 
the need to foster the hermeneutic of caritas. In his writings, he addresses the 
challenging task of clarifying the social and political significance of Christian 
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charity.529 In Deus Caritas Est, Ratzinger contends that God’s love for humanity is 
most profoundly revealed in Jesus’ crucifixion, which is an event of God turning 
against God’s self for the salvation of humanity. The response of this loving 
relationality is to create a network of loving communities, always open to others.530 
Caritas envisioned here is the recognition of the transcendent value of each person, 
seeing in others, a uniqueness, and giving others the look of love for which they crave 
(Deus Caritas Est, 22). Caritas in Veritate insists that love is the principle of every 
type of human development; it also includes the macro-relationships of society, 
politics, economy, and environment.531 Pope Francis in Amoris Laetitia observes that 
love co-exists with imperfection and is the companion of the weak. He says; “[W]e 
need a healthy dose of self-criticism…We have long thought that simply by stressing 
doctrinal and moral issues, without encouraging openness to grace, we provide 
sufficient support to human persons.”532 Rowan Williams in God and Habits of 
Language remarks that only at the point where language breaks down (dogmatic 
language) can we encounter God’s true likeness.533 It is a pure form of caritas, where 
one gives place to God on earth and takes responsibility for God’s appearing.534 It is 
giving shelter to a vulnerable divine presence, a giving life in all circumstance. These 
remarks suggest that caritas is central to the post-modern return of religion. 
The eventual nature of ‘truth’, (its diffusion into the realm of ordinary experience) and 
the distinctiveness of a hermeneutic of caritas in reimagined religion, forms the core 
of my argument. Caritas takes precedence over truth. This proposition that caritas 
taking precedence over veritas is not targeted at theological or dogmatic truth claims. 
It resists the metaphysical violence of traditional truth claims replacing them with 
charity and dialogue. It initiates ethical ‘precedence’ not an aesthetic or logical 
precedence. It is an ‘ethical precedence’ because caritas can be described as a post-
modern and weakened form of Kant’s categorical imperative.535 The ‘truthfulness’ of 
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charity that takes precedence over the epistemological and metaphysical truth claims. 
The experience of truth here, becomes an interpretive dialogical charity. Though truth 
and love are theologically compatible; Nietzschean nihilism is the prelude to 
hermeneutical charity. Caritas taking precedence over truth can be seen as a 
hermeneutic of Verwindung, but not Ửberwindung, not a radical precedence over truth, 
but rather a healing, and remedying precedence. Metaphysical truth claims are healed 
and recuperated into a realm where truth becomes both experience and event. Taylor’s 
use of ‘new language’ and the ‘experience of love’ (SA, 729) by individuals who have 
the experience of conversion can be equated with this experience of truth in caritas. 
This hermeneutic of caritas also can be considered as the result of ‘language turn’. 
Caritas is the result of secularisation/kenosis; being so, caritas is the ‘thought’, 
‘feeling’, or ‘meaning’ of kenosis. Whenever an individual self is able to disenchant 
itself from an absolute claim, there is an experience of caritas. Caritas, and the 
dialogical, experiential, and eventual nature of truth becomes the inner disposition of 
‘the disenchanted self’ who has the freedom either to ‘close’ or ‘open’ himself/herself 
to the immanent frame in a reimagined nonreligious religion of post-modernity. 
Admittedly, it should also be acknowledged that there is a deep rooted ontological 
intertwining between truth and charity. Truth is sought, found, and expressed in 
charity; and charity is understood, confirmed, and practiced in the light of its own truth.  
Erick Meganck critiques the concept of truth as sustained and fostered by caritas. 
Meganck explains: 
…caritas does not banish the notion of truth from philosophy. Truth in late-
modernity has, however, left its transcendent and objectivist presumptions behind 
and becomes a truth that finds its validity in a historical socio-ethical immanence. 
Caritas is not a theoretical concept that describes a situation adequately and 
therefore will change whenever the situation changes. Caritas does not change with 
praxis, it is praxis. Caritas became visible in ethical thought, in pietas, and is 
therefore unable to rely on any theoretical scheme. Caritas can only stay true to itself 
by remaining loyal to the message of Christ, of love. To paraphrase Augustine: 
‘Love, and then say whatever you want.536  
Praxis and ethically oriented caritas in post-modernity should be understood as 
resembling the notion of truth that requires an interpretation for its appropriate 
meaning as an interpretation; an interpretation that brings in reciprocity and alterity. 
In its persistent feature, the experience of truth is the experience of an interpretation of 
meaning. Significantly, it should be noted that the hermeneutic of truth fostered by 
                                                          




caritas in post-modernity is not the object of any hard-fought absolute knowledge but 
rather takes the form of an experience. “It is not the telos of a specific and 
methodological activity but rather that in which we are constantly immerged and that 
escapes our ability to mastery.”537 For Taylor, to be a Christian, is to have faith and an 
anticipatory confidence that one is “standing among others in a stream of love which 
that facet of God’s life we try to grasp, very inadequately” (SA, 701). If one can be 
inspired by such an experience of love in community, it can lead towards a much more 
powerful and effective healing action in history (SA, 703). The neopragmatism of 
Rorty and the communicative action of Habermas also note the proximity of truth to 
charity. “For both thinkers, no experience of truth can exist without some kind of 
participation in a community, and not necessarily the closed community (parish, 
province, or family) of the communitarians” (FR, 51). For Gadamer, truth comes as 
the ongoing construction of communities that coincides in a fusion of horizons, which 
has no inseparable “objective” limit… (FR, 51). As discussed in Chapter Four, the 
central role of the ‘Other’ in Levinas, the philosophy of communication in Habermas, 
and the theory of charity in Davidson also contribute to the centrality of the 
hermeneutic of caritas.  
Admittedly, it should be noted that Vattimo’s Nietzschean nihilism and Heidegger’s 
Ereignis which make caritas the ultimate meaning of revelation, are not truly ultimate 
(B, 39). Accordingly, Harris observes; “[C]aritas is, not a moral absolute or 
transcendent principle, but it is the only limit of secularisation (AC, 48, ADG, 39).”538 
It is this ‘limit’ or lack of there being an absolute caritas that enables nonreligious 
religious members to still speak of truth. Opinions, choices and values will become 
truth when they are shared in caritas. Each religion should move in a direction that 
further weakens its ethical code in favour of practical charity. This transformation 
towards further weakening and charity should eventually replace truth. Accordingly, 
“[T]he future of Christianity, and also of the church, is to become a religion of pure 
love, always more purified…Charity is the presence of God,” (ADG, 44-45).   
Vattimo in his recent dialogue with Richard Kearney clarifies the precedence of charity 
over truth. He proposes a post-atheistic transcendence of God after God where charity 
should take precedence over truth, moving away from a God of metaphysical power 
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and conceptual idolatry.539 He explains the role of charity in the nonreligious religion 
of God after God as follows: “[T]his love penetrates the soul of a believer that he/she 
is able to worship God exclusively in the form of service to others, not only without 
dogmas and holy offices but also without churches and rites, most of all without 
hierarchical divisions between clergy and layman…”540 Santiago Zabala in his 
criticism of the Catholic Church notes that the future of the Church as an institution in 
the twenty-first century necessitates a diffusion of all structural powers including the 
papacy. The Papacy should not be above the world, as the head of the church, but in 
the church as, in the words of Pope Gregory the Great, the “servant of the servants of 
God.”541 The challenge of the future church will be to convince itself that charity must 
take pride of place, “looking at a map of faith without precepts and, most of all, without 
the image of a metaphysical God.”542 (FR, 16). Vattimo and Zabala continue to observe 
that the truth that shall make you free (Jn 8:32) is not the objective truth of theology 
and natural sciences. The scriptural revelation contains no explanation of how God is 
made or how to save ourselves through knowledge of the truth. “The only truth that 
the Bible reveals to us is the practical appeal to love, to charity. The truth of 
Christianity is the dissolution of the metaphysical concept of truth itself” (FR, 14, 50-
51). Vattimo observes that Christianity should recognize that the redemptive meaning 
of the Christian message makes its impact precisely by dissolving the claims of 
objectivity. The church must also finally heal the tension between truth and charity 
that has tormented it throughout its history (FR, 50).  
The hermeneutic of charity taking precedence over truth relates to postmodern nihilism 
and the end of metanarratives. “It (suggests) a moving away from the sacral horizon 
of the beginnings” (NE, 31). It is a move which constituted the core of a secularised 
and weakened concept of the divine. It relates to salvation and emancipation from the 
strong structures of violent impositions and hierarchies. “As Nietzsche’s nihilism 
teaches, emancipation is brought about by the realization that “God is dead, and now 
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we wish for many gods to live” (NE, xxvi). Therefore, hermeneutic nihilism and 
relativism of a constructive type is required to weigh the sustainability of the religion 
of post-modernity. This means that the hermeneutic of caritas assumes the truth of the 
reimagined returned religion of post-secular and post-modern Christianity. A 
postmodern nonreligious human, living with a ‘weak’ conception of truth, learns to 
live in his impermanency, able to practice solidarity and charity.   
 
8.1.4 From Sacred to Secular: An Exodus and a Transition 
The principal purpose of my research, as the title of the dissertation suggests, is to 
argue de-constructively that secularisation is an “Exodus and a Transition from Sacred 
to Secular.” Conventional secularist scholarship defends secularisation as an ongoing 
process of diffusion from the ‘sacred to the secular’. Relying on the accounts of 
Vattimo and Taylor, my account of secularisation contrasts with this understanding. 
With the help of Vattimo and Taylor, I suggest that the movement from ‘sacred to 
secular’ entails a movement from ‘sacred to a better/purified secular sacred’. One 
significant question is whether this process of secularisation is best thought of as an 
‘exodus and a transition’.  
To reach the conclusion of a non-religious religion, (the result of secularisation), 
Taylor asks “what does it mean to say that we live in a secular age?” The historical 
process of secularisation profoundly re-situates the place of religion in post-modernity. 
An individual self in a ‘secularised nonreligious society’ envisions his/her faith as 
‘personal’, and not based on any metaphysical and dogmatic truth claims. Taylor offers 
a credible historical-genealogical analysis of the development of Western society, 
especially of those aspects of modernity which he calls ‘the immanent frame’. We have 
seen how the conversion from the ‘immanent frame’ or the shift into nonreligious 
religion is in fact not a single, but rather a continuous transformation, a series of new 
departures, in which earlier forms of religious life have been dissolved or destabilized 
into new ones both purified and refined. Consequently, today’s secular world is 
characterized not by an absence of religion, but by a continuing magnification of new 
options, religious, spiritual, (and anti-religious), which individuals and groups seize 
upon, in order to make sense of their lives and give shape to their spiritual aspirations. 
Prompted by Nietzsche and Heidegger, Vattimo deals with the question of history and 
the transition from modern to postmodern experience, - the so-called experience of the 
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end of history. He articulates this as the transition from ‘strong thinking’ to ‘weak 
thinking’. He admits a parallel between Western Christian tradition and the thinking 
of being, as Ereignis. If this relation is accepted, it creates a basis for philosophy and 
the assumption for a critical approach to religion, which ‘returns’ again in the post-
metaphysical and post-modern epoch as ‘the religion of being for the other’.  
Admittedly, both Vattimo and Taylor’s narrative of secularisation effects a paradigm 
shift in the conventional understanding of religion and secularism. Vattimo gives an 
account in which religious experience moves from transcendence to secularism, not in 
order to deny transcendence but to acknowledge it. It is a transition in that 
transcendence is shared in the immanent. For Taylor, there occurs an historical 
evolution of secularism, which is an intellectual evolution, in which historical religions 
undergo a transition through the social imaginaries, through cultural and political shifts 
in history, and by replacing the transcendental with personal religious experiences. A 
different grammar to their thinking can be observed here. For Vattimo, secularisation 
is a circular experience, an exodus, in which he himself is a participant. For Taylor, 
secularisation is a linear progress, a transition, to which he is only a witness or 
spectator.  It transforms the transcendent and in so doing becomes available to the 
ordinary and secular. It is not in the transcendent being changed into the secular; but 
rather, the secular transforming the transcendent to yield truer religious experience, 
that secularisation becomes an inevitability. Religious experience is a fundamental 
aspect of human experience (unlike play), that continues to shape and guide human 
history. Hermeneutically, religious experience is a culturally and historically emergent 
phenomenon and not unlike politics and art, always refined by history. It is 
fundamentally an on-going process of improvement, change, and transition, shaped by 
its own concern.  
In what way is ‘the paradigm shift’ that follows Vattimo and Taylor’s secular narrative, 
an ‘exodus’ and a ‘transition?’ The historical and hermeneutical process of 
secularisation from ‘sacred to secular’ (or ‘from sacred to a better understanding of 
sacred’) is both an exodus and a transition. The vein of this argument of exodus and 
transition is the hermeneutic of Verwindung.  Primarily, exodus is “a situation in 
which many people leave a place at the same time.”543 According to Michael R. 
Collings, “exodus is an outward journey toward a new world, a new home…to reach 
                                                          
543 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/exodus, accessed on 22/08/2016.  
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a final place to home before doubling back on itself to encompass changes 
throughout the universe. The journey entails a life-long series of crucial events, each 
testing, altering, strengthening the individual.”544 For Bloch (religious) exodus is both 
ontologically and determinately historically oriented towards the promise of a 
salvation that is always hidden from common life, as an obscure promise. He explains 
this as follows; “Instead of the finished goal there now appears a promised goal that 
must first be achieved; instead of the visible nature of God there appears an invisible 
God of righteousness and of the kingdom of righteousness.”545  
‘Exodus’ is a situation, in which many people leave a particular place. It is an outward 
journey towards a new world in order to reach a new place. It encompasses changes 
throughout the world. There is always a hidden and at the same time promised goal in 
exodus. Exodus can be the ontological and historical ‘presentness’ of the individual 
self and the realm of sacred/God could be seen as the promise and futurity of the self. 
The hermeneutics of ‘the death of God’ and the Verwindung of metaphysics, (and thus 
the secularisation of dogmatic and objective truth claims) is in fact an exodus, a leaving 
behind of the metaphysical realms, coming to terms with the indelible promise of 
Christianity, and moving towards renewed reflection. One will never be able to return 
to where one started, because one experiences an unparalleled and an indelible promise 
of charity in this exodus. It is a constant process of transformation, during which one 
does not arrive at one’s pre-determined point. What is important is the dynamic of 
exodus, i.e., charity and the communalising truth experienced by dialogue. Setting out, 
journeying, and reaching the end are only techniques of the modality of exodus. What 
is important is the dynamic, the divine/sacred who himself, is the exodus. Both 
Vattimo and Taylor have an optimistic expectation of the dynamic of secularisation, 
though one will never be able to realises its promises entirely, but only through 
dialogical charity. Our spiritual pursuit is a constant struggle in which divinity is part  
(an invisible God of righteousness), a horizontal transcendence that we never attain 
but share in charity.  
                                                          
544 Michael R. Collings, Towards Other Worlds: Perspectives on John Milton, C. S. Lewis, Stephen King, 
Orson Scott, and Others, United Kingdom: Borgo Press, 2010, p. 267. 
545Chris Thornhill, “Utopian Emancipation: Bloch,” in Edinburgh Encyclopedia of Continental 
Philosophy, Ed., Simon Glendenning, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 485-487, and 
Chris quotes Earnest Bloch, The Principle of Hope, trans. N. and S. plaice and P. Knight, Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1986, PP. 1233-4. 
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Secondly, transition means “a passage from one state, stage, subject, or place to 
another, or a movement, development, or evolution from one form, stage, or 
style to another.546 According to Terry Pinkard, “to understand (an historical) 
transition, we must understand it as it was lived on the ‘inside’ by those living through 
it, and to understand what it was like on the ‘inside’ we must understand the forces 
and facts that were impinging on agents from the ‘outside’.547 Evaluating Taylor’s 
narrative of secularisation and historical transition, Pinkard observes that this 
transition need not always be rational. This is due to the fact that the change from old 
beliefs to new always results in being asymmetrical, and partly due to the gradual 
destruction of the practices, the language, and the culture that sustained the earlier 
beliefs.548 Accordingly, for Taylor, ‘transition’ is an historical, genealogical, and 
linguistic process. It is not an organised but an irregular change in the earlier beliefs.   
For William Bridges, transition means a gradual, extended, or unfinished change. 
However, to clearly appreciate the meaning of ‘transition’, it should be differentiated 
from the term ‘change’. “Change is situational: the reduction in the work force, the 
shift in the strategy, and the switch in reporting relationships are all changes.”549 
Nonetheless, transition has a three-phase psychological reorientation process. Bridges 
explains: 
 It begins with an ending—with people letting go of their old reality and their old 
identity. Unless people can make a real ending, they will be unable to make a successful 
beginning. After the ending, people go into the second phase of transition, the neutral 
zone. This is a no-man’s land where people wander between two worlds. The neutral 
zone is a time and a state of being in which the old behaviours and attitudes die out, and 
people go dormant for a while as they prepare to move out in a new direction.550 
 Accordingly, ‘transition’ means ‘a passage from one stage/state to another’, and ‘a 
progressive evolution’.551 A transition is an internal (inside) process of a system lived 
                                                          
546 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transition, and 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/tr ansition, accessed on 23/08/2016.  
547 Terry Pinkard, “Taylor, “History,” and the History of Philosophy,” in Charles Taylor: Contemporary 
Philosophy in Focus, Ed., Ruth Abbey, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 200. 
548 Terry Pinkard, p. 201.  
549 William Bridges, “Getting them through the Wilderness: A Leader’s Guide to Transition,” in William 
Bridges and Associates: Resources for Organisations in Transition, 
http://www.wmbridges.com/pdf/getting-thru-wilderness-2006-v2.pdf, accessed on 3/07/2016. 
Bridges concept of ‘transition’ is generally concerns economic changes and organisational crisis 
management and development. I use this to explain the process of secularisation in Vattimo and 
Taylor, as transition and exodus which bring in historical changes, and development in religious 
experience and the understanding of the sacred.  
550 William Bridges, “Getting them through the Wilderness: A Leader’s Guide to Transition.” 
551 However, I acknowledge that there are also negative reforms leading to destruction and division, 
not re-discovery and construction.  
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and experienced by those inside, having compelling external influences and forces. 
Transition is always gradual, prolonged, and on-going without a specified culmination 
point. It begins with an end, the precondition for a successful beginning. There is also 
a neutral zone or no-man’s land in every transition before moving into a new direction. 
Both for Taylor and Vattimo, there is no displacement of ‘the hermeneutic of sacred’ 
(change is associated with displacement) is no displacement, but only a transformation 
which implies continuity. 
Taylor’s deconstructive and hermeneutical re-reading of the medieval and modern 
history of Christianity as a narrative of secularisation enables a process of transition. 
As discussed in Chapter Six, Taylor’s ‘self’ in the process of secularisation 
progressively transitional. The individual ‘self’ moves from one state/stage to another 
in a progressive evolution. The emergence of the ‘secular self’ as the ‘porous self’ (in 
the enchanted world), and ‘buffered self’ (in the disenchanted world) is ‘cross 
pressured’ in ‘the immanent frame’. It finally must decide either to ‘shut out’ or ‘break 
out’ of the immanent frame. The ‘internal’ movement of ‘the self’ in secularisation is 
always influenced by forces external to it. The ‘self’ in the enchanted world was 
impinged upon by external forces of spirits, magic, and moral forces. The formation 
of ‘the self-interpretability’ and ‘the embodiment’ of the ‘disenchanted self’ is set in 
motion by the ‘social imaginaries’ and ‘faith options’ in ‘the immanent frame’ leading 
either to ‘openness to conversion’ or ‘closure’. The Reform movements functioned as 
a ‘tool’ that assisted this transition of the ‘self’ through the centuries. First of all, 
Taylor’s ‘self-interpretive,’ ‘disengaged,’ and ‘moral and ethical’ self’s transition 
begins with ‘end’, with ‘porousness’ and ‘enchantment.’ Secondly, the self in 
transition is placed in a no-man’s land of ‘believing options’ and in a ‘nova effect.’ 
Finally, the ‘self’ being ‘cross pressured’ in the ‘nova effect’ decides to ‘close’ or 
‘open’ to conversion.  
As for Vattimo, secularisation as an on-going exodus, channels the substantial link 
between the history of Christian revelation and the history of nihilism that helped to 
interpret the history of the West and re-engage with Christianity. This “paved the way 
for a conception of secularisation characteristic of modern Western history, as an event 
within Christianity linked positively to Jesus, and to a conception of history of 
(Western) modernity as a weakening and the dissolution of Being” (B, 40-41). 
Significantly, the hermeneutic of weakening itself is a process of transition in human 
198 
 
history; a transition of all strong structures and strong truth claims, to weak and 
charitable structures and relationships. Accordingly, in conclusion, I suggest that 
Vattimo’s version of secularisation, (the hermeneutic of weak thought) is an exodus, 
which emphasises a departure from and a rethinking of the religious message of the 
West. This exodus liberates religion from metaphysics and leads to an anti-essentialist 
religion founded on kenotic-charity. Correspondingly, Taylor’s account of 
secularisation (secularityiii), is a historical transition towards the formation of the 
secular self; a ‘self’ that enables the post-modern man to re-think and to re-invent the 
























Mark A. Wrathall writes; “[A]ny reflection on religion after metaphysics, needs to be 
understood in terms of thought about the place of religion in an age where the 
understanding of being that legitimised certain traditional modes of conceptualising 
the sacred and the divine is called into question.”552 Vattimo and Taylor’s hermeneutic 
of secularism calls into question all traditional modes that conceptualise the sacred. 
Accordingly, the effects of Verwindung (of metaphysics and epistemology) and of the 
‘death of God’, allow for re-engaging with religion and a return to religion in the 
specific sense defined in this research. The dialogical hermeneutics of Vattimo, Taylor, 
and their interlocuters enable ‘God to return from the death of God’. In this return, 
metaphysical ‘gods’ are no longer a necessity, and the individual self presupposes a 
renewed return of religion which can become the ground of a new faith. In the returned 
religion, one believes because one can believe, not because one must or is commanded 
to.553 Reality in the Nietzschean and Heideggerian sense is a ‘game of interpretation’ 
and ‘this particular interpretation itself’ cannot be claimed to be a pure and objective 
mirror of the world. The inexhaustibility of interpretation and the language turn open 
the possibility of a hermeneutics where different languages provide different language 
games. Dialogically each of these ‘games’ adds to the experiences of the ‘the post-
secular’ mode of reality where ‘each game respect the boundaries of the other’. 
Accordingly, Taylor and Vattimo’s dialogical and non-foundationalist approach to 
Continental philosophy and their hermeneutical critique of metaphysics and modernity 
unmask the structures of the power in certain conceptions of the transcendent. This 
opens the way to an anti-essentialist religion founded on kenotic charity and being for 
the other.  
Re-evaluation of religion and secularism interpreted as diffusion and kenosis 
(weakening and secularisation), tries to show the modern transformations in power, as 
formulations that increasingly weaken the absoluteness of the ‘sacred’ person’s 
sovereignty. In this process, modern subjectivity is also secularised (B, 42). Weak 
thought and secularisation work as ‘paradigm examples’ to explain the modern 
transformations in power. It includes the transition and dissolution of the power sectors 
                                                          
552 Mark A. Wrathall, Religion after Metaphysics, p. 3.  
553 Eduardo Mendieta, “Secularisation as a Post-Metaphysical Religious Vocation,” in Between Nihilism 
and Politics: The Hermenutics of Gianni Vattimo, ed., Silvia Benso, and Brian Schroeder, New York: 
Sunny Press, 2010, pp. 149-166. 
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of ecclesiastical hierarchy, political dictatorship, patriarchal societies, etc. The 
secularised sacred envisions an authority and transcendence in dialogue and friendship 
with the other. Charity and dialogue become the norm of all religious, political and 
philosophical deliberations. The hermeneutic of charity and dialogue is further 
elaborated to include nature and the environment. “Hermeneutically speaking, there is 
always a “beyond” to interpretation, that is more interpretation.”554 The ‘beyond’ and 
inevitability of interpretation, furthers the futurity of the hermeneutic of the 
secularisation of Taylor and Vattimo. If so, secularisation (and religion re-imagined) 
has an inexhaustive role to play in post-modernity, post-secularity, and beyond. The 
‘beyond’ of the hermeneutics of secularisation rescinds its boundaries outside human-
history to encompass the whole of creation and ecology. This holistic ecological 
approach can be framed by the hermeneutic of charity and friendship. 
Vattimo, presents charity as the end/limit of secularisation. Alternatively, Taylor does 
not foresee an end but seems to advocate the unending and inexhaustible transition of 
the hermeneutic of secularism. The individual ‘self’ who has ‘the fullness and 
conversion experience’ (according to Taylor) is drawn into his or her own choice of 
religion and spiritual life. This may involve meditation, or some charitable work, a 
study group, a pilgrimage, or some special form of prayer.555 The sacred in this 
‘nonreligious religion’ includes the secular, though it is not of the secular. One cannot 
simply separate the two. The sacred is before us even before we are aware of it. “We 
do not cognize it but we re-cognize it.”556 The sacred is inside each other, and every 
organised religion should ‘secularise’ the ‘sacred’ to affirm ‘the everyday’ life of the 
human self. The sacred in nonreligious religion is always at distance and near; always 
departing and arriving; always a future possibility and a presentness. The search for 
and experience of the sacred is always an ‘exodus’ and a ‘transition’ for the self-
interpreting self. It is a departure both from metaphysicalism and absolutism, and the 
Nietzschean ‘death of God’. Individuals in this anticipated post-modernity are not a-
religious, un-religious or anti-religious but members of a ‘nonreligious’ religion in 
                                                          
554 Nicholas Davey, “Praxis and Impossibility of Hermeneutics? Reflections on Vattimo’s Beyond 
Interpretation and “The Future of Hermeneutics””, pp. 22-44. 
555 Richard Kearney observes that this can take “the form of art of Botticelli, Bach, or Bob Dylan through 
theosophical New Age movements, astrological readings or, more recently, forms of transcendental 
meditation and Yoga – a mix of Rumi and Ramakrishna. All these forms of spiritual journeying and self-
discovery can occur without any commitment to a denominational religious faith, with its inherited 
rites, creeds, practices and doctrines.” (Richard Kearney, Reimagining the Sacred, p. 15).   
556 Richard Kearney, p. 15. 
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which ‘charity takes precedence over ‘the claims of truth’. Since there is no end to the 
process of the hermeneutic of ‘weakening’ and ‘secularisation’, the never-exhaustible 
future of religion and the sacred will be ever evolving. 
Religion post-Vattimo and Taylor may well become a mode of hermeneutic being 
which forever unfolds itself through dialectic of faith and critique. The dialectic of 
faith and critique in an era of inexhaustible interpretation goes through a process of 
hermeneutic of assimilation and rejection. The process of ‘weakening’ and 
‘secularisation’ strengthen possibility of more interpretation regarding religion and the 
secular. Here, the negation of religion in modernity moves to a hermeneutic of re-
engaged of religion. The formal denial of religion through ‘a language’ itself 
dialectically and hermeneutically lead to the possibility of further transcendence. The 
language I use to deny means more than what I immediately mean, but the language 
implies more than what is literally implied, which is also true in the case of the 
hermeneutic of religion. My claim is that both Taylor and Vattimo’s hermeneutic of 
interpreting ‘secularism’ in its post-secular setting take them ‘beyond’ their own 
dialectic of secularism. Significantly, the hermeneutical, and existential outcome of 
this is the philosophical and ontological appropriation of the claim that ‘True Being 
never is, but sets itself on the path and sends itself, it trans-mits itself’ through the 
hermeneutic of interpretation, language and cultures. The eternal God exists through 
repetition, and repeats himself ad infinitum in language and interpretation. In the post-
secular setting, the hermeneutic of ‘Being’ is an ‘event’ that occurs, repeats, and 
appropriates to itself. As a result, re-engagement with the sacred involves a process of 












Overview: As was stated at the very outset of this thesis, our concern has been in some 
respects to the journey of ‘the dark night of the soul’ in Western philosophy which 
articulates the most problematic relationship between the individual self and the 
transcendent reality. Our exploration of Vattimo and Taylor’s hermeneutics very much 
follows in this journey and transforms how it can be understood. Accordingly, with 
the help of their hermeneutics, this thesis offers a deconstructive analysis of religion 
and secularism. Their hermeneutics of secularism share an interest in and concern for 
the continued relevance of religion and transcendence. Therefore, I explored and 
compared a detailed analysis of both thinkers with regard to the philosophical and 
ethical emergence of modern secularism and how it leads to a hermeneutical re-
engagement with the sacred. Their hermeneutics of Verwindung/secularisation/kenosis 
recover the possibility of religious experience, and at the same time, seek to reconstruct 
metaphysical and epistemological claims to certainty and truth. Though belonging to 
different schools of thought and using diverse approaches in developing their 
philosophy, they take seriously the significance of Christianity in shaping post-
modernity. By going beyond convention, they offer an explanation of the meaning of 
secularity within the parameters of deconstruction, hermeneutics, and postmodernity. 
I employed their dialectical conception of secularity that re-evaluates the essential 
aspects of religion. This entails 1) a process of reflexive re-evaluation, 2) a re-
evaluation of transcendentalism, and 3) a retrieval of the notion of transcendence. In 
addition, their dialectical discourse on religion exploits 4) the inexhaustible nature of 
religion, and its capacity to always be more than itself. My position derives not only 
from Vattimo and Taylor’s re-evaluation of secularism and religion but is also based 
on three basic claims. (1) Vattimo and Taylor’s concept of secularism opens up the 
possibility of a new non-metaphysical re-orientation towards transcendence and 
associated ethics. (2) Modern secularism emerges as incompatible with an orientation 
towards transcendence and religious diversity. (3) Re-engaged religion and secularism 
do not spell the death of conventional religion and ethics, but re-locates, re-invents, 
and re-forms them.  
Research Summary and Response: Based on the principal claims above, this 
research analytically and deconstructively explained ‘the hermeneutics of secularism 
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and religion’ of Vattimo and Taylor in Four Parts comprising of Eight Chapters. In 
Part One (Chapters One and Two), I made a systematic and logical clarification of the 
field of the research and outlined the historical relevance of the concepts of religion 
and secularism in the context of Vattimo and Taylor’s hermeneutics of secularism. 
Vattimo’s philosophy of ‘weak thought’, and ‘secularisation’ were explained in Part 
Two (Chapters Three and Four). As we saw, Vattimo’s discussion raised the 
philosophical question that with regard to our first basic claim in philosophical and 
ontological appropriation, true Being never is but sets itself on the path and sends itself, 
it transmits itself. Therefore, the hermeneutic of Vattimo suggests that ‘Being’ is an 
‘event’ that occurs, repeats, and appropriates to itself the dynamic of language and 
culture.  
In Part Three (Chapters Five and Six), we presented Taylor’s reflection on the 
‘formation of modern secular self’ and ‘secularityiii. As examined with regard to our 
second basic claim, Taylor explains secularisation of religion as a self-critical process, 
not as something static but as something that evolves through stages of reflective self-
re-appraisal. Concerning our third claim, his philosophical vocabulary used in this 
thesis helped to identify the tendency of religion to actualise transcendence in 
immanence. In conjunction with our fourth claim, through his hermeneutic of 
secularism, Taylor helps shape a vision of a world-historical progression from a deeply 
religious past to a secular but re-engaged religious future.  
In Part Four (Chapters Seven and Eight), I provided both a comparative and dialogical 
exchange between Vattimo and Taylor, how they improve and advance on each other’s 
positions, and finally a review of the leading arguments of the research. Finally, with 
regard to a fifth claim, this thesis argued that a postmodern philosophical perspective 
suggests that individuals practice their own post-modern version of ‘free-lance’ 
secular religion. This religion, having undergone the process of 
Verwindung/secularisation is not bound by dogmas and precepts but based on kenosis 
and caritas. The deconstruction of religion and secularism does not lead to destruction 
per se rather to reconstruction and the rebuilding of religious belief (hermeneutically), 
and secular culture. Thus, this thesis attempts to set in motion a new interpretation of 
religion by taking recourse to Vattimo and Taylor. In addition to the above semantics, 
I utilized both the axiom of ‘the principle of hermeneutic excess’ and ‘the language 
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turn’ to further investigate and to show that the basic claims of the thesis derive from 
the arguments of Vattimo and Taylor. 
The Language Turn and Hermeneutic Excess: This thesis unveiled the 
inexhaustible continuity, the hermeneutical possibility, and rich implications of the 
language turn for the interpretation of religion. The inexhaustible interpretive 
possibilities of religion and ‘God-talk’ after Nietzsche become a philosophical 
paradigm on the basis of a language turn in Western philosophy. In Twilight of the 
Idols, Nietzsche remarks, “I am afraid that we have not got rid of God because we still 
have faith on grammar…”557 Nicholas Davey comments, “Nietzsche’s pronouncement 
of the death of God is the logical outcome of his repudiation of the apophantic aspects 
of philosophical language. However, Nietzsche’s language of negation also reveals the 
disclosive (aletheic) capacity of expressive practices to operate independent of 
intentionality serving as an autonomous source of insight and revelation.”558  
Vattimo and Taylor exploit Heidegger’s revelation of the revelatory power of world 
disclosure in aletheic language. No longer does a Hebrew God ‘speak’ through the 
Word, rather language becomes the divine-like gift of world revelation. For them, 
religion and the divine are ‘experienced’ in the eventual openings of our speech-
created world. Their linguistic ontology, especially Vattimo’s invocation of negative 
hermeneutics, helps to offer a hermeneutical reconstruction of re-engaging God and 
religion after the death of God and secularism. Vattimo writes’ “I am thinking of a 
movement of taking leave, of distance, of the dissolution and weakening of reality… 
and which in my opinion philosophy can try to interpret only by taking it to 
                                                          
557 Fredrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, “Reason in 
Philosophy”, Section 5. 
558 Nicholas Davey, Seminar, 2017. Davey explains the nuance of ‘language turn’ further; “This insight 
is made possible by the language turn in European philosophy which Nietzsche did much to facilitate. 
Nietzsche fails to see that his propositional denial of God does not settle the question of God…. The 
apophantic dimensions of his negation only succeeds ironically in re-positioning the question within 
the speculative dimensions of language itself. As a linguistic act, Nietzsche’s apophantic denial of God 
unavoidably subverts its own negation by stimulating and affirming the world disclosive powers of 
language. The transcendent dimensions of our existence become apparent through the eventual 
openings of our speech-created world (Sprachlichkeit). Aletheic language is world-disclosive language. 
This both adds to our invocation of negative hermeneutics and suggests how Vattimo’s post-modern 




emancipatory outcomes.”559  Language ontology becomes the pre-requisite through 
which the divine is revealed, re-engaged and experienced. It involves a language 
movement, a weakening, a moving away from the absolute. In this sense, the 
Nietzschean ‘death of God’ argument undergoes a seminal epoch-making change 
within the philosophies of Vattimo and Taylor. They both ‘re-locate’ the question of 
God with their speculative thinking and the hermeneutics of language ontology. They 
re-think religion without metaphysicalism and dogma. Both Taylor and Vattimo 
provide rich material for engaging in wider cultural and philosophical deliberations on 
‘post-secularism’ and the ‘return of religion’ with the help of ‘language ontology’. It 
means that the claims of religion need not be dealt with from a propositional 
perspective but also from a linguistic and experiential orientation. Thus, I argue for the 
post- modern and post-secular philosophical relevance of the hermeneutical 
reconstruction of religion and secularism.  
Research Consequences: The philosophical relevance of the hermeneutical 
reconstruction of religion and secularism is as follows: (1) it poses a non-religious 
religion, 2) a religion of being-for-the-other, 3) the precedence of charity over truth, 
and 4) the hermeneutical process of sacred to secular considered as a transition and as 
exodus. Both the religion of ‘non- religious’ and the ‘being-for-the-other’ gives 
‘precedence to charity’. The re-engaged religion in post-secularity renegotiates the 
secular and the sacred. They are mutually non-exclusive. ‘Exodus’ and ‘transition’ 
become the pre-condition of re-engaging God and religion so far these are continuous 
movements, an on-going process, a re-evaluation in which the divine appears and 
becomes. As we have seen, in this thesis, the conventional understanding of truth is 
re-examined and challenged by Vattimo and Taylor. Truth becomes de-
metaphysicalised, weakened, and presented as an openness to the other. Truth is no 
longer institutionalised but charitable. It is a continuous transformative unfolding that 
is always in the process of re-evaluating itself. It does not postulate truth about ‘Being’; 
whereas it renders caritas truthful being. Accordingly, the concept of truth in this 
thesis can be defended against further de-construction. Truth conceived as charity 
resolves, re-engages and re-evaluates truth rather than de-constructs it.  
                                                          
559 Gianni Vattimo, Of Reality: The Purpose of Philosophy, trans., Robert T. Valgenti, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2016, p. 14. 
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Such research outcome is also indicative of a postmodern philosophical and onto-
theological re-engaging with religion in which individuals practise their own post-
modern version of religion with full reflective consciousness. Vattimo argues that post-
secularity is the outcome of the secularisation of Christianity.  For him, the 
hermeneutic of Verwindung leads to a post-onto-theological religious experience of 
caritas. Taylor’s secularism ‘breaks the spell of the immanent frame’ and leads to 
‘conversion and fullness’. Both resist the absoluteness of metaphysical and 
epistemological truth claims. Accordingly, for Vattimo and Taylor, the death of the 
metaphysical-moral God expedites the ‘post-secular’ possibility of a pluralistic vision 
of the world. The constituent essence of religion as re-engaged via ‘the weak ontology’ 
of Vattimo and ‘the fullness and conversion’ argument of Taylor is experienced as 
caritas and agape. Hermeneutically speaking, it means that the process of 
secularisation does not diminish the relevance of religion but relocates religion 
ontologically. It is a re-appropriation of religion from its denial, a recognition, a 
retrieval and re-activation. The hermeneutics of re-engagement, caritas, and the re-
discovered sacred is existentially pluralistic, non-exclusive and praxis oriented in post-
modernity.   
Pluralism and Non-exclusivism: The irreversible return of religion as outlined by 
Vattimo and Taylor, answers the existential praxis-oriented questions raised in this 
research. Post-secular religious consciousness rethinks the constraints of time, place, 
hierarchies, absolutisms, and truth claims. It entails an ana-theistic worship. The 
believer returns to worshipping God after having participated in and having moved 
through the death of God. The worshipper worships ‘spirit’ and ‘truth’ as liberating 
and as transcending sacred-secular dichotomies. Hence, post-secular re-engagement 
with God is centred on the mutual non-exclusivity of formal religion and secularism. 
The non-exclusive nature of re-engaged religion involves the complimentary relation 
between the secular and religious, religion and State, and the sacred and the profane. 
This complementarity entails a hermeneutic of plurality where ‘the other’ is recognised 
and their role in any ensuing dialogue appreciated. On the one hand ‘weak thought’ 
weakens whilst on the other hand a ‘plural-generous’ hermeneutic strengthens 
rationality as a reasonableness that is open to the other rather than pursuing the closed 
aims of institutionalised and instrumentalised reason. Post-metaphysical religion 
embraces a robust and reasonable openness to the plural. ‘Giving space to the other’ 
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is committing oneself to dialogically constituted truth. One achieves one’s wholeness 
in dialogue with the other. For Richard Kearney, it is the hermeneutic of hospitality 
where loving and welcoming strangers becomes a sacrament of living in the world.560 
Here the truth of the secular and religious complement each other. Plurality develops 
solidarity in the quest for truth. As was seen above, the re-imagined human person (the 
other) becomes an occasion of truth’s emergence. It is not a truth sought in a particular 
transcendentalism within a religion, but a truth of tolerance and complementarity. The 
non-exclusivity and complementarity of religious and social life (a tolerant secular and 
religious society) has a positive value. Hermeneutical philosophy in reference to this 
dialogical social tendency, limits or de-universalises the claim to truth (either secular 
or religious).  This hermeneutical view offers the basis of a pluralistic account of social 
and religious life. 
An appeal to a cultural pluralism (Rowan Williams) which opposes secular efforts to 
exclude religion from ‘the public square’ frames religious experience in a praxis-
oriented ontology. Nicholas Davey calls this non-exclusive society of 
complementarities, ‘a community of the plural’.561 In the community of the plural, the 
inevitable outcome of engagement is not brutal confrontation, but social, religious, and 
political involvement in dialogue.  Such a pattern of social, political and ethical life, 
with much decentralised and co-operative activity, is in fact the living reality which is 
the church as conceived by Vattimo. Church or religious groups need no longer be 
considered as ‘unreliable allies’ for any political system. In this ethical vision, public 
civility and respect for diverse religious beliefs are guaranteed. The Church is no 
longer the spiritual guarantor of a political system but an individual constituent within 
the broad political franchise. However, according to Rowan Williams, a pluralistic 
society (a society where co-existence of religious groups, secular groups, and the 
democratic state are envisioned), cannot exist without difficulty and challenge. 
“Argument is essential to a functioning democratic state, and religion should be 
involved in this, not constantly demanding the right not to be offended.”562 This ethic 
requires a strong common culture of ordinary courtesy and respect. 
                                                          
560 Richard Kearney and Gianni Vattimo, “Anatheism, Nihilism, and Weak Thought”, pp. 129-148. 
561 Nicholas Davey, “Towards a Community of the Plural: Philosophical Pluralism, Hermeneutics and 
Practice,” pp. 88-102. 
562 Rowan Williams, Faith in the Public Square, p. 4. 
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Possible Criticisms: The invaluable contributions of Vattimo and Taylor towards 
achieving a post-secular re-engagement of religion are not without their difficulties. 
Their ‘non-foundationalist ontology’ is prone to criticism. Taylor admits that his 
‘master narrative’ depends on ‘Reform’, Providential Deism’ and the ‘Modern Moral 
Order’ as ‘a background for his intellectual story-telling’ about secularisation. 
However, he fails to recognise that the cultural, and religious identity of “medieval 
Europe was shaped by its protracted encounter with Islam.”563 As explained, this 
criticism shows that Taylor’s ‘narrative of secularism’ is limited in scope and fails to 
take note of other sources of secularity in history. As David Storey notes, “Taylor’s 
hermeneutical approach makes war on the very idea of an objective history, yet still 
relies heavily on what, in the end, we do want to call concrete historical facts.”564 
Taylor’s notions of the nova effect, and of ‘the age of authenticity’ is hardly applicable 
to contemporary European society or elsewhere in Islamic or Hindu countries.565 
Taylor can be criticised for narrowing down the scope of his ‘post-secularity’ 
exclusively to Europe and the United States. As Casanova comments, Taylor’s account 
of secularity fails to consider the crucial significance of the colonial encounter in 
European development. Taylor fails to take on board his master narrative and his 
genealogical account of colonial and inter-civilisational encounters. It is very 
regrettable that Taylor limits his account of secularism to his own religious 
background. His narrative would have given more universal credibility if he had 
included other non- Christian traditions to strengthen his argument. It might have been 
his personal faith that restrained him to be broad-minded in his secular narrative. This 
is particularly evident in his not acknowledging other civilizations in political, 
existential and epistemological terms. Hence, Taylor fails to present a post-secular age 
that transcends all territorial civilisational boundaries.566 Taylor’s concept of 
secularism is provisional and open. He admits that his ‘secularity’ needs to be 
                                                          
563 David Storey, “Charles Taylor’s Secular Age: Breaking the Spell of the Immanent Frame”, pp. 179-
218.   
564 David Storey, p. 203. 
565 Jose Casanova, “A Secular Age: Dawn or Twilight”, pp. 265-281. 
566 By “All territorial civilisational boundaries” I mean the civilizations outside the West to which 
Taylor’s notion of secularism is limited. 
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complimented by other accounts and approaches, and in the process, both amended 
and altered.567  
Vattimo, on the other hand, has also attracted criticism from Frederiek Depoortere, 
Thomas G. Guarino, and Matthew E. Harris. First of all, Depoortere expresses his 
concern regarding Vattimo’s appeal to Heidegger and Nietzsche in defending nihilism. 
Depoortere notes that Heidegger and Nietzsche in fact “have moved beyond nihilism” 
and “it is doubtful whether it is correct to engage Nietzsche in order to defend a 
nihilistic pluralism as Vattimo does.”568 Vattimo’s violent metaphysics needs to be 
criticised. We must view with suspicion the claim that transcendence is violent by 
definition. Is it possible that there can be metaphysics without violence, and a 
sacredness without violence? Hence, it should be noted that Vattimo’s version of 
Christianity is a very limited one. First of all, religion (Christianity) is not all about 
strong truth claims and violence. Religion also portrays features like love, empathy, 
other-centeredness, morality, the sacramental, preaching, and liturgy. None of these 
elements have been taken into deep philosophical consideration by him. Secondly, he 
makes limited use of the scripture passages (John 15:15 and Philippians 2:7). He reads 
them in isolation; gives a literal hermeneutical explanation and takes into account only 
half of the Christological hymn found in Philippians 2. Thomas Guarino criticises 
Vattimo’s Verwindung of Christianity as having “gnostic proclivities”. He observes’ 
“for virtually every key term in the Christian mystery is profoundly reinterpreted, 
treated as an old wineskin to be filled with, and indeed ruptured by, a new and alien 
vintage.”569 It is an obvious weakness of ‘weak ontology’ that it limits the precepts of 
faith to the withering confines of an ailing reason. His commitment to horizontal 
transcendence rules out the possibility of a vertically transcendent God.570 
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The limitations of Vattimo and Taylor’s hermeneutics of religion and secularism 
restrict my thesis to the criticisms of nihilism, relativism, and pluralism. The basic 
approach used in this thesis is deconstruction and hermeneutics. In my opinion, my 
research findings cannot be verified quantitatively or empirically.571 Non-religious 
religion, religion of being-for-the-other, and charity taking precedence over truth are 
existential occurrences in a post-secular age, not objects subject to factual verification. 
What I have proposed is a framework of thinking about God, the transcendent and the 
secular which is a clear and consistent logical outcome of a deconstructive approach. 
Moving Beyond: Regardless of these criticisms, with the help of Vattimo and Taylor’s 
hermeneutics of the deconstruction of religion and secularism, I propose a ‘never-
having-gone-away-character of religion’ which is at the basis of post-secular age 
religious experience.  
As discussed, their hermeneutics of Verwindung/secularisation/kenosis recover the 
possibility of religious experience. However, the revival of religion has been exhibited 
more in fundamentalist movements, and ethno-religious conflicts. The return of 
religion in contemporary philosophy described as post-secular or post-modern return 
is characterised first of all at its core by a deep tolerance for difference and otherness. 
However, there are examples where certain migration-driven communities and certain 
religions drift away from the characteristic features of post-secular re-engagement of 
religion. These lead to metaphysically violent fanaticism and nationalism.  
I argue that to arrive at a belief in God in a post-secular era is infinitely more likely to 
be an outcome of whatever prompts one to let go of unhelpful doctrinal fictions. These 
fictions may include both mythic and transcendent control, namely, the notions that 
one ‘owns’ one’s body (genetic engineering), one’s world and earth (economy and 
ecology), one’s future (ethics and religion) and such like. Letting-go opens up the 
possibility of such fictions taking responsibility for meaningful action that announces 
the presence of a fundamental giving on which the world subsists. This includes both 
non-exclusivity and complementarity as against exclusivism and opposition between 
religions, the secular state, and the environment. It also entails taking responsibility 
for the other, for an ethical code, a global economic policy providing equal distribution 
                                                          
571 It is true that the research outcome cannot be quantitatively verified, but in a sense, it can be 
empirically verified in relation to the material the research uncovered.   
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of the natural resources, environmental laws to protect mother earth, and democratic 
governance where state and religion do not require to bargain for either’s rights. 
Religion re-engaged in post-secularity is a reaction to dogmatist claims to truth no 
matter the quarter from which they emerge. Whether found in newspapers, the message 
of a political party, an academic journal or a pulpit, such claims can promote arrogance 
and smugness. Significantly, the death of God theology presents itself as a critical and 
prophetic voice in the midst of a culture and faith in crisis.  The hermeneutic of 
‘overcoming metaphysics’ helps to move away from old religious certainties and 
assures a move towards a transformed religious sensibility. Vattimo and Taylor’s 
thoughts legitimately seek to respond to the rise in extremism, fundamentalism, and 
global animosity572 Vattimo and Taylor stand as the representative voices of distinct, 
though profoundly interrelated modes of thinking through, and thinking about, the 
relation of religion to society and the continued possibility of theological thinking. 
Through their distinctive narratives of secularisation, Vattimo and Taylor offer 
prescient tools for the analysis of “an emergent religious and cultural sensibility that 
(is) now forced to pick up the broken pieces and to imagine, if not craft an alternative 
future” (ADG, 8).  
Conclusion: My thesis defends the following: 
1.Thinking through the logic of secularity creates the conditions through which 
contemporary secularity is conceptualized and is transformed into new nuances 
through the secular narratives of Vattimo and Taylor. 
2.Modern secularism gives rise to charity/caritas and is not incommensurable with 
transcendence but articulates it as a way of being open to the other. 
Therefore, the significance of my argument is that it dismisses the conventional 
perception and myth that secular modernity represents the historical legacy of the 
termination of both God-talk, and religion after the death of God. The hermeneutical 
deconstruction of religion and secularism with its paradigms of inexhaustible 
interpretation, the implication of its language turn, and the ‘inventiveness’ of truth 
paradoxically promote the resurgence of religion through its own weakening and 
secularisation. The post-secular in this ‘return’ is “re-routing the transcendence away 
                                                          
572 Thomas Guarino, Vattimo and Theology, p. 65.  
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from alterity towards the practices of daily and human life.”573 Hence, ‘a hermeneutic 
of inexhaustible interpretation’ and ‘the ontologisation of the word’ enable the 
principle of the non-exclusivity of religion and secularism to further advance its 
possible orientations in post-secularity and post-modernity. These hermeneutical 
orientations include, (1) a post-secular religious practice including inter-religious 
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The following Glossary provides an explanatory list of several technical terms and 
phrases with unique philosophical meanings, which are frequently used by Gianni 
Vattimo and Charles Taylor.  
 
Gianni Vattimo: 
1. Caritas: Vattimo interprets this concept through his theory of ‘weak thought’. 
Caritas is the force driving secularisation, and the limit of secularisation. It is the 
application of the message of the kenosis of God through the interpretative act. Kenosis 
is the message of the weakening of God, and caritas is the message of weakening as a 
categorical imperative. 
2. Kenosis:  Kenosis is the central message of the New Testament, and in Vattimo’s 
understanding kenosis is God’s love shown through the message of weakening. 
Through the hermeneutic of kenosis, the Christian God sheds more and more of his 
traditional metaphysical properties, bringing forth the final truth of Christianity (B, 46-
48, Philippians 2:5-7).   
3. Koiné: Koiné is a dialect or language of a region that has become the common 
or standard language of a larger area or region. 
4. Verwindung: The Verwindung of the metaphysical tradition is a recovery from, 
recuperation, convalescence and a resignation to metaphysics and its strong notion of 
‘Being.’ 
5. Űberwindung: ‘overcoming,’ which implies a transition from one phase or moment 
to another ‘higher’ one in a given process, and it is radical overcoming of metaphysics.  
6. Weak Thought: ‘weak thought’ is understood not as “the idea of thinking that is 
more aware of its own limits, that abandons its claims to global and metaphysical 
visions, but above all a theory of weakening as the constitutive character of Being in 







7. Age of Authenticity (AA): Post 1960’s age in which spirituality is de-
institutionalised and is understood primarily as an expression of “what speaks to me.” 
Reflective of Expressive Individualism. 
8. Age of Mobilisation (AM): The Political Order is no longer divinely instituted; 
rather, it is our task to construct political order in conformity to God’s law/design. 
Roughly 1800-1960. 
9. Ancien regime (AR): One of Taylor’s ‘types’ of religious identity, the ancient and 
medieval ordering which tied religious identity to political identity. E.g., the king is 
divinely appointed.   
10. Buffered Self: In the modern social imaginary, the self is in a way insulated in an 
interior ‘mind,’ no longer vulnerable to the transcendent or the demonic. Contrast with 
the porous self.    
11. Closed World Structures (CWSs): Aspects of our contemporary experience that 
‘tip’ the immanent frame toward a closed construal. See also spin, and take.  
12. Cross-pressure: The simultaneous pressure of various spiritual options; or the 
feeling of being caught between an echo of transcendence and the drive toward 
immanentisation. Produces the nova effect.  
13. Excarnation: The process by which religion (and Christianity in particular) is de-
ritualised, turned into a ‘belief system.’ Contra incarnational, sacramental spirituality. 
14. Exclusive Humanism:  A World view or social imaginary that is able to account 
for meaning and significance without any appeal to the divine or transcendence.  
15. Expressive Individualism: Emerging from the Romantic expressivism of the late 
eighteenth century, it is an understanding ‘that each one of us has his/her own way of 
realising our humanity,’ and that we are called to live that out (‘express it’) rather than 
conform to models imposed by others (especially institutions). See also age of 
authenticity). 
16. Fragilisation: In the face of different options, whereby people who lead ‘normal’ 
lives do not share my faith (and perhaps believe something very different), my own 
faith commitment becomes fragile- put into question, dubitable 
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17. Fullness: A term meant to capture the human impulse to find significance, 
meaning, value – even if entirely within the immanent frame. 
18. Immanent Frame: A structured social space that frames our lives entirely within 
a natural (rather than supernatural) order. It is the circumscribed space of the modern 
social imaginary that precludes transcendence. See also immanentaisation.  
19. Immanentaisation: The process whereby meaning, significance, and ‘fullness’ are 
sought within an enclosed, self-sufficient, naturalistic universe without any reference 
to transcendence. A kind of ‘enclosure.’  
20. Modern Moral Order (MMO): A new understanding of morality that focuses on 
the organisation of society for mutual benefit rather than an obligation to ‘higher’ or 
eternal norms. Thus, the ‘moral’ is bound up with (and perhaps reduced to) the 
‘economic.’ 
21. Nova Effect: The explosion of different options for belief and meaning in a 
seculariii age, produced by the concurrent ‘cross-pressures’ of our history – as well as 
the concurrent pressure of immanentisation and (at least echoes of) transcendence.  
22. Porous Self: In the ancient/medieval social imaginary, the self is open and 
vulnerable to the enchanted ‘outside’ world – susceptible to grace, possession. 
Contrasts with buffered self.  
23. Reform: Taylor’s umbrella term for a variety of late medieval and early modern 
movements that were trying to deal with the tension between the requirements of 
eternal life and the demands of domestic life. A response to ‘two-tiered’ religion. 
24. Seculari: A more ‘classical’ definition of the secular, as distinguished from the 
sacred – the earthly plane of domestic life. 
25. Secularii: More ‘modern’ definition of the secular as a-religious – neutral, 
unbiased, ‘objective’ – as in a ‘secular’ public square. 
26. Seculariii: Taylor’s notion of the secular as an age of contested belief, where 
religious belief is no longer axiomatic. It is possible to imagine not believing in God. 
See also exclusive humanism.  
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27. Secularism: A doctrine associated with secularii that pushes for public institutions 
(schools, government, etc.) to be a-religious. Roughly equivalent to the French 
doctrine of laȉcité and often expressed in terms of the ‘separation of church and State.’ 
28. Secularisation: Secularisation is the process by which sectors of society and 
culture are removed from the domain of religious institutions and symbols. 
29. Secularity: Secularity is the state of being separate from religion, or of not being 
exclusively allied with or against any particular religion. 
30. Social Imaginary: Differs from an intellectual system or framework, “broader and 
deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social 
reality in a disengaged mode.” A social imaginary is “the way ordinary people 
‘imagine’ their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in the theoretical 
terms, it is carried in images, stories, legends, etc.” (SA, 171-72). 
31. Spin: A construal of life within the immanent frame that does not recognise itself 
as a construal and thus has no room to grant plausibility to the alternative. Can be 
either ‘closed’ (immanentist) or ‘open’ (transcendence). See also take.  
32. Subtraction Stories: Accounts that explain ‘the secular’ as merely the subtraction 
of religious belief, as if the secular is what is left over after we subtract superstition. 
In contrast, Taylor emphasises that the secular is produced, not just distilled.  
33. Take: A construal of life within the immanent frame that is open to appreciating 
the viability of other takes. Can be either ‘closed’ (immanentist) or ‘open’ 
(transcendence). See also ‘spin’.    
* The glossary from Charles Taylor’s works are taken from James K. A. Smith, How 
(Not) to be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor, pp. 140-143. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
